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ABSTRACT 
EXTENSIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE IN WEIGHTED 
VOTING SYSTEMS 
The present work reviews the concept of values in 
the theory of games with particular reference to 
political games. 
A model based on the Shapley value concept is 
developed and applied to simulated and practical voting 
situations. In particular it is shown how numerical 
expressions can be.obtained for the values of each 
group or party given their sizes and with a knowledge 
of their previous voting patterns. 
Data based on the Nigerian political set up as 
well as other political systems, including the U.N., 
E.E.C. etc. was used for calculating the values of the 
different participants. 
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NOTATION 
The following notation is used all through the Thesis. 
1. B, C, D, L, L*, M. 0, S, S*, T •... = subsets of tr.e set of p1ayers 
2. B;(V) = Banzhaf va1ue 
3. 
4. 
d. = rea1 vectors 
1 
E = Expectation operator 
5. { i} = set vcota ti on for i as only member 
6. i, j, k, m, n, Px •... =number of players or individual players 
or as specifically defined 
7. N = set of players or finite carrier or as defined 
8. [P] = partition 
9. 
10. 
(P.) =Negotiation group 
1 
Pr. =Probability 
11. Sm =Set of minimal winning coalitions 
12. U = Set of players or the universe of players or as specifically 
defined 
13. Q(S) = Standard of Fairness value 
14. V or V* or V** = Characteristic function 
15. V(S) = value of S in characteristic function form 
16. W(S) = Number of votes or weight of S 
17. w.r.t. =With respect to 
18. ~{N) = Simple games or as specifically defined 
19. ni{V)= Number of swings 
20. n(V) = total number of swings 
21. <Pi, <Pi [V], ¢; (V) = Shapley value 
22. Zi =Shapley value- multilinear extensions 
23. ~ = Summation operator 
24. n = multiplication operator 
vii 
25. J = ~ ntegra 1 operator 
y = (S-l))(n-1)j 26. n( S) ~-111 4!-~ -ll-~ =Probability measure 
27. 11 = w.ea11 
28. a2 = varia.rJce 
29 w~ f.l~l\.. = ang~e measures or operators as the case may be 
30. 3= There exists~ ~= There does not ex'ist 
31 0 £ = member of~ ~ = mot member of 
32 0 \/ = for every 
33. > = greater than 
34. ~ = greater than or equal to 
35. >> = much greater tharn 
36. < = less than 
37o ~ = less than or equal to 
38. << = much lesser than 
39. :::: = in equilibrium 
40o iff = if and ornly if 
41. U = Unton 
42. n = Intersection 
43. C:: = Subset 
44. c:= = proper subset 
4 >· t> = kJta 
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CHAPTER 0 
INTRODUCTION 
Voting occupies a central position in democratic theory and practice. 
It helps to provide a tool for helping democratic societies consisting of 
d~fferent individuals with desperate preferences to decide on one course 
of action. 
Voting is not a simple process as would be expected. Early 
works by Jean-Charles de Borda and Marquis de Condorcet in the late 
18th century succeeded in revealing that certain voting methods could 
in fact hide surprising logical subtleties. This is further exposed 
when an attempt is made to evaluate the voting systems with respect to 
the equitability of the principles of proportional representation or 
when individuals are faced with the problem of deciding on one course 
of action when they have more than two alternatives. The problem is 
made clearer still when one evaluates the voting powers possessed by 
different individuals or groups of individuals in a voting system. 
The problem of equitability in proportional representation and 
the validity of different voting schemes have been studied in some 
detail by many game theorists including, Fishburn, P.C. as contained 
in his paper on "Paradoxes of Voting" Fishburn, P.C. (1974) and 
also his paper on monotonicity Paradoxes in the theory of Elections, 
Fishburn, P.C. (1982). Also Gibbard, G. (1973) has a good coverage on 
the manipulation of election schemes as well as Niemi G.R. and Riker, 
W.H. on "The Choice of Voting Systems" Niemi, G.R. and Riker, W.H. 
(1976) to name a few. They all seem to conclude that "any voting 
-system can lead to paradoxical results where losers are preferred 
to winners and winners become losers. In certain situations, however, 
some voting ~;ystc111s arc better than others", Nie111i and Rikr~r 
(1976, p.2l). 
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The aim of this thes~s as indicated by its title is to look at 
the problem of measuring ~ower in a weighted voting body which is 
involved in making yes or no decisions when faced with two altern-
atives. In order to do this, the a·lready well known Shapley value 
is extended to cover areas where weighted voting, coupled with social, 
political and economic bias of the players (participants), play major 
roles in determining the outcome of the game and thus its value. A 
model which gives result like the Shapley value is developed and 
applied. 
The Shapley value according to Aumann,R.J. (1978) 11 iS an 
a priori measure of a games utility to its players; it measures what 
each player can expect to obtain, 11 0n the average 11 , by playing the 
game. Other concepts of cooperative game theory, such as the Core, 
Bargaining set and N-M solution predict outcomes (or sets of outcomes) 
that are in themselves stable, that cannot be successfully challenged 
or upset in some appropriate sense. Almost invariably, they fail to 
define a unique result; and in a significant proportion of the cases, 
they do not define any result at all. The Shapley value, although it 
is not in any formal sense defined as an average of such 11 Stable 11 
outcomes, nevertheless can be considered a mean which takes into 
account the various power relationships and possible outcomes.~~ It 
is clear therefore that the Shapley value is a better tool for pred-
icting outcomes than most of the other concepts we are familiar with 
in game theory. 
The Banzhaf index as will be shown later is one of the most 
prominent value concepts in connection with political games. It has 
close relationship with most -value concepts, namely Coleman index, 
Rae index, Dahlingham index etc. Aumann in the same article as quoted above 
saw the Banzhaf index or Banzhaf value as a variant of the Shapley 
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va~ue and he went on to say that a "variant of the Shapley value 
called the Banzhaf value has achieved some prominence in connection 
with political models"9 and he concluded by saying that "In general 9 
it is not efficientu. 
It seems therefore that the Shapley value is more prominent 
because of its efficiency in connection with political games value 
models due perhaps to its mathematical derivation and properties. 
Also, it seems that no superior value measure has yet been developed 
with respect to political games. An extension of such a model would, 
I believe, constitute a major contribution to the clearer under-
standing of games' theory as applied to political models. 
In the theory of games a variety of optimality principles 
are studied and these principles are derived by stipulating the nec-
essary and/or sufficient conditions they have to satisfy. This is an 
axiomatic approach to the problem and in the study of the Shapley value 
and its extensions we are indeed considering an axiomatic description 
of a principle of optimality which is characterised as the principle 
of a fair subdivision of payoffs. 
This thesis is concerned therefore with the consideration of 
an axiomatic description of a principle of optimality. The first 
chapter will be devoted to a survey of the different models developed 
and applied to voting games with particuiar reference to political 
games. 
The second chapter will cover a detailed analysis of the Shapley 
value and the extensions done by Owen, G. In the third chapter the 
theoretical base of our work will be presented, while chapter four 
will contain the results of the applications of these models as well 
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as comparisons and deductions based on simulated data. 
The fifth chapter will contain results of the applications 
as in Chapter Four but based on data from practical voting situations 
and conclusions. The Appendix. which follows Chapter Five. will 
contain an alternative approach to the value concept, some mathem-
atical derivations, an extension of Owen•s technique to Oceanic 
games and a few major computer programs developed and used for 
the course. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
REVIEW OF VALUE CONCEPTS 
1.1 BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The mathematical analysis of voting is carried out through the 
Thecry of Games known as voting games. Voting games are classified 
as "Simp1e Games". A simple game can be defined as a cooperative/ 
competitive enterprise in which the major goal of the players 
(participants) is "t·Jinning" and the rule guiding this is a specification 
of the coalitions capable of achieving this desire to win. This 
abstract definition which will be rigorously expanded under the heading 
of simple games covers most of the familiar examples of constitutional 
political machinery, including direct majority rule, weighted voting, 
direct or indirect election of a President or Prime Minister, bicameral 
or multicameral legislatures, committees and subcommittees, veto sit-
uations etc. 
The modern mathematical approach to the theory of conflict 
resolution which voting belongs to can be traced back to the invention 
of the modern theory of games by Von Neumann and Morgenstern as con-
)/ 
tained in their 1944 classic, "Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, 
which was based on Von Neumann's earlier papers of 1928 and 1937. 
It was in the 1950s that most of the more useful analytic tools 
of voting games were achieved through the efforts of Kenneth Arrow, 
Martin Shubik, Duncan Black and Robin Farquharson. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, nevertheless explored the mathemat-
ical structure of simple games and to provide a solution they applied 
the concept of "Stable Set" which they had already developed for a 
general class of coalition games - simple games although they never 
used the words "Stable Set" for their concept. (VN-M 1944 ch.lO) 
This solution concept was very logical and they were able to construct 
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an economic vote-selling mode~ from it, where vote-selling implies 
trading of votes in a market game involving the exchange of money 
or goods other than "Power" as is the case in political games. 
Their "equilibrium price• imp1ied the share of spoils which each 
player (participant) was expected to receive if he belonged to the 
winning coalition. Unfortunately, as pointed out in the introduction 
with respect to Aumann•s comments, only a very small insignificant 
class of simple games yielded a solution via this approach. We can 
rightly regard this VN-M price vector as an early form of "Power 
Index" which in itself constituted a major step forward in the quest 
for a quantitative analysis of the power of voters in an abstract 
voting system. Shubik and Weber, R.S. (1978) Young, H.P. (1978) and 
Wilson, R. (1969) have done some work using the Vote Selling approach 
while Gurk and Isbell, S.R. (1959) Vickrey, W.S. (1959) and Wilson, R. 
(1971) have a good coverage of the so-called "main simple solutions". 
In 1954 Shapley and Shubik, M. (1954) published a paper 
entitled "A method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee 
System" where they succeeded in adapting a general-purpose solution 
concept developed in their 1953 paper, the so-called "Shapley 
value" to the case of simple games. Their new technique yielded some 
numerical indices capable of being directly interpreted in terms 
of the a priori ability of the players to affect an outcome. The major 
and important advantage these indices had over the VN-M equilibrium 
prices was that they were well defined for all classes of simple games. 
1.2 SIMPLE GAMES 
As defined earlier simple games are cooperative/competitive in 
nature and the major goal of the players where players stand for 
participants including politicians, board members etc. is to belong to 
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the 'winning• coalition. They constitute a distinguished class of 
multiperson or N-person games, namely those in which each coalition 
that might form is either all-powerful or completely ineffectual and 
power~ess. These c:asses of games are well suited for the study of 
orga:'l~sations, comm~ttees9 legis1atures or any system that has a 
common 11 Po1itical 11 structure where power and authority rather than 
monetary payoff is the fundamental goal and major driving force. 
Simple games are by their unique structure relat1vely 
independent of most of the restrictive and sometimes controversial 
assumptions that underlie the more general theory of games. Thus, for 
several reasons, including methodology and practice, the theory of 
simp~e games requires a self-contained, independent analysis. 
For a formal definition of simple games; Let N denote a 
set of players, and let S denote the set of subsets of N, 
Let N = { 1 , 2, 3, 4, . 0 0 n } be the p 1 ayers in N. Then S a 
subset of N is called a coalition of players n. s N. 
1 
In a game G, S is a winning coalition if S ~ C where C is the 
required number for winning. C is referred to as the 11 quota 11 • 
If S is a winning coalition then L = N-S is a losing coalition 
sm is called a minimal winning coalition if Sm = C 
Let Smu = Union of the set of all minimal winning coalitions then 
P is a dummy if P 4smu, a 1 so P is a di eta tor if S = { { P } } for some 
P s N. 
B = Ln L* = Blocking coalition where L* is the compliment of L. 
We note that Blocking coalitions neither win nor permit their 
compliments to win. 
For a straight majority simple game S is winning if 
S > ~N + l if N is even 
and S ~ ~ N + i if N is odd. 
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This class of straight majority simple games is what we are interested in. 
Shapley (~962) and Lucas~ w.F. (1972) have a rigorous coverage 
of other properties of simple games~ as well as other definitions and 
p1oofs. We sha 11 nmv define some common terms which we sha 11 refer 
to constantly throughout this work. They include the characteristic 
function of a game, an imputation, the core of a game etc. 
1.3 CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION 
A major factor in multiperson cooperative games, as would be 
expected, is the urge to form coalitions and thus the maximum amount 
or payoff obtainable by such a coalition is therefore the primary 
concern of the players. The starting point for most studies of co-
operative N-person games should therefore be the "characteristic 
function''. The characteristic function formulation was suggested by 
von flewman 111 1928 and later presented in their 1944 classic. 
An N-person game (N,v) in characteristics function form consists 
of a set N of players as defined in 1. 2 but with characteristic 
function V which assigns the real number V(S) to each nonempty subset 
S of p 1 ayers . (players in our model will represent politician0. In 
some other models they could represent board members, business exec-
utives, organisations etc. The value V(S) is therefore a measure 
of the worth or power of coalition S and is regarded as the 'expected 
value' of such a coalition, thus the members of coalitionS expect 
V(S) between them. The characteristic function can then be defined as 
a set D of n-dimensional real vectors d = (d , d ~ d ,---, dn) 
1 2 3 
which represents the realizable distribution of 'spoil', 'wealth' or 
patronage among theN players. Player j therefore expects· dj. 
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We note that the specification of the game might reasonably be 
required to satisfy the following 
( l ) 
(2) 
also (3) 
and ( 4) 
V(¢) = 0 
V(BUC) ~ V(B) + V(C) 
V(di) ?PO 
L: di = V ( N) 
Vi£ N 
which i~plies that the set of non 
players should realize nothin~. 
(2) implies the super-additivity 
property of the game which means that 
the value realised by two different 
sets while playing together should 
not be less than the values due 
them before the union. 
This condition of the game quar-
antees individual rationality or 
pareto optimality. No player should 
earn a negative value, but a zero 
value is allowable, in which case one 
does not get paid just for playing 
the game. 
This implies group rationality. 
The winning coalition shares the 
whole value of the game among 
themselves. 
The set D above defined as n-dimensional real vectors representing 
the realizable distribution of wealth is usually referr~d to in the 
language of game theory as an 11 imputation 11 • It consists of all 
dj which satisfy (4) above as well as (5) below 
( 5) dj ~ V ( { j } ) for every j E N 
-10-
We require a few more definitions before we discuss value 
concepts. LetS be a coalition (winning) then S is 'effective' for 
imputatio;1 d or dis $-effective if L: dj ~ V(S) which implies jES 
that the value of the coalition should not be less than the values 
of the individual players. Thus let x andy E D, the set of 
imputations;>then x "dominates" y if3a nonempty setS such that 
x is S-effective and each member of S would prefer Xi to Yi for 
every i E S. A subset L of D is a "stable set" if no x s L dom-
inates any y E L. This is necessary for the existence of internal 
and external stability of a set of imputations. The existence of 
stable sets led to the concept of the "core" of a game. 
The "CORE" is a subset of any 'stable set' as defined above. It is 
therefore a set of imputations such that no imputation belonging to 
it is dominated by some other imputation. This precisely implies 
that it is a set of all undominated imputations. 
It could be defined formally as 
C = {d s D: L:iES d; :;:..V(S) for all non empty SISN 
This further implies that no coalition S can protest against or have 
the ability to block an outcome x inC on the grounds that such a 
coalition can expect more. 
Donald B. Gilles (1959) and Shapley and Shubik (1969) 
have carried out an extensive and detailed analysis of the CORE 
concept. Most of its applications as a characteristic function 
value as will be seen later are in the area of market games. We 
shall now carry out a detailed survey of various value concepts, 
including those applied to political games.· 
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1.4 VALUE CONCEPTS 
The search for~ rigorous way(s) of determ1ning the payoff 
vector led to different definitions and approaches to the prob.!em 
of value determination. O~fferent models were therefore deve~oped 
and proposed9 including the Shap~ey Value or Shapley Shubik power 
index, the Banzhaf power index and its associate the Coleman index, 
etc., the standard of fairness concept, thelVstability, the 
a-power model (alpha power model), the graph approach, the :<ernel; 
Also the Bargaining Set model as well as the core. We shall give a 
brief summary of each of them but we shall extend the discussion 
of the Shapley value into Chapter two in order to expose most of its 
properties and derivation force. 
It must be pointed out that only a few of the value concepts 
mentioned above have yielded successful results in political games, 
namely, the Shapley Value, Banzhaf index and to a small extent, 
Coleman index. The others have been more successful in the areas of 
economics and market games where the payoff is usually tangible e.g. 
money instead of power and authorityP nevertheless~ a brief survey of 
most of them is necessary for a proper understanding of the problem. 
1.4. 1 The Shapley Value or Shapley Shubik index 
The Shapley Value or Shapley Shubik index as the names imply 
was put fon\lard by Shapley and Shubi k in their 1954 paper based on a 
model Shapley developed in his 1953 paper. References to these 
papers will be in chapter two. 
The Shapley value, according to Aumann (1978) is an 
a priori measure of a games utility to its players; it measures 
therefore the average expectation of a player while playing the 
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game. It is based on a system of coalition formations and is defined as 
¢; [V] = E [V (S(i,~)U { i})- V(S(i,t> )) ] where [:::::::» 
defines a given ordering of the players and S(i, C>) is the set 
of players py-2ceding player i under the ordering~::>. E is the 
expectation operator or expected value under the given randomization 
scheme. If all coalitions are equally likely, then each order on N, 
the number of players has probability 1 /jNj~o A proof of the 
0 
uniqueness of this value has been given by Dubey, P. (1975). 
As mentioned earlier the Shapley value will be rigorously 
def1ned in the next chapter but it is necessary to have this brief 
definition meantime since a few of the other values we intend to 
survey presently make some references to it. 
1.4.2 The Bargaining Set 
The 'Bargaining set' concept is based on the CORE as defined in 
1. 3. It is therefore connected vii th the ide a of a "stab 1 e set". The 
aim of the bargaining set is to try to def-ine what payoff vectors are 
stable once a coalition is formed. An individual outcome is "stable" 
if there is no objection to it and where there is any, there is sure to 
be a counter objection. A player i in setS can object to another 
player j inS if a payoff vector dis proposed, if it is possible 
for him to join a new coalition M without j and find a realizable 
vector d* where every one in M gets more. Player j can also counter 
object if he too can find a ~oalition S* containing himself and 
without i having a realizable vector d** in which all members of M 
get their original amount d and everyone in MnS* gets at least what 
he would have r<'J 1 i zc:cl ·j n the objection ct·~<. Set·.; whc~n~ the idJOVl: 
bargains and counter burga·ins can take place would be referred to as 
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bargaining sets. From the nat~re of bargaining sets,we note that they 
are best suited for market games where the payoff is not restricted 
to power and authority, nevertheless, it is possible for politicians and 
pcl~tical parties to constitute themselves into bargaining sets if no 
single party succeeded in winning an overall majorHy. Bargaining 
sets are really not suited for the situations 1'/e are interested in 
where yes and no answers are required for decision making. An extensive 
coverage of the bargaining sets is contained in Nash, J.F. (1950), 
Nash, J.F. (1953) and Harasanyi, J.C. and Selten, R. (1972) 
The bargaining set concept is precisely concerned with locating stable 
sets and predicting the coalitions that could be formed from it, bearing 
in mind the tendency of players to seek for optimal payoffs. We shall 
survey some other models that are concerned with the equitable way to 
share payoffs in order to ensure the s tabi 1 i ty of a coa 1 i ti on. 
1.4.3 Standard of Fairness 
The standard of fairness model incorporates the 11 psychology 11 of 
the players in an &j-person game by giving consideration to the players' 
bargaining abilities, moral codes, roles in other coalitions and their 
a priori expectations. All the above information is necessary for the 
adequate definition of the 11 Standard of fairness 11 of the players. It 
is of course difficult and even impossible to get all the required 
information. The standard of fairness is defined using Thralls 
partition function to determine the 11 power 11 of a Coalition and thus 
its value. This is done by regarding the game as being played among 
various coalitions who have pure strategies (A strategy can be defined 
as a complete description of how one would be expected to behave under 
every possible circumstance) of breaking themselves into negotiating 
groups. The power derived from this approach has been shown to be a 
~ i 4·-
new characteristic -:unction which reduces every game to a constant-sum 
game. Maschler~ M. (1963). 
The mathemat~ca1 definition of "Standard of fair:1ess" is hereby 
given: Let an i\1-=person game be def1 ned in characteristic function form 
as in 1.3 above. 
In addition to satisfying conditions 1 - 4 of 1.3 it is further 
required that 
( 1 ) V(N) > V(S) + V(N-S) V Coa 1 i ti on S c: N except N and 0 
We notE that this extra requirement is an impossible condition to 
satisfy hence for a "fair" split of the payoff accruing to CoalitionS 
the standard of fairness concept recommends that 
(2) V(N)- { V(l) + V(2) + --- + V(K) } 
For j = l, --- K E S 
be split equally among each player j. Player j receiving his original 
value V(j) in addition. 
Standard of fairness could then be defined as a vector function 
defined for each partition [ P] = (P , P ~ ----, Pk) of N into 
l 2 
negotiating groups (negotiating groups mean intermediate sub 
Coalitions) and satisfying the following:-
(2) 
and(3) 
i = 1,2 --- K (rationality within 
negotiating group) 
cp ( [P]) + ¢ ( [P]) + 
1 2 
(3) implies that all the negotiating groups will share the 
amount v(N). 
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The pair (~([P]); N) where N stands for set of players in game (V;N) 
and <P( [P]) stands for the standard of fairness satisfying (2) and 
(3) is known as a game space and a game space is therefore Thrall~ 
game ~n partition funct~on form. Lucas W.F. (1963) and 
Thra~l, R.M. and Lucas9 W.F. (1963) have more details. 
The •standard of fairness• can also be defined in terms of the 
Shapley value as follows. 
Let the players in partition [p] regard the partition as finaL Also 
let the negotiating groups in [P] namely P
1 
9 P
2
, --- Pk consider 
themselves as involved in a K-person game (V**, [ P]) havin~ the 
characteristic function 
V** (P. 9 P. ----, P.) = V(P. UP. U--- UP.) Jl J2 Jm Jl j 2 Jm 
since the Shapley value is regarded as an a priori measure of a 
player~ value and since it is necessary for a negotiating group to 
evaluate itself in any partition that it belongs to 1 then1 it would be 
in order to have the Shapley value of (V**; [P]) as the evaluation 
of the game. 
Thus the standard of fairness based on the Shapley value is 
cp.( [P]) = ~s 
J o\ 
(t -lH (K-tJ! a , a, 
K I 
0 
¢j ( [ p ] ) = 2: s ( t) For j = 1, 2, ---K Y K [ V ** ( S ) - V ** ( S - P . ) ] 
J 
K = number of negotiating groups in [P] 
Sa= All possible coalitions of the negotiation groups and 
ta = Number of negotiation groups inS. 
= 
Kl 
. 
~1aschler, r·1. (1963) contains a detailed treatment of the ••standard of 
fairness" concept. 
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It is important to note that like the bargaining set concept 
the application of the "Standard of fairness" model is not in the 
area of political games but would serve as a useful tool in such a 
system where physica1 exchange of spoils is possible, for example, 
market games. 
The concept is concerned primarily with the way the excess 
over the contribution made to a coalition is to be split. This model 
suggests that since everyone played a part in the realization of the 
excess, such an excess should be split equally, each player receiving 
this equal share in addition to his personal value which could be 
regarded as his own contribution. It is expected that a player would 
remain in a coalition where he has more excess accruing to him. We 
shall survey in the next section the r.x-power model which is similar in 
conception to the standard of fairness idea. 
l. 4. 4 The ct-power mode 1 
The u.-power model is very similar in conception to the standard 
of fairness approach except that it proposes a free parameter "ct" 
as a tool for defining the way two complementary groups will participate 
in distributing their excess. 
The model constructs a standard of fairness function U, defined 
for all foalitions S of N players as a function of the grand ~alition, 
the ~oalition value and the value of the complement of S, S* in 
conjunction with a free parameter a,(O < cL~ 1). We illustrate by con-
~idering a 3-person game in detail. 
Let A,B,C be the players in a characteristic function game (V;N) 
and let the proposed or actual outcome of the game (V;N) be represented 
by a payoff configuration (X [P J) =(xA,XB,XC; SP Sz, ---5
111
) 
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where X = (XA' x8 ~ XC) represents a 3-dimensional real vector known 
as the payoff vector which stands for a realizable disbursement of 
points among the players. [ P ] = coalition structure is a part-
ition cf the p~ayers intom mutually disjoint coalitions and for 
this case (1 .( m ~ 3). 
Then (1) ~(S) ~ V(S) The standard of fairness value must 
not be less than the value of the 
characteristic function for any 
coalition. 
(2) ~(A,B,C) = V(A,B,C) - for the grand coalition 
~ ~ 
and Q(S) + ~(S) = V(A,B,C) where Q(S) = the 
complement of ~(S). 
Thus the free parameter ( 0 < o. < 1) defines the 1 fair 1 way 
that the two complementary groups 
S and S* will partition their excess 
V(A,B,C) - V(S) - V(S*) in order to assess 
their power, where V(S) stands for the coalition value of S and 
V(S*) stands for the value of the complement of S, S*. 
The parameter a is further assumed to be independent of which coalition 
forms. 
The standard of fairness function can then be derived as follows:-
~(A,B) = V(A,B) +a [ V(A,B,C) V(A,B) v (c) ] Q(C) = Q(A,B,C)-Q(A,B) 
( 1 ) ~(A,C) = V(A,C) +a [ V(.l\,B,C) V(A,C) V (B) ] ~(8) = Q(A,B,C)-Q(A,C) 
U(B,C) = V(B,C) +a [ V(A,B,C) - V(B,C) V (A) ] U(A! = ~(A,B,C)-~(B,C) 
and Q(A,B,C) = V(A,B,C) 
The above standard of fairness function has been suggested as a 
more realistic representation of the value of the coalitions. 
-:8-
Stabi1ity ~n payoff disbursement has been defined by Rapoport 
and Kahan ( 198@) as a set of payoff configurations (PCs) in which 
the differences between a player's payoff x; and his power Qi in (1) 
above are equal for all members within each coalition Sj~ Sjs[P]. 
A set of an stable payoff configurations ~n the ,,-power model 
for the three person game has been derived by Rapoport and Kahan in 
their paper on "Coalition formation in the triad"~ Kahan~ J.P. and 
Rapoport, A.(l980) p. 16). We note that the choice of u is not 
easy to make and could affect the efficiency of the above mode 1. 
We also note that the model incorporates the standard of fairness 
technique and also the value of the complementary coalition set in 
an attempt to determine a stable payoff configuration(s). 
We shall look at a slightly different approach in connection 
with the use of graph theory for value analysis. 
1.4.5 Graphs in Cooperative Games 
There has been some attempts to apply graph theory to analyse 
cooperation in games by incorporating certain allocation rules for 
selecting a payoff for every possible cooperation structure. Coop-
eration in this sense means coalition formation. A brief analysis of 
one of such concepts which links graph theory with coalition formation 
is as follows: 
Let N be a set of players. A graph GR on N is a set of 
unordered pairs of distinct members of the set of players N = (1, 2, 
3, , 1 , n) 
Let these unordered pairs be called links. Then g defines a set of 
links on N and gN is a complete graph of all the links. 
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Let GR = set of all graphs an N 
then (~) GR = {g/g s;; gN 
( 2) i~ g = {n: m/r.E Nand m Ei~~ n~m where n m defines 
a link between n and m. 
Players are 1inked if there exist bilateral agreements between them 
which for our purposes we refer to as coalitions. 
Let S~N. g t:GR, nES and mt:S. Then ni and mi are connected in 
S by g ifi}'there is a path in g which links ni tom; and remains in 
S. g therefore defines a unique partition of S which groups players 
together if they are connected in S by g. 
Let S/g ( 11 5 divided by g) denote such a partition, then S/g = {{i/i 
and j are connected inS by g}/jE S} 
Let y be an allocation rule which maps the graph g unto the 
allocation vector from the values V(C)of a coalition C. 
We require 
( 3) L Y (g) = V(C) which means that the values of the 
r c n n,_ 
individuals sum to the value of the coalition 
and (4) 
where g~ is g if n is not linked tom . This means that the value 
of a coalition is diminished by the same amount at both ends if the 
links between them are removed, i.e. vJhere the coalition breaks up. 
Myerson, R.B. (l~J77) has been able to prove that there is at 
most one such allocation rule. Also y(g) = ¢(V/g), for every gt: GR 
establishing a relationship between the allocation rule and the 
Shapley value operator ~ (.). Exa111ples for the use of this iJpproach 
can be found in Myerson's paper on Graphs and Cooperation in Garnes. 
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(f.1a~hs. of Oper. Res. (1977) Vo~. 2 page 227). We shall carry our 
survey to those value concepts that have been used in connection with 
political games or have been so suggested. 
l.5 PO~ITICAL GAMES VALUE CONCEPTS 
In addition to the Shapiey Shubik index a few other indices 
have been deve1oped and applied to po1itical games. Some have been 
quite successful, for example, the Banzhaf power index, the Coleman 
index, Dalingham index and the Rae index. Some have not been as 
successful, for example, the ~-stability concept and the Kernel, 
nevertheless we shall carry out a survey of all starting with the 
less successful ones. 
1.5.1 ~-STABILITY 
~-stabi 1 i ty concept can be traced back to Luce and RogOl'-' 
(1956). In this concept a legislative scheme is supposed to be 
describable by the characteristic function of a simp~e game as defined 
in 1.3. The payoff for passing a bill is considered to be the "Power" 
due to the winning group, while the power distribution scheme among 
the winning players is an imputation. Furthermore "Power" is 
supposed to be ~~-- a divisible and transferable commodity--" Luce 
and Raiffa (1957). The problem then is to determine the power 
distribution with respect to the coalition structures which are 
considered to be stable. It is important to note that in the devel-
opment of the ~-stability concept, "stability" as such is not 
defined but ~-stability is defined below. 
The analysis so far made have been restricted to the stable 
distribution of power in a tvw party state, nar,Jely, the United States 
presidential system. Coalitions in equilibrium are considered 
unlike the Shapley value which gives an a priori measure since the 
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coalitions that might form are not yet known. 
In the calculation for the power distribution,pairs consisting 
of an imputation and a corresponding arrangement of players are isolated 
and these are tested for stability using the definition of ~-stability 
which will be given later. Thus a pair [ d,S ) are isolated, where 
d is an imputation and S is a coalition structure which remain in 
equilibrium when described in characteristic function form V and 
when changes in coalition arrangements are limited by a function ~-
A pair [d,S], where d is an imputation and S a coalition structure 
is ~-stable for the game (V,N) and given "boundary condition" ~.if 
(a) V (S) ~ for every S in ~(S) 
and 
(b) d. = V({i }) 
1 
for coalition structure S 
player is alone in S. 
(It is important to note that the CORE as defined in 1.3 
is a special class of the ~-stability scheme) i,e, if dis an 
imputation .in the core then the pair [d, { 1 }, { 2 },----,{ n }] 
is ~-stable for ~-
The function~ has the set of all coalition structures as its 
domain and the range is the class of all sets of subsets of the 
players. Thus if Tis inS, then TE:~ (S). Also S* is a possible 
change from coalition structureS if S*E: ~(S). 
~-stability for a coalition therefore guarantees that no 
admissible change insures any profit to the participants. 
In practice, the calculation and power distribution via this 
technique involves the division of players in a group (party) into 
two distinct non overlapping subsets of potential defectors and· 
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diehards in the event of a bi~l. The model allows potential defectors 
to defect and vote on the side of the other party but forbids 
the formation of a coalition by defectors from two different parties. 
~ is then chosen to represent the limitations on defections from 
the party structure. Different cases of defection are then considered 
and for each case the resulting coalition is examined for stability, 
using the definition for ~~-stability. Thus ;f ~(S) = [ T] 
either _3 i such that TU { i } c S or L and L E S such that T = Ulllu 
The distribution of power is then determed by analysing the role of 
potential defectors. We note also that a pair [d,S] is ~-unstable 
if there exists Tin ~(S) such that v(T) is greater than the 
sum of the payments in T as given by d. 
Luce and Rogow (1956) have some relatively simple 
calculations based on the ~-stability concept. The choice of ~ 
and most of the underlying suppositions have generated a lot of dis-
agreement among game theorists. The technique is therefore considered 
as not being very efficient. Luce and Raiffa (1957, pp.223-23l) 
contain a summary of some of these criticisms. 
This model can be applied to political games but its application 
will become acceptable when most of the underlying assumptions are 
removed, especially with respect to the choice of1p. 
1 .5.2 The Kernel of a cooperative game 
The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set as defined in 1.4.2. 
It therefore has its base on the 'stable set' concept like the 'CORE' 
of section l .3. 
In order to define the 'kernel' of a game fonnally we need some 
preliurinil~f c.lef"in'itiow; about l:he sort of coopLT<tlivc: uan1es usually 
associated with the kernel. 
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Let r be a cooperative N-~erson ~arne in characteristic fun:tion 
form satisfying al1 the conditions as stated in 1.3 exc~;~t that V(S) 
is not assumed to be a superadditive function. N = (I, .1, 3.- ' 11) 
Also iet (d,S) = (d 10 d2, d 3 ,---dn; 5\~ 52,---~n) 
define an outcome of the ;dme where di denotes the ~ayoff to player 
i and S = {S
1
, S:/ ---S11 } r'?l;resent the coalition structures that 
were formed. f}.lso let [S] be a partition of N satisfying individual 
and group rationalLy as in 1.3. Then, 
(d, S) = an individually rational payoff configuration 
(i.r. p. c) Also letS be fixed, then, dis the set of 
all payoffs satisfying conditions (3) and (L',) of 1.2 ard 
is a cartesian product of m simplices. Thus 
(l) d::: d(S)::: P
1 
X P
2 
X ••• X pm 
and (2) Pj = [{ di} ij~S/di ~0, t:di = V(Sj)] 
i c::S. 
J 
j = 1 , - -- - , m c oa 1 it i on s 
Further let D* be an arbitrary coalition. The "excess" of 0* with 
respect to (d,S) is 
( 3) e(D*) ::: V(D*) l: di 
i c:: D* 
Thus e(D*) represents the total gain of members of D* if they should 
withdraw from (d;S) and form 0*, thereby making e(Sj) = 0 9 j = 1,---,m. 
Also let m* and n be two distinct players in Sj of S. We denote 
Tm*n = set of all coalitions which contain player m* but not n 
; 
Thus (4) ---T 
m*,n { 0/0CN, m*cD, n~ 0 } 
The maximum surplus of m* over n is given as 
(5) --- Pm*,n =max e(D) 
D cT 
KViJ*' n 
This therefore represents the 
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maximum surplus (or minimum loss) clue to m* by withdrawing from (d,S) 
and joining D without the consent of n. 
Also player m* is said to out~tJeigh player n denoted by m* » n or 
n << m''' if 
p > p 
m*.n n.m* 
Also if neither m*>> n nor n>> m* then both m* and n are in equil-
ibrium. We note that a player is in equilibrium with himself and 
that two distinct players in two disjoint sets are also in equil-
ibrium. Also, if player i had 0 in (d,S) no player outweighs him. 
( s pee i a 1 rule) . 
It therefore follows that a coalition Sj of S is "balanced" 
w.r.t. (d,S) if each pair of players of Sj are in equilibrium, denoted 
by m* ~n. 
Now, the kernel "K" of a game r is a set of all individually rational 
payoff configurations that have only balanced coalitions. Thus 
(d,S)t:: K iffeach pair of players are in equilibrium with respect 
to ( d ,S) 
It follows therefore that 
( 6) m* >> n if (P * - P ) d > 0 m .n n,m* n 
and also m* ;:. n iff 
( 7) (Pm*.n - Pn,m*) dn ~ 0 and (P * - P * )d *~ 0 
, n,m m ,n m 
In order to determine the shares among the players in the 
game a pseudo pure bargaining ~-person game is defined based on the 
following properties of the kernel 
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(8) V(N) ~ V(l) + V(2) 4 + V(n) 
(9) (d,S)~ K for S~ {N} iiYdi = v(i),i = 1,2,- ... (!I· 
and (d,N) €. K iff 
(!C) di:::; vi + [ V(N) - V(1)- V(2) - ... - v(n) J/tl 
where K = Kerne 1 for = 1,2, ... n 
To derive the shares then we require the following. 
Let the triplet (Q;N; w1 , w 2 ••• wn) define a pseudo pure bargaining 
N-person game. 
Then define V(N) based on w1 , w2 ••• wn = (d;N)s.t. 
(11) di = wi + [Q(N)- w
1
- w
2
- ••• -w0 1111 for = 1,2, ... fl 
provided that 
( 12) di ~ 0 
We note that where (12) does not hold the technique applied 
would be to isolate player i who has the smallest di (di would be 
negative) and assign 0 to him. Then base the share of the other 
members on the pseudo pure bargaining set. Peleg (1963) has 
succeeded in proving that for each coalition there exists at least 
one stable payoff vector in the bargaining set concept. 
Davis and Maschler (1965) have done a detailed analysis 
of the kernel. Their work includes opinions expressed by game theory 
experts with respect to the applicability of the kernel technique 
to real life situations. 
A practical application of the kernel to the political 
coalitions found in Europe can be found in Schofield, N. 
(1977), pp.zq-49). He observed that the kernel predictions 
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performed well for countries with a low degree of political polarization 
and fragmentation. He also compared it to his resource/reward 
regression relationship. He noted~"the relationship between polar-
ization, fragmentation and payoffs appears to be mcst complex. The 
nction of the kernel happily appears to be of some use in exploring 
these relations." 
1.5.3 Common property- Successful Political Power indices 
We shall continue our survey of the political games power indices 
by looking through the successful power indices, except the Shapley 
Shubik index which we mentioned briefly earlier and hope to mention 
again in detail in chapter 2. 
These include the Banzhaf index, the Rae index, Coleman index 
and the Dahlingham index. In addition to the properties of games in 
characteristic function form they also have the following properties 
in common. 
( 1 ) V(S) = {1
0 
if s 
ifS 
is a winning coalition 
is a losing coalition 
We shall now survey all of them one after the other, noting the simil-
arities between them. 
1.5.4 The Banzhaf Index 
The attraction of the Banzhaf index lies in its easy and 
straightforward verbal definition which has resulted to the Banzhaf 
index having a greater appeal to the legal mind than the rest. Thus 
it has been cited in cases involving the distribution of power in 
connuittec~s Jnd a·l~.o Ctl'.es ·involving the prob'l<~lll ur- politicdl n·pr<!:;-
entation 1110n~ often than any of the other power indices; ncverLiicless, 
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the Shapley Shubik index appeals more to the game theorists due to 
its underlying mathematical properties. 
The principal word in the Banzhaf model is "SWING". We now 
define swing for player i as a pair of sets (S,S- {i }) such that 
Sis winning and S- {i } is losing. 
Let1t.(V) denote the number of swings for player i in the 
1 
game V E £ (N) where 
£(N) denotes simple games on N. 
also let -ii(V) = Total number of swings i.e. 
( ~ ) ?i( V) = l: /~( V ) 
i EN 
We note that'Q;(V) = 0 implies that player i is a dummy, thus his 
vote makes no difference either way, also1l,(V) =1\(V) implies 
that player i is a rlirtator, thus his vote is all that is necessary and 
sufficient. 
1'\;(V) = swing number is known as the "r~w" Banzhaf index. 
These were the numbers Banzhaf (1965) used for 
his calculations. 
To derive the Banzhaf index one has to consider all the 
situations when the vote of player i would definitely cause coalition 
S to win or Bill B to be passed and would cause coalitionS to lose 
if i leaves the coalition resulting in a defeat for Bill B. 
These are regarded as swing situations and the player of 
interest is the one that actually determines the swing. As expected 
these "r~w" Banzhaf indices wi 11 have different magnitudes, yet our 
principal interest lies in.the ratio of these numbers, therefore, 
it has been common practice to normalize them by making them add 
up to 1. 
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This could be done by dividing the swings for player i by the tota1 
number of swings in the game. 
Thus (2) Bi (V) ~ 11; ( V ),h(v) = 1 , 2, .... ,n. 
Where B(V) = Banzhaf i:-Jdex 
~i (V) = Swir.g number for player i 
and ~ (V) = Total number of swings. 
Also the swing probabilities for player i could be defined as 
(3) B. (V) 
1 = II\; ( v )/ V'b-1 
. 2 
i = 1 ,2, ... . f» 
Finally, let a; stand for the probability that player i will 
vote "yea" to a bi 11 and 1- @i, the probabi 1 i ty that he wi 11 
vote "nay" 
Where a; = O<a·<l 1 i s N 
Then the generalized Banzhaf probability index can be given by 
(~) 
where 
= 
a~i = The probabi 1 ity that Y = S - { i } 
(and Y stands for "yea" voters) 
We note that (~) is similar in structure to the Shapley Shubik index 
( 5') = (.n .}©J. JE:$-{1 :.J 
The proof of the above as well as the derivation of the swing 
probabilities, including other calculations involving the Banzhaf 
index with respect to its upper and lower bounds, extensions and 
applications to weighted majority games can be found in Dubey and 
Shapley (1979) 
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1.5.5 Relationship with Shapley 
The brief analysis of the Banzhaf index in Section 1. 5. ~ 
confirms to us that mathematically the Banzhaf index is based on the 
equiprobable combinations of the N players, while a closer look at 
the brief sketch on the Shapley value (or Shapley Shubik index) 
would remind us that the Shapley value is mathematically based on 
the equiprobable permutations of the N players. They both seem to 
be similar in some mathematical sense and this can be clearly 
portrayed if they are presented in their generalized form. 
A generalization of the Shapley index as will be seen in the 
first part of the 2nd chapter leads to the Shapley value 
~i[V]= Is- {i} II IN-s II ----·----·[V(S)- V(S -{i })] 
I N I! 
(regarded as player i~ marginal contribution to all possible coalitions) 
Also since Banzhaf regards every coalition as equally likely, it 
follows that for simple games the Banzhaf index could be converted 
to the Banzhaf value. Thus 
I 
B. [V] = 
1 
l lV(S)-V(S-1_i} 
2_li0- {i}\ 
For every S t:. N 
We note that the Banzhaf value like the Shapley value is symmet-
rical, linear, possses the dummy properties but fails to satisfy 
the efficiency criterion which is satisfied by the Shapley value 
as will be shown in Chapter 2. I We also note that B.[V] can be 
. 1 
normalized as was done for Bi(V) earlier. The conversion formula 
is fairly messy but for purposes of reference it shall be given thus 
8.;[V] = [ V(N)- ~ V( {j} )] B< [V] + [B""[V] - V(N)J V( { i}) 
u J l 
B'[V] -~V({ j}) 
J 
Straffin, D (1977) has carried o~t some ccmparisors between the 
Shapley index and the Banzhaf index based on his practical application 
of both indices to real life voting situations. He concluded by 
recommending that "The Banzhaf index should be used for situations 
in which voters, vote completely independently, the Shapley 
Shubik index for situations in which a common set of values tends 
to influence the choices of all voters." This confirms that they 
constitute the same tool but perhaps suited for slightly different 
circumstances. 
1.5.~ The Rae Index 
Douglas Rae (1969) considered the problem of comparing 
the responsiveness of different voting systems to the general 
will of the electorate. He approached it by counting the 
number of ways the average voter can find his vote in agreement 
with the outcome of the voting, i.e. being on the winning 
side. 
He thus defined an index of agreement to be 
= aj = { Y«:N: j E Yc. W or j ~ Y ~W} where W = set of all winning 
coalitions in a simple game V Ei(N). Thus the overall responsiveness 
of the voting system is the sum a or its average ajn or better 
the average probability of responsiveness which is given by a/(n2n). 
whe~ n is the number of elements in N. 
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It has been shown that the "Rae Index" is the Banzhaf index 
stated differently 9 Dubey and Shapley (1979) 
The following identity confirms it 
ai 2 n- ~ + ¥~ 
where 1\i = swing number 
1.5.7 Coleman Index 
James Coleman (1973) considered the two different types of 
power that can be exercised by a player in simple games. For simple 
games he used the word "collectivity". He stated that such a player 
can either initiate or prevent action. He carried out his calcul-
ations for "initiating action" by considering the fraction of all the 
losing coalitions where by his joining such a coalition would turn it 
to winning. And the power to "prevent action" he calculated by con-
sidering the fraction of all the winning coalitions that would lose 
should he leave the coalition. 
Thus, let w = total number of winning coalitions 
and 6' =total number of losing coalitions 
Then for player i, the power to prevent action is 
and the power to initiate action is 
We note that~; = swing number. 
I We a ·1 so no tc tha l 13-,-. 
. , 
1 ( 1 /,) ;;-_-
L j)'l 
_1_ ) 
il . 
Ill 
= Lhr.: 
harmonic mean of api and ani = !3 ~ where r/ 
1 1 
= the swing 
probabilities of player i as calculated in the Banzhaf model. It 
-32-
is clear therefore that the Coleman index is a re-definition of the 
Banzhaf Index. 
1.5.8 Dahlingham Index 
In an attempt to carry the power survey of voters some way 
further, Robert Dahl (1957) gave a definition of the power 
of one individual over the other as 
a. 
1 
w; ~ winning coalition containing i. 
-
where 
w; = w - Wi = winning coalition not containing i 
n = number of elements in N the set of players 
-We note that~\; = wi - wi = the swing number 
Thus 
I 
where B; = swing probability of pla~i as given in 1 .5.~. 
We then note that the Dahlingham index is also a redefinition 
of the Banzhaf index, Alingham (1975). 
The brief survey above covers a few of those techniques developed 
in mathematics and applied to political science, especially with 
respect to political games. A few other techniques exist also which 
were not covered here but all the most important ones have been 
discussed. Brams, S.J. (197~ contains a great deal of work on the use 
of mathematical techniques in political games. Some of his techniques 
are fairly different from the ones mentioned here, especially his 
calculations on the U.S. presidential primaries, nevertheless they all 
have the same underlying principles· and nearly always use the same 
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mathematical and statistical tools. 
As showr above all the political games indices surveyed are 
re-definitions of the Banzhaf index and in the introduction it was 
pointed out that Aumann, R.J. sees the Banzhaf index as a variant 
of the Shapley value, Aumann, R.J. (l968, p.999). It therefore 
fol1ows that an extension to the Shapley value will also constitute 
an extension to all the other political game indices discussed 
above. We shall then devote the next chapter to a detailed analysis of 
the Shapley value and some of its extension, namely, those done by 
Owen, G. A tabulated summary of the values discussed is given in the 
next page. 
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1.5.9 TABUlATED SUMMARY 
We hereby give a tabulated summary of all the value concepts we have 
analysed. including some of their special requirements. 
CORE C 
Imputation I 
Stab1e Set SS 
Characteristic function (0.1) normalization CF 
t' 
Characteristic function not in (0.1) normalization CF 
Political games 
Market games 
Psychology of Players 
Partition 
Division of excess 
Complement Set 
Connectedness 
Related to Shapley Value 
Related to Banzhaf Value 
Swing Numbers 
Ordinary Winning Numbers 
Special Requirement 
Pg 
Mg 
PSY 
p 
eO 
S* 
Cn 
RSV 
RBV 
SN 
SN 1 
SR 
VALUE 
" 
Special Requ. 
CONCEPT c I SS CF CF Pg Mg PSY p eO S* Cn RSVRBV SN SN 1 SR Page 
Bargaining 
... / J / J J Concerned with It 
- - -
- -
- - -
- - -
Set locating ss. 
Standard of / / .j / J v 
Con.with equit-
Fairness - - - - - - -
- -
- able way of sp- 1 3 
o\. -Power ./ 
litting excess 
./ J / .j De f. of for 16 - - - - - - - - - - -Model fair split. ex. 
Graphs in IJ ../ / De f. Connect- 18 Coop.games - - - - - - - - - - - - - edness 
"'/'-Stab- J -limits changes 
i 1 i ty - J ../ - j- v' - - - - - - - - - in coal .struc- 20 
tures 
J ./ J J ../ j J ./ 22 Kernel - - - - - - - Splitting ex. 
Banzhaf 
./ ./ ...; / Counting of 26 
Index - - - - - - - - - - - - swings 
Rae Index / ./ ./ J .../ 
1:ount 1 ng of 
- - - - -
- - - -
- - votes on win- 30 
J v J v 
n i _n_~L_sj _d_c: ____ 
.. .. ~- -
Coleman / -
- - - - - -
- - - -
Power to win 31 Index compared to 
/ ./ lose Dah 1 i ngham J ..; ./ Power of i 32 
- - -
- - - - - -
-
-
Index over j f-=---
Sl')n.nley - - - J ./ / / - / Concerned with ll - - - - - - - the Pivot n~Jl,fflber. 
Vaiue 
. 
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CHAPTER n10 
THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
In this chapter we shail carry out a detailed survey of the 
Shapley value ar.d some of its extensions as stated earlier except the 
nev1 model \lie are proposing IIJhich we shall give in Chapter Three. 
A study of the Shapley value as stated in the introduction 
involves the consideration of an axiomatic description of a principle 
of optimality. Most of what is to follow is therefore concerned with 
defining these axioms and describing an abstract model that satisfies 
these axioms. Optimality will be defined in terms of payoff vectors 
and the search for optimality would then involve the search for 
stable and equitable payoff vectors. 
2.1 DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
We need some important definitions as well as all or most of the 
other definitions given in Chapter One for a realistic approach to our 
analysis of the Shapley value. The following definitions are therefore 
necessary. 
A. Coalition : Let U be a finite set of players. Any subset 
S of U (S~U) will be known as a coalition. 
Let V be the characteristic function for game G. We required that the 
coalitions in U satisfy the following axioms. Let n be any permutation 
of players. Then n is called an automorphism of the characteristic 
function V if for any coalition scU 
(1) V(n S) = V(S) 
This implies a mapping of each player i into ~i and thus each 
coalitionS= (i .... i ) into n5 = (n .•.... n. ). To obtain 1 $ l1 lS 
our a xi om of symmetry we only require that for any automorphism of 
the game V. 
(2) = ¢ . (V) 
Til where ¢(V) denotes 
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the valueo(2) only te11s us that the value is essentially a property 
of the abstract game. 
B. Dummy : A player in a cooperative game with characteristic 
function \If is called a "dummy" if \!coalition S not containing 
player i 
(3) V(SUi) = V(S) + V(i) which implies that a 
dummy contributes only what he can win on his own while playing 
independently. He could therefore be deleted and the game will still 
be unchanged. The set of players consisting of all non-dummies is 
called the "support" or "carrier"of the game. 
Thus if N is the support of game V 
( 4) V (S) =V(NfiS) + ~V(i) 
i!: U /N 
This leads us directly to the axiom of effectiveness which requires 
that if N is the support of V then 
( 5) L: cp . (V) = V(N) 
. N 1 1 s 
We also desire that the vector cp(V) be an "imputation" as defined in 
Chapter One, thus implying that the value represents the full yield 
of the game. (This axiom is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value, 
see Dubey, P. and Shapley L.S. (1979 page 128) and Dubey, P. (1975) 
If we have two games hence two characteristic functions with 
the same set of players participating, it will be fair to assume that 
the payoffs of the players should be a combination of their payoffs 
in each of the games. 
Thus if V* and W* are the characteristic functions for the 
two games 
(6) ¢[ V* + W*] = ¢[ V*] + ¢[ W*] 
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Thus (6) represents our 1ast required ax~om~ the "axiom of aggregation" 
which could be interpreted to mean that when two independent games 
are combined the values must be added player by player. 
As expected any system satisfying the three axioms given here 
will be non-co~tradictory and complete. The vector satisfying those 
three axioms we call the Shapley vector or Shapley value. 
Let us recast the three axioms so as to have a direct link 
with our derivation of the Shapley value. 
Axiom A Let U be the set of players. For every 
1T in TI(U) 
cp .(TIV] = ¢. [V] -+ 
Til 1 Symmetry 
Axiom B For every carrier N of V 
j ~ N cpj [ V ] = V ( N) -+ Efficiency 
Axiom C For every two games V* and W* 
cp [ V* + W* ] = ¢ [ V* ] + ¢ [ W* ] Super- addi ti vi ty or Law 
of Aggregation 
Let V be a characteristic function game in [0, 1] normalization. Let 
N be a finite carrier of V;\?1 i ~ N, we define 
cpi [ V] = 0 giving zero to any dummy player 
Let R~U, R~O, we define 
if S .2 R 
(7) 
if s~ R 
Where St:U. The function CVR is a symmetric game; For every non-negative 
C, and R is a carrier of V. We let r, s, n, ..... ,be the numbers 
of the elements in R, S, N, ... ,respectively where R. S, N are 
subsets of ~J the Sei. of players. 
Then for C > 0, 0 < r < oo 
(8) = 
5 C;r if 
Lo if i'&:R 
is R 
By Axiom B, which guarantees efficiency 
(9) = 
ViER 
Also any game with a finite carrier is a linear combination of 
symmetric games VR: 
Thus 
(10) V = L:R~N CR(V)VR 
RW 
We note that N being a finite carrier of V, the coefficients are 
independent of N, and could be given by 
r-t 
CR(V) = 2: (-l) V(T) T~R ( 11) (O<r<oo) 
Also it could be verified that 
( 1 2 ) V ( S ) = ~~N C R ( V ) V R ( S) For every S ~ U 
R:.\'0 
Also for every finite carrier N of V, if S~N then it follows that 
from (7) and (11) we get 
( 13) V(S) r. 2: (=-l)r-t V(T) Rt:S TI::R 
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We note that the expression within the brackets vanishes except 
for the case S = t9 thus we are left with the identity V(S) = V(S) 
General1y therefore we have 
It could also be shown that CR(V) = 0 if R is not contained in 
every carrier of V as assumed. 
From axiom C we note that cp[V*- W*] = cjJ lV* J ~ ~~ [ W* J 
if V*, W* and V*-W* are all games. 
As a result we can apply the definition in (8) to the derivation at 
( 1 0) and obtain 
¢ i ( V) = L: R©\1 CR ( V) fr \( i F: N 
iS"R 
if we insert (11) and simplify we get 
¢ .(V) = 2:: S~N (S-1).[ (n-s)! V ( S) = L: S«:N 1 
iss nj i~S 
Now, let y (S) = (S-1) ~ (n-S) ~f! 
n 
We get 
s!(n-S-1)~ 
-.--· 
n i 
\:j if N 
(14) ¢; [vJ = 2:: SfSN Y n(S) [ V(S) - V(S- {i))] 
V(S) 
V i E U w nere N is a finite carrier of V. 
Expression (14) is therrfore the required Shapley Value. 
as pointed out in Chapter One. 
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The following properties are true of expression (14) 
(a) ¢ i [ v ] ) v ~i ) ) i E.: u 
The equality condition results iff 
{b) V(S) = V(S-(i)) + V((i)) ;ss and(b)is 
true iff is a dummy. 
Other properties including the rigorous derivation of all the 
axioms and theorems, together with their proofs are al1 covered 
in Shapley, L.S. (1953), Vorotfev. N.N. (1977) Luce and 
Raiffa (1957) and other literature on games and values. 
We may point out that the Shapley value given in (14) can 
aiso be reached via a bargaining model. Assuming the players that 
constitute a finite carrier N arrange to play game V in a grand 
coalition fashion as presupposed by Shapley. Furthermore, if they also 
agree that the order of admission of any member into a coalition or the 
order of joining a coalition is determined by chance, then all arrange-
ments or orderings of players are equally probable. Also, suppose 
that on admission or on joining a coalition a player makes a demand 
and is promised the full amount his participation contributed to the 
value of the coalition as defined by the function V. All the players 
then play the game efficiently with the aim of realising the total 
amount V(N), enough to meet all their promises. 
The expectations of each player would then be worked out thus. 
Let p(i) be the set of players preceding player i, then for any i£5 
the payment to i if S-(i) = p(i) is 
M = V(S) - V(S - (i)) 
Now let the probability of such a contingency be y (S) thus the 
n 
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total expectation of in the scheme is 
M-1 Y (S) [ V(S) - V(S-(i))] n = cjJi[v] of ( 14) 
We also note that since all members can occupy a11 positions with 
equal probability then the value of the game for each ordering should 
be allocated to the decisive player whose votes determined the 
result of that particular voting situation. Such a player we refer 
to as the "PIVOT 1 player. We then see that in simple games in 
which Vis monatomic and assumes only the values 0 and l, the 
pivot player is the only one that receives a non zero gain of any 
ordering. 
The Shapley value therefore gives a unique result which for 
our purposes could serve as a good a priori measure of a games 
utility to the players. Classical Shapley has had a few extensions 
to the original model and has successfully been used for 
analysis in real life political situations, either directly 
or via a few of its extensions, namely, weighted majority games, 
oceanic games, and through some extensions that could be found 
in Owen, G. (1971) and Owen, G. (1972). 
We shall carry out a brief survey of each of these applic-
ation modifications and extensions of the Shapley value. 
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2.2 WEIGHTED MAJORITY GAMES 
The classical Shapley approach as analysed in Section 2.1 needs 
some slight modifications to take care of many real life situations. 
In real life,voting situations exist whereby voting strength differs 
with respect to the number of votes each player has or a group of 
voters have, for example, The U.N. Security Council~ the U.S. 
electoral College, State and National legislatures, multi party 
parliaments, shares in corporations and companies, etc. Our research, 
as will be seen later, is concerned mainly with weighted majority 
games. 
The Shapley value is applied to weighted majority games in a 
slightly different way from the situation where all voters h?ve 
equal weights. 
Let this class of simple games be denoted by [C:W] where C 
is a real number and W is a measure on R. [We let R be a Bo~ean ring] 
Let W(S) be the total number of votes of coalition S and let C 
represent the number of votes needed to "win" w.r.t. the characteristic 
function V. 
We have 
if W(S) < C 
V(S) 
if W(S) >... C 
We note that a carrier of W is also a carrier of V. Let N 
be a finite carrier of V. We may now denote the game as 
[ C; W , W , .... , W J . We assume that the players in N are matched 
1 2 n 
with the natural numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, .... nand that Wi = W( { i} ). 
The numbers Wi are the weights of the players while C stands for the 
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"quota" i.e. the number required to win. ~Jith the above re-definitions 
we can then apply expression (14) of section 2.1 to determine the value. 
From the classical Shapley point of view the weights of the players 
and their values are closely related. Although it is possible also 
to find players of unequal weights having exactly the same value yet 
it has been shown in Shapley, L.S. (1953) example 5)that a player's 
value is a monotonic, non-decreasing function of his weight if the 
other players' weights are held fixed while their quota either is 
held fixed or adjusted while preserving the ratio C/W(N). 
It will be shown in practical examples in Chapter 3 that the 
classical Shapley approach produces the obvious result i.e. power 
proportional to voting strength for the weighted majority game, 
when the players play the game as separate individuals with groups. 
As mentioned earlier the extensions we shall present are 
applicable to the weighted majority class of games since they could 
be easily identified with practical political situations where 
voters belong to different parties with different identities and 
different voting patterns. The number of representatives from 
each party constitute the voting strength or weight of the party 
and each party is regarded as a player since for homogeneous 
parties the party leader should be able to determine or indicate the 
direction his party members should vote in theeventof a bill. 
We also have another class of games, known as oceanic games 
which have some peculiar properties that differentiate it from both 
the ordinary classical Shapley one-man, one-vote approach and the 
weighted majority games approach. 
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2.3 OCEANIC GAMES 
Oceanic games constitute a special class of weighted majority 
games, but unlike the type discussed in 2.2, here we have a situation 
where a block of votes is broken up and distributed among a very 
large number (continuum) of players which we call the ocean while a 
few major players called atoms control fairly large numbers of 
votes among themselves. If we denote this by [ C; W1 , W2 , W3 , ••• Wm;a.] 
where 
c = 
Wi = 
= 
The quota required to win 
The weight of the atoms 
The total weight of the ocean 
In most cases we may require that Wi ~ C < a. . We note that the 
direct formular applicable to finite person game as stated in (14) 
of Section 2.1 is not readily applicable here. 
The question now is to determine the values of the major 
(atomic) players from where the values of the ocean can be calculated. 
We also note that the earlier approach whereby players are randomly 
shuffled in order to locate the pivot player is not easy to extend 
to a continuum of oceanic players because the notion of randomly 
shuffling oceanic players, even without the major players is not easy 
to formulate. Nevertheless, we note that the ocean is symmetric so 
we can limit ourselv2s to inserting the major playersinto the 
ocean in a properly random way. 
Let us consider a sequence of (m + n£) - person weighted 
majority game. L 9= [C; W1 , Wz, w,, ... , WU"'lpaa,<Z'Ol.a,.t' .. ,,an.t] 
Q, = l, 2, .... 
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Such that we have 
( 1 ) 
with ~being a positive constant and such that 
( 2) max 
j 
a. :: a --o-'" 0 as J. £ max.~ 
Now conditions (1) and (2) require that n£~ ro i.e. the minor 
players tend to a continuum of oceanic players. 
Now let ~i'£ denote the value of game L£ to the ith 
major player. i = 1, ....• n. 
Let < > define the following 
=median g(O,x,l) ={ if X~ o. <x> if 0 ~ X ~ 1 • 
if X ~ '1. 
Also let M = {l, ..... ,m} major players, S = S 
and W(S) = L. S W .. also let M
1
. = M- { i } . 
1 E 1 
It has been shown that for each major player iE M, the value ~· n 
1 • J'v 
of the game L£ convergers to a limit, thus 
(3) 5<(C-W(S))/a > S m-S-1 L t (1-t) dt SfM; <(C-W(SU { i}) )/a > 
We can recast (3) as 
(4) L S~M. 
1 
t, = ( c -w ( sUJ {; } ) ) 
a 
t~ = (c - ~(S) ) 
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In order to calculate the values of the major players in 
an oceanic game so as to determine also the minor players value 
we shall resort to formulation (4) above instead of the derivation 
we had in Section 2.1. We would therefore be expected to resort to 
this new formulation if we were to determine the values or powers 
held by major shareholders in acorporation with, say, three major 
shareholders and (a continuum) a very large number of people having 
very negligible shares each. 
A detailed analysis of Oceanic games as well as a rigorous 
derivation of the above formulations can be found in Shapiro and 
Shapley (1978), Milnor and Shapley (1978) 
2.4 EXTENSIONS/APPLICATIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
There have been a number of extensions and applications of the 
Shapley value to practical voting situations, especially weighted 
majority games by a few game theorists other than Shapley himself. 
Lucas, W.F. (1976) has a good survey on its application to such 
weighted bodies such as the U.N. Security Council, U.S. Electoral 
College etc. Also Littechild, S.C. and Owen, G (1973) have 
used it in determining the cost of airport landin~J fees by different 
types of ai1·crafts. In this case landing fee is computed from the 
maintenance charge (M;) for aircraft type i plus a capital 
charge <P .• 
1 
The capital charge is then computed from the Shapley 
' 
value, or put differently, a game V is defined by considering the 
players to be individual aircraft landings with V(S) the hypothetical 
cost of building a facility that can accommodate a setS of landings. 
Thus each landing attracts a fee equal to its Shapley value. 
Owen, G. ( 197 5) carried out an evaluation of the presidential 
election game using both the Banzhaf value as compared to the 
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classical Shapley value. We find in Owen, G (1972) a multilinear 
extension of the Shapley value which constitutes a fairly good 
generalization of the value. 
t~e s:1all survey two of 0vJen 1 s extensions in some detail s~nce 
one of the extensions we carried out was based on Owen's extension 
and modification with respect to political games. 
2.4.1 Multilinear Extensions by Owen, G 
In Owen's multilinear extensions an N-person game Vis defined 
as a function on the N-cube IN that is linear in each variable and 
also coincides with V at the corners of the cube satisfying 
f(x) = V( {i/xi = 1 } ) 
In order to derive the generalized Shapley value, the following 
initial conditions defined for the classical Shapley also hold. 
' We let V be a characteristic function of anN- person game as 
defined in 1.3. Now consider d.= { 0,1}, then the domain of V 
is a subset of the unit N-cube IN where I = [ 0,1 ] . To extend 
V to this cube we write 
for 0 ~ x. ~ 1 , i = l , ... , n. 
1 
s Let a represent the S-corner 
of the cube and n be the number of elements in N. 
S = { l if iES 
Thus (5) al 
0 if i~S 
We see then that f( a 5) = V(S) because 
(6) f(a5 ) = ~ { rrjET aj rrj~T(l -a~) } V(T) 
TCN J 
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We note that the braces vanish except forT = S whe~ it will equal 
unity, thus f is an extension of v. 
An interesting interpretation of (6) is that if player i has 
probability X; of joining a coa.lition, then the probability that 
coalition S exactly will form assuming independence of the players 
will be given by (4). f is then thought of as an expected va1ue. 
If we let ¢;(t), i = 1 , •.. ,n be a continuous monotone function 
with ¢i(O) = 0, ¢i(l) = 1 'tf i 
Then X; = ¢i(t), 0 ~ t ~ 1 wi11 then represent a monotone path 
from the origin (0,0,0, ... ,0) to the unit corner (1, 1, 1, 1, .... ,1) 
We write 
(7) z. 
1 
= 
J 
jfi(g(t))d ¢i(t) where fi is the 
partial derivative of the function f then 
( 8) 
n 
L: z. 
i = 1 1 
= 
Therefore we get 
(9) ·n L: Z. = V(NJ 
. 1 
1 = l 
()f dx . d 
0x. dt 1 t = 
1 
Ia ~~ dt 
0 
= f(¢(1) - f(¢(o)) 
.th 
1 
If we let fi(t,t, ... t) = L: t 5(1-t)n-S-l [ V(SU { i} ) - V(S) ] 
Thus (10) 
( 11 ) 
z. = 
1 
z. = 
1 r SCN: i t\S 
SCN: ili;S 
0 
S!(n-S-l)! [V(SU I i l)- V(S)J 
n I 
] 
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Thus we have the multilinear extension of the Shapley va1ue. 
A detailed derivation of the above is contained in Owen, G. (1972) 
We can then apply the above to weighted rnaj ori ty games by bearing 
in mind the followi~g modifications and representations. 
We represent the weighted majority game by [C : W1 , W2, W3 ••••• W~ 
with C ~ Wi ~ then V(S;= 1 if 
(_ = 0 if 
C is the quota as in Section 2.2 
t:W.~C 
s 1 
t: w. < c 
s 1 
where 
The partial derivative fi(X) could then be interpreted as the 
expected marginal value of player i to the coalition he will join, 
given that j has probability Xj of being there as well. Thus 
f i (X) = l if 
(12) C - Wi ~ W(S) < C and 0 otherwise. 
If we regard the random variable W(S) as the sum of ~-1 independent 
random variables (each of the remaining players having one), thus 
the jth can have values of 0 and Wj with probabilities 1 - ~ and 
Xj respectively. It will then have a mean XjWj and variance 
x.(l-X.)W~ for the point on the diagonal of the cube IN where XJ· = t. J J J 
( 13) fl = t L:. w. -+ mean and 
J :\ i J 
i 6'2 = t(l-t) L:~' 
-+ variance j ti 
( 14) 
Under normal conditions we assume that the distribution will be normal. 
Thus the only required calculations would be fort, i.e. the prob-
ability that a normal variable with mean (13), variance (14), 
satisfies (12). 
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The multi 1 i near extem ons of the Shap 1 ey va 1 ue ha~ some 
similarity with the model we are proposing at least in concept. 
2.4.2 Owen and a Modification of the Shapley Value 
In Guillermo Owen (1971) a suggestion for the modific-
ation of the Shapley value to take care of situations where 
different affinities between players can give rise to certain 
coalitions orderings being more probable than others is made. 
This modification he claims is better suited for political games 
than the classical Shapley approach and goes on to give some 
practical examples. In Owen, G. (1971 page 845) he states that 
"it is a well known fact, in most games, the players do not behave 
as one would expect from an abstract study of the game. That is 
the characteristic function or even the norma 1 extensi.ve forms 
of the games are not sufficient to determine the coalitions which 
will form, since these depend to a large extent, on personal 
affinities of the players." He considered the players for the 
political games to be the political parties since for a homogeneous 
party, the party leader should have some control over the way 
the parliamentarians in his party would vote. From observations 
he notes that the voting power of certain parties only had 
slight relationships to their payoffs as calculated via the 
classical Shapley approach, where payoffs are represented by 
say, the number of cabinet positions held by a party. 
In the discussion on the Shapley value all the orderings 
of players are given the same probability since the only property 
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assumed known about the game was the characteristic function and the 
value is only a function of the ch~racteristic function. 
In some sets of simple games. this line of thought is very 
adequate b~t in real life situations and for political games some 
knowledge exists of the affinities among the players which to a great 
extent would determine the way the players would vote and thus would 
affect their Shapley values. We know that a right wing party and a 
left wing party wi 11 hardly ever vote on the sarne side in the face 
of a bill and as a result a randomization scheme that assigns equal 
probability to the way they would vote such as the classical Shapley 
model may be inadequate to explain the occurrences that take place. 
Owen therefore goes on to suggest a randomization scheme which takes 
into account the different affinities among the players and assigns 
different probabilities to the formation of different coalitions and 
theOluses the Shapley formula to calculate the Shapley values. It 
is expected that coalitions with higher probabilities would have 
higher Shapley values. 
The scheme was derived as follows: 
Let N = (1, 2, ... , n) be players in game v. Now, consider all 
possible N) orderings of the N-players and assign probability 
to each. Let "A. represent an ordering and 1 et S ( i , )\,) represent the 
set of players preceding player i under the ordering~. Then 
the Shapley value would be given by 
( 1 ) ¢i [V] = E ( V ( S ( i ;V\) l) { i } V(S(i ,(\r))l 
Where E denotes the expected value under the given ordering. The above 
guarantees all the properties that are known for the Shapley value. 
Thus¢ will be additive, a carrier K of the game V will obtain the 
amount V(K) and for super-additive gan1es 4> will be an.impulation. 
-::12-
The major reason for the modification is to assign some prob-
abilities to the different orderings with respect to their desire 
for coalition formation. We require that the assignment of these 
probabilities must possess some properties not contradictory to the 
Shapley value requirements. 
The following two properties are therefore desired. 
(A) An ordering and the reverse ordering should have the same 
probability, for example if 1, 2, 3 is an ordering for a 3~person 
game where the order of listing defines the way the coalition was 
formed with 1 starting the coalition, then joined by 2 and then 
3 (note: as pointed out earlier the calculation of the Shapley value 
envisages the formation of grand coalitions with the pivot player 
casting the winning or blocking vote) If such an ordering has 
probability t 1 then the ordering 3, 2, 1 which starts with 3, 
followed by 2 and then 1 should also have probability t 1 If 
this is a simple game in [0,1] normalization 2 would be the pivot 
player. 
(B) The removal of a subset, S, of the players should not affect 
the probabilities assigned to the remaining set, N-S, of players 
which implies that the addition or removal of dummies should not 
affect the probabilities assigned. 
A scheme was developed satisfying the two properties above 
and the Shapley value calculated as defined by (1) above. The 
scheme proposed by Owen assigned to each player a point in space 
and then the distances between pairs of points so defined was 
considered as the probabilities of having both points together in 
one coalition arrangement. ThiS geometric framework was based on an 
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N-dimensional sphere and it seemed to have satisfied properties (A) 
and (B) and at the same time non-contradictory to the Shapley 
value model. 
To gain an insight into the working of this scheme; consider 
several players in an N-person game, each assigned a point x 
in a Euclidean space of high dimension. Two points (parties) will 
normally be placed close together if they have some high affinity for 
each other. If these points are in general position, they would 
normally determine an (N-2)-sphere, T. 
We note that an arbitrary point Z€T determines an ordering 
of the players N=(l,2 .. n) which is the order of increasing distance 
of the points 1 2 n x , x , .... x from z . We also note that ties 
between points would form a set of measure zero. Each ordering of 
the players will have different probabilities assigned to them 
determined by the measure of all z which determine the ordering. 
It is theoretically possible to place N players on the surface 
of an (N-2)-sphere but the relationship between them with respect 
to their distances from a point z will neither be easy to be related 
effectively well to political affinities, nor will their repres-
entation be easily possible on a two dimension paper except perhaps 
the (N-2)-sphere is reduced to a circle. 
Owen gave some examples based on a circle. 
Pairs of points on a circle of course satisfy properties (A) and 
(B) and would not contradict Shapley•s initial assumptions. 
Now consider 3 roints on the circumference of a circle as shown 
in Figure (1) 
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of the three players or parties. Since it is a circle, we note that 
antipodal sets on a (sphere or) circle have the same measure 
which satisfies property (A). 
Also if we remove one of the players, we may have to replace 
the sphere with another of a lower dimension except in degenerate 
cases. 
It has been shown by Owen, G (1971, 348-349) ~hat the 
relative orderings of the remaining players will have the same 
probabilities in the reduced game. Also, if the points x 1 , •••• , xn 
are the vertices of a regular ~-simplex, all the orderings would 
have the same probability and we have the usual Shapley value. 
The following analysis of a 3 party legislature will serve 
as a very good example. 
Let the 3 parties be represented by the three points as 
shown in figure (2) 
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Thus the players ar2 represented as the three vertices of an inscribed 
triangle with angles A 9~ and w. We note that the three perp-
endicular bisectors of the triangle cut the circ1e at six points 
A, B, C, D, E, F. 
(2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
FA = CD = A 
AB = DE = ~ 
AB = EF = w 
We note that the relative distances between each pair of points 
defines the relative probabilities of coalition formation (ordering). 
The six arcs and the associated angles give the ordering 
probabilities 
(5) FA = CD = A = 312 
(6) AB = DE = ~ = 123 
( 7) BC = EF = w = 231 
We note that P(3~1,2) = P(29l ,3) = A/2rr 
and P(l,2,3) = P(3,2,l) = ~/2rr 
and P(2,3,l) = P(l,3,2) = w/2rr 
The modified Shapley value for player (l) then becomes 
¢
1 
= 21r {( ~+w) [ V ( { 1 } ) +V ( { 1 , 2, 3 } ) - V ({ 2, 3 } ) ] 
+A[V( {1,2}) +V({l,3}) -V({2})- V({3})] 
We have similar expressions also for the other two players. We note 
that for the constant sum three person game in (0,1) normalization 
we get 
(H) <!> ~ 
D 
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We shall present some examples based on these models in 
Chapter Four. 
We shall now proceed to Chapter Three to propose a model 
which would incorporate the psychology of the p!ayers which includes 
their different affinities resulting in a predetermined pairwise 
probability of association from where we can calculate the Shapley 
value directly. 
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CHA?TE R TH R:: E 
THE NEW APPROACH 
3. l THE DIRECT APPROACH MODEL - AN EXTENSION TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
L.S. Shapley as pointed out earlier proposed a set of 'values' 
which we regard as an 'a priori' evaluation of players positions in a 
game by ignoring completely any social or economic structure or the 
psychology of the players, including their standard of behaviour. 
He got his results by imagining the random formation of coalitions 
of all the players, starting from one player and adding one at a time. 
Each time a player joins he is assigned the advantage gained by the 
coalition due to his admission; as a result the player whose admission 
causes the coalition to become a winning coalition as defined in 
Chapter 1, Section~.5.3 is assigned the total value of that coalition. 
He is known as the 'Pivot' player as defined in Chapter 2, Section 2.1 
This process is carried out over all coalitions since in the scheme 
all coalitions are equally likely. These are later normalised so 
that if we had N players with all orderings equally likely the pivot 
player would get ~~ij~ as mentioned earlier . 
• 
This technique was extended by Shapley to cover political 
games where parties are regarded as distinct groups that form 
coalitions with other groups in the weighted majority game model as 
discussed in the last chapter. In the weighted majority games model 
the assumption that all coalitions wete equally likely was still 
present and calculations were carried out similar to the simple 
majority games except that in this case, pivot players were the 
distinct units. He also extended his model to the case involving 
a few major players and a continuum of minor players in his oceanic 
games model. In the oceanic games model a few players have fairly 
heavy weights attached to them while the minor players' weights 
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tend to 0 as their number tend to infinity. The value for the major 
players was therefore calculated via a limiting process as shown in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3 , while the ocean of minor players are 
assumed to share the remnant of the weight equally. 
G. Owen modified the Shapley value by incorporating the 
psychology of the players which he described by assigning definite 
probabilities of cooperation for coalition formation to the players 
which were regarded as homogeneous groups by placing them round a 
circle at predefined intervals. He computed the Shapley value for 
the players by associating the common angles (or arcs) to a part-
icular ordering of players as the probability of having such an 
ordering and hence derived their value as described in Chapter 2, Sub-
Section 2.4.2. 
A modification of this techniGue was considered during this 
work and is described in Appendix B. It is based on the probability 
of a particular ordering occurring~ given positions of points placed 
at random but in restricted positions on a straight line. The 
calculations are straight forward but lengthy and this model was 
finally rejected in favour of that to be described. 
G. Owen also carried out a multilinear extension in an attempt 
to take care of ~ituations where the players were many, since the 
initial modification model could not easily take care of many players. 
His multilinear extension included a set of approximations by 
computing the partial derivatives of f.(x) where f.(x) is a prob-
1 1 
ability measure for the derivation of the Shapley value. fi(x) is 
then the weighted average of the terms [V(SU {i} - V(S)] G.Owen 
(1972) as described in Chapter 2~ub-Section 2.4.1 .The basic idea 
here is to take account of probabilities of orderings but to sum 
over varying probabilities. 
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Similarly in the mode~ to be described we consider distinct 
homogeneous groups 9 the ith group having size n. where the number n. 1 1 
is large these groups represent political parties or distinct units 
of players in committees. To determine the value we cons-idered the 
probability that members of group i vote yea or nay together with 
members of group j 9 KJ> .. ·in order to constitute a winn1ng coalition. 
Each event in which this occurs i.e. given that a minimal winning 
coalition exists containing members of partyi would then contribute 
to the value for party i. 
We know that in practice it is not possible to say with 
certainty that parties will vote together on any particular issue. 
Calculating the probabilities of such occurrences could then give 
a measure of how often members of party i would belong to winning 
coalitions and hence the value vi for party i. More precisely we 
define the value of group i as the expected proportion of group i in 
a minimal winning coalition given that such a minimal winning coalition 
exists. 
It is simple to carry out an exact calculation using the above 
reasoning for the case when there are only three players, as will 
be shown shortly. In order to take care of large numbers of distinct 
parties including large numbers of distinct players it is possible, 
under some circumstances, to use the normal approximation to the 
binomial distribution (since the voting behaviour within groups is 
assumed to be strictly binomial). When this approximation does not 
hold, the binomial formulae -themselves can be used. In any case we 
are therefore concerned with the conditional expectation that groups 
(parties) will vote yea together or nay together in order to constitute 
a winning coalition as will- be shown later. The probabilities can 
~60-
then be varied in order to get a better understanding of any voting system. 
Calculations of the formulae follow; these are compared in the 
next chapter with the simulated results of many voting situations. 
These simulated results are also analysed by Ow~n's tech~ique and the 
results compared in the next chapter. 
Finally the model is applied to practical voting situations, 
namely~ the Nigerian Senateet.The basic assumptions are tested against 
a small set of actual voting situations and conclusions are drawn 
about the Shapley values of the various parties. Some comparison is 
made with the powers of the parties in government as measured by their 
representation in the Cabinet and other important government offices. 
We now carry out the calculation of the Shapley value based on 
this concept. 
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS MADE 
The assumptions made in the model will now be listed and the 
consequences derived. Expressions for the value will be obtained 
first in the simple case of three players only (3.2.1); then the 
case of a number of groups will be discussed and an approximation 
to the value obtained under simplifying assumptions (3.2.~ and 
finally it will be shown how the value could be calculated when this 
approximation does not hold (3.2.5). 
The assumptions made are -
(i) a player i votes yes to a question with probability a; and 
yes to its converse with probability (1-ai). 
(ii) players within group i, and between groups and j, vote 
independently. 
(iii) there is an equal chance of the question or its converse being 
asked. 
This is clear~y a very s~mp~ified version of the voting process. More 
correctly the response shou1d be a function f of the question q, 
so that f(-q) = 1-f(q) and q should vary according to some probability 
distribution on the whole real axis. The simplification made is to 
take q as concentrated at ± 1, equally likely to take either value 
and to define f(l) = a;• f(-1) = 1 ~a;. In any practical situation 
it is only the difference between the voting be~aviour of different 
groups which is known so the absolute values of the a; 's are 
irrelevant. Methods of estimating the a; 's are considered in the 
next chapter. 
3.2. 1 Three Person game - In The New Approach 
Let 3 participants in game V be denoted by 1, 2, 3 and let 
123 imply coalition 1 and 2 together and 3 on the other side. Also 
let Pr. be the abbreviation for probability. Now let a; be the pro-
bability that party i vdEs yea and 1-ai be the probability that 
party i votes nay to the question (+1). Then Pr. of 123 voting 
together = a a a +(1-a )(1-a ){1-a ) 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Also Pr. 123 i.e. 1 and 2 voting together and 3 voting against 
= a a (1-a ) + (1-a )(1-a )a 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
and Pr. 123 =a (1-a )a +(1-a )a (1-a ) 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
and Pr. 123 = (1-a )a a +a (1-a )(1-a ) 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
So value for player 1 is the probability that 1 and 2 vote together 
and 3 apart, plus the probability that 1 and 3 vote together and 
2 apart given that one of the patterns 123, ~23 or 123 happens. 
But in either case two participants would be present, thus we require 
that the two share the value hence we take ~of the probability 
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worked out as above and assign it as the Shapley value for 1 and the 
same for the other participants. 
Thus value 1 = ~ [Pr. 123 + Pr. 123 y/[ Pr. 123 + Pr. 123 + Pr. 123] 
" > {a
1
a
2
(1-a
3
) + a
1
(1-a,Ja, +(1-a1 )(1-a,Ja, +(1-a1 )a2 (>a,)}/ 
{l-a 1 a2 a3 -(1-a 1 ) (l-a2 )(l~a 3 ) } 
i . e. vl = 1 (a +a 2 2 3 -2a2a3y(a1 +a2 +a3 -a2a3 -a3a1 -a1a2) 
and v2 = ~ [Pr. 123 + Pr. 123 v[ Pr. 123 + Pr. 123 + Pr. 123] 
i.e. vz = l (al +a3 -2a 1a3y(a 1 +a 2 +a 3 -a 2 a 3 -a3al -ala2) 2 
Similarly V3 = ~ [Pr. l23 + Pr. 123] /[ Pr. 123 + Pr. 123 + Pr. l23] 
So V3 = ~(a 1 +a 2 -2a 1 a 2 ~(a 1 +a 2 +a 3 -a 2a 3 - a 3a 1 -a 1a2 
which is the ordinary 
Shapley value for 3equal participants. Variation of values with different a· •s 
I 
are shown in graphs Gl, G2, G3, G4. 
Now let us consider a special case where a 2 = a 3 ; implying that 
players 2 and 3 have the same voting behaviour, then 
= (a -a 2 ) /(a +2a -a 2 - 2a a ) 
2 2 1 ' 1 .2 2 1 2 
v = 
2 
1 (a +a 2 2 1 -2a a )j(a 1 2 1 +2a -a
2 
-2a a ) 
2 2 1 2 
V = 1 (a +a -2a a )l(a +2a -a 2 -2a a ) 
3 2 2 1 1 2'/ 1 2 2 1 2 
V .and V are clearly equal and V = l-2V . 
2 3 1 2 
If both of them consistently vote together and in a directly opposite 
way to player 1 (i.e. if a =a = 0 while a = 1 or a = a = 1 while 
2 3 1 2 3 
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a = 0 or near those values) then piayer l •s value will vanish. 
l 
The variation of values V with other values of a~is shown in 
1 
graph G5. 
Consider another special case; Let a = ~. 
l 
This implies that player 
one will vote with either 2 or 3 on an equal proportion of times. 
In this case 
v = ),(a +a -2a a )/ { J. ( 1 +a +a ) - a a } l 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 
i.e. v = (a +a - 2a a )/( 1 +a +a -2a a ) 
l 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
and v = v = ~;( 1 + a +a -2a a 3 ) 2 3 2 3 2 
again v = v and v ~ 1 2V 
2 3 l 2 
This result implies that if player 1 votes with either player 2 
or 3 in equal proportion of times then the value of player one 
depends on the voting behaviour of players 2 and 3. The more 
players 2 and 3 vote alike, the more the value of player one 
diminishes but the more players 2 and 3 differ in voting behaviour 
the more the value of player one appreciates. The variation of 
V0 with a:a. for various va 1 ues of a3 is shown· in Graph G6. 
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3.2.2 COMPARISON WITH OWEN 
G. Owen considered the three person game in his paper on 
political games;Owen (1971) pp.351-352). 
as follows: 
His results were 
p ( 1 2 3) = p ( 3 21 ) = (3/ 21T 
Ptl32) = P(231) = Y/2TI 
P ( 31 2 ) = P ( 21 3 ) = aj 2TI 
These ordering probabilities which he used in calculating the values 
show that if s = y = a then V = V = V and 13 = y = Of. 
1 2 3 
implies that the angles (or arcs) that define those orderings are 
equal in which case the values for players 1, 2 and 3 are }'3 each. 
In his schem~that will correspond to having the three players 
equally spaced around a circle. For the three-person game in 
(0,1) normalization (Majority game- M ) these reduce to 
3 
v = 1 v 2 = 13/TI , V = y/TI 
We see that if o\. is large, then V1 appreciates while V2 and V3 
diminish and V 2 and V 3 appreciate as Ol becomes smaller. This. is 
equivalent to our case where player l's value depends on the voting 
behaviour of players 2 and 3 where a, = ~-
The case where a 2 = a 3=lor0 would correspond to players 2 
and 3 occupyin~ the same position in Owen's case, so that both of 
them will have all the values while player 1 would have a zero value 
agreeing ~ith the result above. The general results in 3.2.1 correspond 
to Owen's formulation with the points allowed to vary in position. 
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3.2.3 HOMOGENEOUS GROUP MODEL 
We shall present an extension of the above model to the case 
when we have more than three participants. We shall consider here 
the case where lr.Je have rr:any participants formed into distinct 
groups which are homogeneous enough to satisfy Owen's assumption 
whereby he regards the political parties as being homogeneous in the 
sense that "each party leader can control to some degree at least~ 
the manner in which his parliamentarians vote; otherwise it is not 
really a homogeneous groupi ng 11 Owen~ G. ( 1971 ~ p. 345) This 
is similar in a sense to the classical Shapley weighted majority 
game concept where parties and not individuals occupy pivot positions. 
In order to investigate such a situation with respect to our 
own model we let n1 ~ n~, ... nk represent homogeneous political 
groupings, thus all members in each party vote together each time. 
Now let G = Grouping (comprising coalition of distinct groups such 
that n .{N + 1 • thus 
1 
( 1 ) G. = (n. ,n. , o. , o ..... o.k 
1 10 1?. HI 1~ 1 implies 
that in G; parties nij and n~ by voting yea (nay) together to 
question k+ or nay (yea) together to question k- constitute a 
minimal winning grouping G.~ N+l where N+l =the minimum required 
1 
to win. Also Gi must be such that Gi - ni ( N+l thus turning 
into a losing coalition. 
Take for example the case of five distinct groups with 
weights attached as follows nl = 36, n2 = 28, n3 = 16, n4 = 8, 
n5 = 7. The following minimal winning groups are possible. 
Question k+ 
Gl = ( 36y, 28y, 16N, 8N, 7N) 
G2 = ( 36y, 28N, 16y, 8N , 7N) 
G3 = { 36y, 28N, 16N, 8y, 7y) 
G4 = ( 36N, 28y, 16y ~ 8y ~ 7N) 
G5 = ( 36N, 28y, l6y, SN, 7N) 
.. ]2-
Gl = (36N, 28N 9 16y ~ 8y ~ 7y) 
G2 = (36N ~ 28y ~ 16N~ 8y ~ 7y) 
Question K -c- G3 = ( 36N, 28y' l6y ~ 8N ~ 7N) 
G4 = ( 36y 9 28N 9 16N, 8N, 7y) 
G5 = ( 36y 9 28N, l6N, 8y' 7N) 
where y = yea~ and N = Nay 
Let a. = Probability of group~voting yea (Nay) to K+. Thus 1 . 
probability of having G~ is 
x a x a 
'+ 5 
Similarly all other minimal winning coalitions can be enumerated and 
their probabilities derived 
Thus 
(2) = E P for all minimal winning groupings 
j j 
j = 1 •.... m (minimal winning groupin~ 
Thus ~ = sum of the probabilities of all minimal winning 
groupings = Prob. of just winning groupings 
T... = Jl 
n. 
1 
= The proportion of the weight 
of group i in the minimal 
winning coalition (grouping) G .. 
J 
N + 1 + &\:r· • = The exact size of the co a 1 it ion j ~ 
~- ~ 0 J 
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Thus the contribution to the value of group (party) i from the 
grouping (coalition) G. is 
J 
(3) T .. X p. 
Jl 1 
ll 
Thus the value of group (party)i is the sum of its contributions 1011 
a 11 the minima 1 winning groupings, thus 
v. = 
1 L: j 
P· (T .. x ___.l ) 
J 1 jJ 
j = l, .... m Groupin~where party i contributed in bringing about 
the "WIN". 
(~) is similar to (3 ) of 3.2.4 as will be seen later. 
We state (3) of 3.2.4 in advance for comparison. 
Thus 
x Pr. {xi and in just winning coalition} 
v. = -----------------------------------------1 
T.. = 
Jl 
Prob. of having just winning coalitio~s 
n. 
1 
N+l +1\. 
J 
replaces 
and Pj/\J is the conditional probability of this particular minimal 
winning coalition. 
The addition of ~j is due to the fact that in minimal winning groupings, 
the quota varies according to the size of the grouping formed. 
If all a& 's are equal to 0.5 the results from this approach 
should reduce to the ordinary Shapley value for a weighted majority 
game. With unequal a. the results should be comparable to Owen for 
1 
some point spacing. 
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3.2.4 THE GENERAL DIRECT APPROACH MODEL 
We shall now extend this to a more general case where all 
individuals i?'l a party are not n.ecessarily required or expected to 
vote on one sfde each time. That is the usual happenirg in ~ost 
real life situations. 
In this model therefore we are concerned with large numbers of 
players ni whose behaviour is strictly binomial and since the 
number n1(i.e. the number of people ih group i (party)) is large. 
their behaviour can be approximated to the normal distribution 
provided that the probabilities of each group voting yea together 
or nay together is not near 1 or 0 because at those. points the 
binomial approximation to the normal fails. Some methods of taking 
care of these cases will be shown later. The va1ue for party i 
via this model would then be the conditional expectation of the 
proportion of party i voting yea or nay together with parties 
j, k, ... in order to constitute a just winning coalitinn. 
We know that if X , X ... are random normal variates indep-
1 2 
endently distributed with mean mi and variance cri 2 • then the 
conditional expectation, 
( 1 ) E { X./X +X + ... = Z m. + K } 1 1 2 1 
derivation is in Appendix A) 
= m. + 
1 
(The 
Henc~ if there are groups whose probabilities of voting yes are a. 
1 
and sizes ni such that zni = 2N+l and if mi = niai, cri 2 = niai (1-ai), 
then if X. are numbers voting yes. we have that EX. is distributed 
1 1 
normally (using the normal approximation to the binomial) about 
zm. = M with varia~ce za. 2 = S2 
1 1 
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Her.ce we have 
Pr( I:X. 1 = N+l) is ~(N+~~~ = ~t(N~~=M) 
Pr(I:X. 1 = N) . \ N-M) 1s <P - 5- \N+J.·-M = ~ --r 
II'Jhere ~ is the norma 1 probabi1 i ty ordinate 
Put a = N+~-M s 
+ 1s ~ 
1s) 
then the probability of having a just winning result 
(Just winning implies minimal winning) is 
and 
If ~S is small and a is small enough for the nonnal approximation 
to be valid, this can be written as 
(2) 2¢(a) 1 +w 
and the value of group i is 
( 3) 
(4) 
and we know that 
X. 
v. = 2~ 1 1~+ I x Pr. (X; and in Just Winning0r.(Just .. 
W1nn1ng Coal1t1on) 
Xe x Pr. {X; in N+l voting yes}+(n1-X;) x Pr.{ X; in 
N voting yes } 
Pr. (just winning) 
I: X. x Pr. { X. in N+ l } 
1 1 
Pr.(N+l voting yes) 
= E(X./D<. = N+l) = expectation of X1. 1 1 
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= m. 
1 
-:- (N + 1 - M) 0 i
2 
using the result for 
and simi1ar~y 
= m. 
1 
(bt s 
+ 
5 2 nonna 1 i ty 
I;X· x Pr. {x. inN} 1 1 
= 
Pr.(N voting yes) 
So we have 
( 5) 
Thus 
v. 
1 
( ~· - M.) .2 
= m. + '~ a 1 
1 
s 2 
( s 1) 2 = m. + a - 2 cr; 
1 
, 1 I( mi +(r<S+))o~ l Pr.(N+l vote yes) 
N+l L s 2 
- { m. + (aS-~)0 i2 }Pr. ( N vote yes) 
1 
s 2 
+ ni Pr. (N vote yes2J 
Pr. (just winning) 
( 6) 
2 
[ 
m
1
. +(aS+~) of} ¢(a+l.J;~-{n.-:-m._{aS-~)o: ¢(a- _1 ) 
s 2 2S 1 1 "S"2 1 2S 
1 " ( ) 2 ¢ (a) + '2f 5:2. <I) a 
2 2 c-Now a S , m, n are all of order n,a is of order vn 
' 
a a 2 1 ( m. + c- . ) ¢ (a+- ) 
1 .:> 1 25 
So ¢(a-
(7) 
+ 
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1 
So regarding ~ as smal1er tha:1 n~ zs smaller than a. and keeping 
1st order terms o~1y gives 
(8) v. 
1 
which reduces to 
{9) v. 
1 
1 
= N+l 
Now we know that 
n. = number 1 
... + 
1 " 1 rri 2 zs ¢ (r.t) ••• ) + 2" 5 2¢ (a ) 
2¢(a) + .•..• 
+ <P 
1 t a ) ( 2m . + 2 a r/ 
4Scp(a) 1 S v,· 
in group or party 
2 n.a. ( 1-a. ) = a;- 1 1 1 
m. = n.a. 1 1 1 
M = L: m. 1 
S2 = L: of 1 
2N+l = Total number of players in the game 
a = 
N + ~ - M 
s 
1 Also ¢(a) = -- -lrl exp 2 , the normal ordinate corresponding 
l 
1 
I 
I 
I 
.J 
vqS 
, . <tU -Jcl2.. ! to deviation-Sa with variance S 2 0Wlla1 ~ (ot.) = "'""mrs ex.f 2 ~ -©t. o/ (Dt..) 
So with nor~a1 approxmation to binomial expression (9) reduces to 
V _ 1 [.. (n.+ u:~ \ 11 (2m. + 2.o .. a:a ; - N 1 1 L2. , si-J - ·4·5' 1 r 1 -"Y] 
n. rn; + 
--s-
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Thus expression (10) is the extended Shap~ey value v.ector which 
incorporates the probabi1ities of association and cooperation among 
players from differer.t groups. 
If we allow the probability of every party to vote together with each 
other to be 1 -2 - .5 then the above expression reduces further to 
(11) v. 
1 = 
1 n. + ol r 2] 2(N+1) _ 1 SZ 
3.2.5 THE DIRECT APPROACH MODEL - THE EXTREME CASE 
In (1) of (3.2.4) we invoked the statistical conditional 
expectation formula for random variates X. independently 
1 
distributed with mean m; and variance o; 2 ~ 
Ko.2 
I 
+ --
L:a~ 
I 
We went further to assume that L:Xi was distributed normany 
about rm. = M ~ith variance L:a 2 • = S2 , and we further carried 
1 1 
out a normal approximation to the binomial in (10) of (3.2.4) 
It therefore follows that for some voting situations the 
formula (10) of (3.2.4) will be inaccurate. 
We can determine the va 1 ue by using the same concept with 
no approximations and carry out our calculations term by term. 
We shall define the procedure by using a simple example, thus -
Let three parties, 1, 2, and 3 be represented as fallows, 
nl = 37, n2 = 28 and n3 = 30 and let them be associated 
with probabilities al, a2,. a3. Let the probability that XL from 
Party 1 votes yea to question K+ = al = 0.1 and the probability 
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that X fro:n Party 2 votes year to quest~on I<+ = a = 0.0 
2 2 
and the probability that X from Party 3 votes year 
3 
to question :<+ =a = 0.5 
3 
We have the total number of players to be 95 
Thus we want Prob. yea= 48 = Pr.{ X + X = 48} (The situation 
l 3 
is simplified since party 2 always votes nay to K+ here) 
and Prob. Nay = 48 = Prob. {year = 47} = Prob. { X + X = 47} 
. 1. 3 
We know the x•s are binomial, so let Pi= Probability of havir.g 
I 
X = i and P. = Prob. of having X = i. We note that X would 
1 1 3 2 
hardly join any coalitions with X and X 
1 3 
I I 
So ( 1) Pr. { X + X 
1 3 
= 48} = p p 
18 3 0 
+ ... +P P. 
3-7 11 
the total Probability of having 48 from players belonging to the two 
different parties. We can refer each of these to the product 
I 
e.g. p p 
2 0 3 0 
p 
20 implies the Probability of having 20 players out of 37 in X 1 
voting yea i.e. 
p = 19 
p = 
18 
p 
= 17 
p = 
21 
p = 
22 
37} 
19!l81 
. . 
37! 
181191 
' . 
37} 
17l2ol 
' 
37! 
211 16~ 
• 
37! 
22ll5i 
: 
37! (.1)20 (.9)17 = p 
20 Ill I 2 0 · 
. . 
(.1)1~ (.9)18 20 X .9 p = T8 rrx- 20 
(.1)1~ (.9)19 20 X .92 p = -J( 
18 . 12 20 
(.1)1~(.9)20 ~3x p = 
.P 20 
(.1)2~(.9)16 17 X • 1 X p = 
21 .9 20 
(.1)2~(.9)1~5 17 X 16 X .:.!_~ p = 
22 X 21 .92 20 
e;·t-(. 
i.e. 
-dO-
also 
pt1 
= (.5)30 
30 
pi I 
= 30P 
29 30 
p"' 30! 30 )( 29 I = 28: 2~ X (.5) 2 ~ (.5) 2 = p 28 2 )( 1 X 30 ' ' 
= 301 ( 5)27 ( 5)3 = 27 i 31 )( • rt • 30 X 29 X 28 p' X 30 
I p 
27 
' 
0 0 
Similarly (2) 
We need (3) 
Pr { X + X 
1 3 
3 X 2 X 
e.i c 
= 47} = 
Pr. yes = 48 
(4) Pr. yes = 47 
We note that from (4) of (3.2.4) 
p pf + p 
1 7 3 0 18 
pi + + p 
29 ''' 1 37 
pP' 
1 0 
v = 
1 
-
1_ L xi X Pr. { X in Ntl voting yea} + (n.-X )x Pr{ xl in N 
1 
1 1 voting yea} 
N+l ----------------------------------------~--~~--
Pr. (Just winning) 
Thus sum of (3) and (4) above give us the denominator and for this 
case N+l = 48. 
For Party X 
1 
2: x. Pr (X in just winning) 
1 1 
= EX; Fr(\ in 48 voting yea) +2: (37- \)PR(\ in 47 voting yea) 
I I , , , 
= 18P p + 19P p + --- + 37P p + 20P p + l9P p + 
18 30 19 29 37 1 1 17 30 18 29 
, 
+ OP p 
37 1 0 
~X. x Pr X in 48 voting yea + ~(37-X ) Pr(X in 47 voting yea 
1 · I 1 1 
= 
48 Pr I X + X = 48} + Pr{ X t X = 47} 
3 l 3 
Since the product term cancels through~ the ca~culation is not 
invalidated by the small va1ue of the denominator. The successive 
terms must be calculated until they become insignificant in both 
numerator a~d C:encminator. 
3.2cG SUMMAR'! OF DIRECT APPROACH CAlCULATION TECHNIQUE 
In order to calculate the value of a participant in a voting 
situation we therefore need the following: 
(A) The quota = N + 1 =minimal winning coalition 
(B) 
(C) 
n. 
1 
a. 
1 
= Number of players from any distinct party or group. 
= measure of the degree of cooperation or affinity for 
others. This measure we interpret as the probability of voting on the 
same side with other players from other parties. This measure is 
similar to Ovven's distance criterion which places players around a 
circle or as points on a sphere whereby the distances between any 
pair of points would determine the affinity among the players of 
. the distinct points. This prot?ability measure can be calculated 
from past events. A pairwise relationship is established by con-
sidering a number of voting situations and determining how often 
and how many players from different parties have voted on the same 
side. For example let the proportion of people in party i who voted 
yea to bill Kin some past voting situation be b., then 1-b. is the 
1 1 
proportion voting nay on the same voting situation. Also let bj 
b·e the proportion of people from party j that voted yea on that same 
event and 1-bj the proportion that voted nay. 
Thus the probability that party and j would vote on the one 
side in some future vot'ing session= 
( 1 ) 2b.kb.k + 1-b.k-b.k 1 J 1 J 
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A simi1ar calculation is carried out for all pairs of parties 
for the available set of voting situations. We then use these 
probabilities in estimating the a; 's via a least square technique 
to be discussed in Chapter 4. With the numbers na~ely a. 9 n. 9 N+l 1 1 
we then calculate m. = n.a., M = 2: m., a~ = m.(l-a.), S2 = L:a.2 , 
1 11 1 1 1 1 1 
N+l-M and a= --5--- and finally the value Vi for any group or 
party can then be calculated from (10) of (3.2.4) 
= 
1 [ a\ am· a · 2 2~ 2(N+1) II n;(l+ 2SJI- ? + ~ (1-a !_j 
Where the distribution of the voting behaviour of the players fails 
to hold with respect to the use of normal approximation to the 
binomial we then employ our term by term calculations as 
illustrated in (3.2.5). 
The new model is dynamic in the sense that we can vary our 
set of a1•s, i = 1, .... m parties in order to study the behaviour 
of the values with respect to the parties. 
The model satisfies all the axioms put forward by L.S.Shapley 
as stated in Chapter 2, except the axiom on symmetry. Shapley's 
axiom on symmetry requres that no matter where one was positioned 
the lik~ihood of one joining a coalition remains unchanged, but our 
concept is based on the proposition that social factors, time, 
political and economic factors have definite influence over the 
behaviour of players in political games and should therefore make 
the formation of certain coalitions more likely than others, hence 
the inclusion of the probability factor. 
We note that Owen's multilinear extension bears some 
resemblance to our model but while he tried to determine the value 
of a player in a game by considering the probabilities that other 
p1ayers form a coalition excluding the player of interest we propose 
Jl 
that 1n calcu"ating a players value" consideration must be given 
to his probabllity of belonging to a coalition with a set of other 
players and also the ptobabil Hy that the other plc:yers can form 
a coalition with him. We sha11 present the results from this model 
and other models discussed in this paper in the next two chapters 
as applied to simulated and practical voting situations. 
CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATIONS TO SIMULATED VOTING SITUATIONS 
The different approaches which have been described will now 
be applied to a specia: polit~cal situation. that of w.ajority voting 
in an Assemb1y made U!J of separate po~itical parties. the ith party 
being of size ni. In particular it is shown hew numerical expressio~s 
can be obtained for the values of each party given their sizes and 
with a knowledge of their previous voting patterns. under the models 
which have been described. 
In 4.1 the formulae from the original Shapley model are 
reviewed. In 4.2 it is shown how the Owen formulation could be 
applied and in 4.3 similarly how the direct approach model could be 
used. In 4.4 are presented the results of analysing a large number 
of simulated voting situations and comparisons are made with the 
theory and between the different models. 
4.1 ANALYSIS VIA CLASSICAL SHAPLEY 
For the purposes of continuity we restate (14) of 2.1 as follows. 
¢i [V] = 
\vf;e U where N is a finite carrier of V and U the 
set of players. 
We note that = (S-1)! (n-S)! 
n} 
The definition involves the Nl permutations of theN finite carrier. 
If all vote individually, the value of party i of size n. = ni 
1 En; 
If they vote together as a group then we have to treat the case 
like that of a weighted majority game whereby parties are regarded as 
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being •pivotal• instead of individuals by determining the number of 
ways the parties can be rearranged and picking out the pivotal party 
each time. This wi1l therefore require a permutation of the parties 
as unified homogeneous entities. If the votes are taken in separate 
legislative bodies whereby winning implies being pivotal in ~ere 
than one body then the calcu1ations wculd fo~low the technique used 
by Shapley and Shubik in 11 A method for Evaluating the Distribution of 
power in a Committee System .. , Shapley L.S. and Shubik9 M 
(1954, p.792). The technique involves firstly determining the 
number of ways the different parties can be rearranged and then det-
ermining the number of ways an individual player can be rearranged 
within his own party whereby he becomes the pivotal player in h~s 
party and his party becomes the pivotal party within that arrangement. 
The 2nd and 3rd techniques are similar since they involve a rearrange-
ment of the parties (groups) and determining which party occupied a 
pivotal position. 
Values obtained in both these ways for the particular situation 
discussed will be given in Section 4.4 after describing the other 
methods of analysis which are used. 
4.2 APPLICATIONS OF OWEN•s FORMULATION 
The model presented by Owen as discussed in 2.4.2 is based on 
the geometry of a sphere or circle. Points Pa, ~ , ... Pn representing 
homogeneous political groupings were placed round a circle as shown 
in Fig. 1 ·and Fig. 2 of 2.4.2. The measure of any ordering £
1 
£
2 
••• in 
was defined as being the length of arc containing all points P whose 
distances round the circle to the base points were in the order PP£
1 
~ PP 9.; .. ·< PPY..n ; the distances between all pairs of points determine 
this arc and its <Jssociatecl ilngle. 
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A co~parable definition ~s possible in te~ms of areas on a sphe~e. 
The probability of having any ordering is assigned to the pivotal 
player of that ordering. A player's value would then be a summation 
of all the probabilities of all the orderings where he is pivota~. 
We note that such an ordering defi~es a coalition and also that an 
ordering and its reverse would have the same probability as guaranteed 
by the geometry of a circle or sphere. 
Owen built his theory on a sphere but gave his example using a 
circle; the computations on an n-dimensional sphere would be difficult. 
On a circle it is impossible to obtain good results for more than three 
points; for example 4 distinct groups placed at equal intervals round 
a circle e.g. points equally spaced in order 1234, give probabilities 
teach for orderings 1243, 2134, 2314, 3214 (or their reverses) and 
zero for the rest. This can be overcome by resorting to a rotation 
technique whereby all players are allowed to occupy all positions once 
at a time. The lack of rotation may be the cause of the many '0' 
values as will be seen later although Owen did not suggest so. 
In carrying out a computerisation project, we required (i) a 
set of points at angles between 0° and 360Q on a circle representing 
the overall relationship of players in a political game with respect 
to the affinities among members of different parties. 
(ii) A scheme for determinil)g possible orderings and the associated 
angle or arc which would define the probability of having such an 
ordering. 
To determine the points which represent the overall measure 
of affinity among all the players we resorted to a multidimensional 
scaling procedure. For our purpose we required that the scaling be 
done in one dimension. The program used for the multidimensional 
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scaling is called SPACES~ a special analysis package developed at 
the Centre for Political Studies~ Institute of Social Research~ 
University of Michigan~ version 3.10 of April 1977 (Numac Oct. 1977) 
This involves a standard procedure9 details are give~ in the appendix. 
The inp~t data is required to be in a correlation matrix 
form. To obtain a correlation matrix we used a program package 
designed for cluster analysis called "CLUSTAN"9 Wishart9 0.(1978). 
The program carried out bivariate measures of association between 
different sets with respect to specific variables. Everitt~ 
B. (1974) contains a good general introduction to the principles 
of cluster analysis. 
Our input to the "CLUSTAN" program is data from voting sit-
uations. The data was supplied as strings of binary variables 
represented by "0"9 "1"9 1 =situation where X; )~ni which implies 
that members of party i who voted yea to bill K are more than half 
the number of people from that party who were present during the 
voting and "0" otherwise; exact proportions could also be used but 
a lot of computer time is saved by the use of the binary variables 
0,1. The matrix of correlation coefficients produced by the 
Clustan package on the lower right-hand triangle off-diagonal position 
is automatically converted to the upper right-hand off-diagonal 
po~tion via a program designed for that purpose. Then invoke the 
'SPACES' program with all the necessary commands and options as presented 
in the appendix and what we get is a set of points that have been 
through the multidimensional process and presented in Euclidean 
one dimension scale. 
The output of the scaling procedure is a set of points with 
the associated distances which represent some measure of affinity 
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among the groups. These distances can be converted into a set of 
points spaced round a circle representing the degree of cooperation 
among different parties. A computer program was designed to cal-
culate the p~obabi1ity of having any ordering which is the Shapley 
value of the pivotal player in that ordering. The search for 
possible orderings is done over all possible orderings of the N 
players~ N =total number of distinct political groups (parties). 
The scheme therefore ca 11 s for a permutation of a 11 the N players 
in line with the concept of the Shapley value. 
Details of the program are given in the Appendix with a 
flow diagram. 
4.3 APPLICATION OF THE DIRECT APPROACH MODEL AND THE 
ESTIMATION OF .a i- • 
~n sub-Section 3.1:6 of Chapter 3 we stated the required set of 
numbers necessary for calculating the Shapley value via the direct 
approach model. These were the quota necessary for the formation 
of a minimal winning coalition, N+l; the number of distinct players 
in any di sti net party or group, n;; and a measure of the degree of 
cooperation or affinity for others, a;, which in this case is the 
probability that party x. votes yea (nay) to question K+ and 
1 
yea (nay) to question K We can write down the _quota_ N+l and the 
number ni directly from the set of data of the players. We therefore 
require a method for estimating the ai•s. To do this we firstly 
calculate the proportion of people in the different parties that 
voted yea or nay to a bill in any particular voting situation as 
given in (1) of (3~·~ of Chapter 3. We restate (1), the probability 
that party i and j would vote on the one side in a voting session k as 
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We stated tr.at similar calculations wou1d be carried out for al~ pairs 
.of parties~ for say T Y1Li:nber of vodng sit~ations. 
These are then summed over all voting sessioiT)th~s 
(2) ~ .. =J..JE. b.kb.~ t-E n~b.k)(l~b.,_)1 
lJ ull!: 1 J•< , h.J 
T = n~~ber of voting situations i~ j = 1~ .•• n =number of parties. 
Assuming we had five parties~ then we shall have ten ~ij 1 s. Each 
~ij gives us then the probability that any pair of parties would vote 
together on the one side. What we are interested in is the overall 
probability of the parties voting on one side so as to get an overall 
measure of relationship between all the parties involved. 
This we do by minimising the following. 
Let a; the probability that party i votes yea to question kt-~ 
(1-a;) the probability of voting nay to the same question as 
calculated from (2) above. The a0 's can be estimated by minimising 
( 3) J. {~ .. ~ [2a.a. + 1- a.- a. ]}2 subject to a~ a.~ l 
lj lJ 1 J 1 J 1 
a~ a.~ 1 
J 
This is done using a constrained least square minimisation program 
described in th~ ,1\ppendi.x.. Thus we have a method for estimating the 
a; 's. The objective has local minima and is clearly symmetric 
about(~.~) since the value is unaltered by replacing each a0 by 1-ai. 
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4.4 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
The methods described in the previous section will now be applied 
to a large set of simJjated voting data. The simulation was done by 
assum~ng the vot~ng behaviour to be that described in 4.3 and this 
assumpt~on is consistent vvith the practical voting data to be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
The simulated values then serve to 
(i) provide a large data set on which the different methods of 
analysis can be tested and compared and also to 
(ii) confirm the validity of the approximations made in the theory. 
The basic situation considered was that of f~ve political parties 
with the following sizes nl = 37, n2 = 28, n3 = 15, n4 = 8, n5 = 7. 
(The reason was that the Nigerian Senate which provided the practical 
data has five political parties with similar group sizes except that 
in place of nl = 37 it has nl = 36 and n3 = 15 it has n3 = 16. This 
\IJas due to a slight error as contained in Okion Ojigbo (1980) 
but was amended on the practical application. 
The political system was analysed via the classical Shapley 
approach, firstly by regarding the parties as distinct homogeneous 
groups where a party occupies a pivotal position as described in 4.2. 
Secondly, the case where individuals occupied pivotal positions were 
considered via the technique employed by Shapley and Shubi~ in "A 
method for evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee 
System" D Shapley and Shubi ~ ( 1954). In the second case we find 
that power is proportional to voting strength but in the first case 
that is not quite true due to the indivisible nature of the assumed 
-91-
homoger.eous groups (parties). The results were as follows 
PARTY AS PIVOT INDIVIDUALS AS PIVOT 
Value of Va1ue of Value of Vai:..~e of l 
Party Seats Party Individ- Party Ind~vid-
ua 1 s in ua 1 s in 
Party Party 
PARTY A 37 0. 4001 0.0108 0.3890 0.0105 
PARTY B 28 0.2333 0.0083 0.2950 0.0105 
PARTY C 15 0.2333 0.0155 0.1576 0.0105 
PARTY D 8 0.0667 0.0083 0.0842 0.0105 
PARTY E 7 0.0667 0.0095 0.0736 0.0105 
The above Shapley values would then provide the initial set of 
numbers for the comparisons that follow from the other models. 
Two sets of simulations were carried out. In the first~ a 
I 
I 
set of a;'s were specified and 100 voting situations were generated. 
The results were analysed on the Owen model and values were cal-
culated. Also it was verified that the actual a; 's could be 
recovered from this data for the direct approach model. Subsequently 
up to 5000 voting situations were simulated for given sets of a; 's 
and only the minimal winning cases were retained. The approximations 
made in the theory of the direct approach method were compared with 
these results. Finally, the values given by classical Shapley 
individual and weighted voting models are compared with the values 
obtained from the Owen model and from the direct approach model. 
I 
I 
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4·.4.1 @; 's Used c.rd Assessr.1ent of Procedure 
The following a~ 1 S were used to generate the initial 
100 voting situations 
a = 0.852 
1 
a2 = 0.059 
a3 = 0.487 
a4 = 0.436 
as = 0.524 
(a) RESULTS FROM OWEN'S MODIFICATION 
A matrix of l 1 S and O's were generated from the 100 voting 
situations and analysed using cluster analysis via the package Clustan 
and multidimensional scaling via 'SPACES' as explained in (4.~). 
The resulting euclidean one dimensional scale was placed around one 
half of a circle at the ordinates shown below. This is in line with 
Owencs application to the Knesset where the parties were "assumed 
to occupy approximately one half of a circle," G. Owen (197l,p.354) 
Point on Value of Value of 
Party Circle Seats Party Individ-
I ual 
I Members 
PARTY A 0. 0° ! 37 0.2533 0.0068 
PARTY B 180. ov I 28 0.2467 0.0088 
I 
PARTY C 88. 8<' i 15 0.5000 0.0333 
I PARTY 
I 
I 
176.8° 
I 
0 I 8 0.0 0,0 i 
I PARTY E 3.0 11 7 0.0 0.0 
The assignment of zero values is a disadvantage in the Owen's 
technique caused by the nature of a model based on a circle or one 
half of a circle. In his example on the Knesset as quoted above, out 
I 
I 
.1 
! 
I 
! 
i 
I 
i 
' 
' 
: 
; 
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of 11 parties 5 had zero values and one party had 0.700 while the 
remaining 5 together had 0.3009 G. Owen (19719 p.354) A rotation 
of thepoints might give better results but that would negate Owen~s 
ideas of fixed positions. 
(b) 
The following a1 's were derived from the least squares 
estimates of the simulated voting situations: al = 0.8409 a2 = U@599 
a3 = 0.501. a4 = 0.428 and a5 = 0.541. 
Another set of a0's were recovered indicating the presence of 
2 local minima and they were as follows : al = 0.160, a2 = 0.940, 
a3 = 0.499, a4 = 0.573 and a5 = 0.459. 
These are the complementary set of a.,'s. The above set of 
a 0 's served as an assessment of the accuracy of the procedure 
of (4.3). 
4.4.2 DIRECT APPROACH RESULTS AND SUMMARY 
59000 voting situations were generated using the following 
Set Of au 0 S. 
Pla~ers 1 2 3 4 
Cases 
l 0.852 0.059 0.487 0.436 
2 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.852 0.001 0.487 0.436 
4 0.900 0.001 0.500 0.500 
5 0.750 0.250 0.250 0.500 
6 0.750 0.250 0.500 0.250 
Case 1 corresponds to a practical voting situation 
the Nigerian Senate 
Case 2 corresponds to the classical Shapley model where 
individuals vote independently. 
5 
' 0.524 
0.500 
0.524 
0.500 
0.500 
0.250 
The other cases are used to test the dynamic nature of the 
model and study the po1itical system adequately. 
The followir.g tab1e gives a comparison of the number of 
r.Jinima1 wir.ning coalitions predicted frorr. the formula of (3.2.4) 
of Chapter 3 which can be ca1culated from the denominator of 
expression (7) of (3.2.4) with the number of actual minimal winning 
coalitions recorded in the course of the generation of the 5000 
voting situations with respect to the cases considered above. 
CASES 1 2' 3 4 5 
Predicted Ratio of 
6 
minimal winning 0.214 0.163 0.227 0.239 0.176 0.183 
coalitions 
Actua 1 Ratio of 
,minimal winning 0.209 0.164 0. 215 0.226 0.167 0.175 
'coa 1 i ti ons 
I 
! 
I 
The following tables give an adequate comparison between the 
values calculated from the theoretical formula derived in Chapter 3 
with the values derived from simulating 5000 voting situations and 
determining the values from a calculation based on the minimal winning 
situations only. 
leASE 1: 
1PLAYERS (PARTIES) 1 2 3 4 5 
a. • s 
1 
0.852 0.059 0.487 0.436 0.524 
Values: Simulation 
Parties 0.3946 0.2848 0.1603 0.0839 0.0764 
I ndivi dua 1 s (0.0107) (0.0102) ( 0. 01 07) (O.OlG5) (0.0109) 
Values : Formula 
Parties 0.3903 0.2916 0.1591 0.0847 0.0743 
Individuals (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
' 
I 
I 
! 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
: 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
! 
' 
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CASE 2: 
PLAYERS (PARTIES) 1 2 3 4 5 
I 
a.'s 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 I I 1 
!values: Simulation 
Parties 0.3898 0. 2963 0.1572 0.0838 0.0728 
Individuals (0.0105} ( 0. Oto6) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0104) 
Values: Formula I 0.3894 0.2947 0.1578 0.0842 0.0737 Parties 
I Individuals (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105} 
I 
I 
CASE 3: I I 
PLAYERS (PARTIES) 1 2 3 4 5 I i 
i 
I 
I 
a.'s 0.852 0.001 0.487 0.436 0.524 I 
1 I I 
Values: Simulation I 
I Parties 0.3741 0.3056 0.1614 0.0841 0.0740 I 
I Individuals (0.0101) (0. 01 09) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
I 
I 
Values: Formula 
Parties 0. 3721 0.3094 0.1591 0.0850 0.0739 
Individuals (0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0106) ( 0. 0106) (0.0106) 
I 
·-
leASE 4: ! 
!PLAYERS (PART! ES) 1 2 3 4 5 I i ! I 
I a. 1 s 0.900 0.001 0.500 0.500 0.500 i I 1 I 
I 
iValues: Simulation 
Parties 0.4088 0.2742 0.1584 0.0857 0.0728 
Individuals (0.0110) (0.0098) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0104) 
IVa 1 ues: Formula . 
I \ 
I Parties 0. 4001 0.2805 0.1596 0.0851 0.0744 I 
! ( 0. 01 06) i I Individuals (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
-96= 
i 
leASE 5: 
!PLAYERS (PARTIES) 1 2 3 4 5 
I a. 1 s 1 0.750 0.250 0.250 0.500 0.500 
~alues: Simulation 
' i Parties 0.3763 0.3012 0.1620 0.0858 0.0745 
Individuals (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0106) 
Values: Formula 
Parties 0. 3811 0.3000 0.1607 0.0843 0.0737 
I Individuals (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0107) ( 0.01 05) (0.0105) 
! 
CASE 6: 
PLAYERS (PARTIES) 1 2 3 4 5 
a. 1 s 
1 
0.750 0.250 0.500 0.250 0.250 
Values: Simulation 
Parties 0.3745 0.3036 0.1581 0. 0871 0. 0765 
Individuals (0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Values: Formula 
I 
I 
Parties 0.3811 0.30 00 0.1580 0.0857 0.0750 
Individuals (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
The extreme case where the normal approximation to the binomial fails 
due to the set of a; 1 S (Probabilities) attached to the distribution 
of players within the voting system, the term by term calculation of 
Section 3.2.5 Chapter t"hree is recommended, e.g. 
CASE 7: 
1 2 3 4 9 
-
a. Is 
1 0.1 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 
VALUES: DirectTerm 
by Term ca 1 cul ati on 
Parties 0.4020 0.2847 0.1566 0.0835 0.0730 
Individuals (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0104} (0.0104) (0.0104) 
J 
I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
! 
: 
I 
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A comparison of vavues dedJced for each party, from class1ca1 
Shapley, Owen (from analysis of the 100 voting situations generated 
as case 1), direct approach (theoretical values) follows. The individual 
values of members of each party are in brackets. 
CASE 1 : 
PLAYERS (PARTIES) 1 2. 3 4 5 
Shap 1 ey (; ndi vi dua 1 0.3890 0.2950 0.1576 0.0842 0.0736 Pivot) 
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Shapley(Parties 0. 4001 0.2333 0.2333 0.0667 0. 066 7 
Pivot) (0.0108) (0.0083) ( 0. 0156) (0.0083) (0.0095) 
Owen 0.2533 0.2467 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0333) (0.000) (0.000) 
Direct Approach 0.3903 0.2916 0. 1591 0.0847 0.0743 
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
The above values show a remarkable difference in the Owen model 
with the presence of rather extreme values. 
A summary of the values for each party from the Direct Approach 
model will now be given as calculated from the Theoretical Formula 
,CASE 
I 1 2 3 4 5 ! 
I 
I 
2 0.389 0.295 0.158 0.084 0.074 
3 0.372 0.309 0.159 0.085 0.074 
4 0.400 0. 281 0.160 0.085 0.074 
5 0.381 0.300 0.161 0 .. 084 0.074 
6 0.381 0.300 0.158 0 .. 086 0 .. 075 
7 0.402 0.285 0. 157 O.OiJ4 0.073 
'-------------·- _________ --J 
---'-----------
i 
I 
! 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
The va~ue changes are fair1y small but very reasonable since 
the set of aj's with the minimal winning criterion would not let any 
party have extreme values. The extreme values from the above model 
can of course be estimatsc from the fo1mula: 
Since Vi = N:l E{X; and in minimal 
\ coalition 
w~n~ing ~ ) /~~~~mal winning 
coalitions 
n. 
The largest possible value is N:'l i.e. about twice the Shapley 
individual value, this will only occur in the extreme situation where 
party i must always be in the winning coalition. The smallest value 
is zero. 
The graphs and tables which follow illustrate the changes in 
V; with ai. 
Gl illustrates the effect of the changes in attitude (a;) 
of members of the largest party on the values of the players when it 
has a powerful opposition party and the minor parties cling 
together, while G2 illustrates the effect of the changes in attitude 
of members of a strong opposition party on the values of the players 
when the minor parties cling together (i.e. bind themselves together). 
In G3 the members of the most important middle party vary 
their attitude towards the other players while the two major parties 
stay apart with the two minor parties clinging together. G4 and G5 
illustrate the effect of the changes in attitude of members of the 
most important middle party when the two major parties stay in 
opposition while the minor parties tend to align with either of 
the major parties. 
Graphs Gl, G2, G3, G4 and G5 now follow, after which we 
have tables Tl, T2,T3, and T4. In the tables the three minor parties 
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cling together and thus have the same a. while the effect of the 
1 ' 
changes in the a; 's of the major pavi./es on the values are tested. 
For each table the ai of one major party is fixed while the ai of 
the other varies. 
Tables for Gl. 
0. 1 00 ~ a 1 ~ 0. 800 
a2 = 0.100 
a3 = a4 = a5 = 1.000 
I 
Party a. V.(Party) 
I 1 1 
1 0. 1000 0. 5221 
" 
2 0.3951 
3 0. 0413 
4 0. 0221 
5 0.0193 
1 0.2000 0.4435 
i . 
I 2 0.3713 
I 
I 3 0.0925 I 
4 0.0494 
5 0.0432 
1 0.3000 0.4101 
I 
2 0.3314 
3 0.1292 
4 0.0689 
5 0.0603 
1 0. 400 0 0.3932 
2 0. 2929 
3 0.1569 
4 0.0837 
5 0.0732 
-100-
V.(Indiv-
1 i dua 1 ) 
. 0141 
. 0141 
.0028 
II 
II 
.0120 
.0133 
. 0062 
II 
·II 
. 0111 
.0118 
.0086 
II 
II 
.0106 
.0105 
.0105 
II 
II 
I 
a. V.(Party) V.(Indiv-
1 1 1 i dua 1 ) 
I : 
I 0. 5000 0.3836 .0104 I 
I I 
! 0.2538 . 0091 i I 0. 1813 . 0121 I 
! 
0.0967 II 
0.0846 II 
i 
I 0.6000 0.3794 .0102 
! 
0.2089 .0075 ! 
0.2059 .0137 I 
0.1090 II 
i 
I 0.0960 II I I 
I I I 
I 0. 7000 0.3824 .Oi03 : I 
0.1501 .0054 
0.2238 . 0156 
i 0.1247 II I 
I 
I 0.1.091 II 
0. 800 0 0.4023 .0109 
0.0640 . 0023 
0.2668 . 0178 
0.1423 II 
0.1245 II 
( 'J, I 
.. l 0 1-
fuV o.o~ao ¢""""~=========~~....:.:_---=~-=-=~=--~~~ --------------1! 
0·0125 
o · f ooof:_ -~' ~ o · 80 oo 
(il !l ~ () . , 0 00 
Qs ~ o... Lr ~ Q s ~ J. o (f) o 
0•0150 
o.6ooo 
Tables for G2 
a 1 = 0. 1000 
0.1000 < a2 < 0.8000 
a3 = a4 = a5 = 1.0000 
r 
I 
Party a. V. {Party) 
l 1 
1 0.5221 
2 0.1000 0. 3951 
3 0.0413 
4 0. 0221 
5 0.0193 
1 0.5032 
2 0.2000 0.3347 
3 0.0810 
4 0.0432 
5 0.0378 
' 
I 
1 0.4654 
2 0.3000 0. 3111 
! 3 0.1112 
I 
I 
I 4 0.0595 i 
5 0.0521 
' 
I 1 0. 4262 
I 
i 2 0.4000 0.3015 I 
I 
I 
I 3 0.1362 
' 4 ' 0. 0726 
' 
' 
5 0.0635 
- 1 0 2~ 
V.(Indiv-
1 idua1) 
.0141 
. 0141 
.0027 
II 
II 
. 0136 
. 0119 
.0054 
II 
II 
.0125 
. 0111 
.0074 
II 
II 
. 0115 
.0108 
. 0091 
II 
II 
V . ( P a ~~ty) 1 V . ( I nd i v _I a. 
1 1 1·d 1)! 1 ua 1 
I 
i 0.3857 .0104 
0.5000 0.2980 .0106 
0.1578 .0105 
! 
0.0841 II 
0.0736 " 
! 0.3401 .0092 
i 0.6000 0.3011 . 0108 
' I 0.1794 . 0120 
I 
I 
0.0957 II I I 
I 
I 
0.0837 II I i 
I j 
! I 
' 
i ! 0.2819 .0076 I 
I I 
' i 0.7000 0.3104 . 0111 ' 
: ! 
0.2039 . 0136 
0.1087 II 
0.0951 II 
I 0.1971 .0053 
0.8000 0.3338 .0120 
I 
I 0.2345 . 0156 
0. 1251 " 
0.1094 II 
1"\ 
..J 
~ 
~ 
...... 
~ 
" u 
~ 
~ 
....J 
't: 
......_ 
_.::-... 
-1 0 3 ,. 
()·0!1.017 ~1 
(),019§~ () • OiiJ 
o.o,so * I 
j 
I 
j "~ ~ 
O·Ol:l~t ~w (). 012."5 
I 
I ~ ~ 
rJ ·0075 
I 
-t---- -- --- I ------1----- -----~--- ···· - ---1 - ----- --I I I I - · · · 
i @•00@ ~ (§)·~@@6 @\~(;} @,~6JO C•fl@®O ~·(J;@(§)O @ipcv@() Cf#·fJJ~o 
~).1000 
~0@@0 ~ @12 ~ fJ·t!@@() 
----------- ..... -----::--7 
Cl, ':::: 0·1000 
< 0,~ < CJ. f 0 oo 
...... .._ 
~~ = OL·~ ~ OL5 
Jal; l ~-!~or G3 
a1 = 0.8000 
a2 = 0.1000 
0. 1000 b: a3 If 0. 8000 
a4 = a5 = 0 4500 . 
-
Pall'ty a. 
1 V-u (Party) 
1 .3770 
2 .3450 
3 0.1000 .1848 
4 . 0817 . 
5 .0715 
1 .3394 
2 .3324 
3 0.2000 .1717 
4 .0835 
5 . 0731 
1 .3566 
2 . 3210 
3 . 0. 3000 .1641 
4 .0844 
5 .0739 
l .3707 
2 • 3101 
3 0. 400 0 . 1601 
4 .0848 
I 5 .0742 I 
I 
I· 
-; 84-
I. - !· 1 
V-(Ir:div-
1 
a. Vi(Pa~ty)l V.(Indhr-1 1 idua1) I 1: 1 i dua 1) 
.0086 .3830 .OW4 
.0123 .2995 .0107 
.0123 0.5000 . 1586 .mos 
.0102 .0848 .0106 
.0102 .0742 .0106 
.0092 .3940 .0106 
.0119 0 2885 .mo3 
.0114 0.6000 . 1592 .0106 
. 0104 .0844 .0105 
.0104 .0739 .0105 
.0096 .4044 .0109 
.0115 .2765 .0099 
.0110 0. 7000 . 1621 .0108 
.0105 .0837 • 0104 
II 
.0732 II 
.0100 .4146 .0112 
. 0111 .• 2627 .0094 
.0107 0.800 0 . 1681 • 0112 
.0106 o0824 .0103 
OJ 
. 0721 II 
~ 0.03-.f)'iJ 
:::5 
~It-
'::, 
~ 
........ 
(__; f).'i> I '1 S 
· o 1 So 
• 0075 
·oo5e 
-----y· -····· 
o ·!looo 6·~oo O·'H:Joo a.5ooo tA. 7ooo o.[foo-o 
0 . I 0 tl 0 ~ 0.3 ~ 0 • g 0 0 0)' 
0.. I~ 0. ~o oo 
a. .t ~ () · I 0 @0 
(f) ' /(\! @O~ 0\.. 3 " 0 · fi 0 0 0 
CALf g d. S":: o · tpS@IfJJ 
I 
i 
I 
i 
' 
: 
' 
' 
! 
i 
' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Tables for G4 
a l = 0. 1000 
a2 = 0.8000 
0.1000 ~ a3 .( 0.8000 
a4 = 0.6000 
a5 = 0 4000 
Party a. 
1 
1 
2 
3 0. 1000 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 0.2000 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 0.3000 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 0.4000 
4 
5 
V. (Party) 
1 
.4963 
. 176 7 
.2012 
.0602 
.0657 
.4825 
.2027 
. 1784 
.0669 
.0694 
.4694 
.2224 
.1649 
.0717 
. 0717 
.4569 
. 2380 
. 1568 
. 0751 
.0732 
-1 06-
V.(Indiv- a. 
1 idua1) 1 
Vi (Party) V.(Indiv-1 idual) 
I 
.0134 .4450 .0120 
.0063 .2510 .0090 
.0134 0. 5000 . 1522 . 0101 I 
I 
.0075 .0778 .0097 I 
.0094 .0741 .0105 I I I 
I 
.0130 . 4331 . 0117 
.0072 . 2623 .0094 
.0119 0.6000 . 1500 .0100 
.0084 .0800 .0100 
.0099 .0746 . 010'1 
.0127 .4208 .0114 
.0079 . 2727 .0097 
. 0110 0. 7000 .1498 .0099 
.0089 .0818 .0102 
.0102 .0749 .0107 
.0123 .4074 .0110 
.0085 .2829 .0101 
.0104 0.800 0 . 1515 . 0101 
.0094 .0834 .0104 
.0104 .0748 .0107 
! 
; 
I 
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Tables for GS 
a1 = 0.8000 
a2 = 0.1000 
0. 1 000 ~ a3 ~ 0. 8000 
a4 = 0.4000 
Party a. 
1 
1 
3 0.1000 
4 
5 
1 
2~ 
3 0. 2000 
4 
5 
l 
2 
3 0. 3000 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 0.4000 
4 
5 
-1 0 8-
a5 = 0.6000 
V. (Party) 
1 
V.(Indiv-
1 idual) 
. 3244 .0088 
.3412 .0122 
.1828 .0122 
.0844 . 0106 
.0672 .0096 
.3459 .0093 
. 3284 .0117 
. 1705 .0114 
.0853 . 0107 
. 0699 .0100 
. 3625 .0098 
.3167 . 0113 
. 1635 .0109 
.0855 .0107. 
. 0718 .0103 
.3761 .0102" 
.3057 . 0109 
. 15 9 9 . 010 7 
.0853 . 010 7 
. 0730 .0104 
a. V. (Party) V.(Ind"iv-
1 1 1 idua1) 
.3878 . 0105 
! 
.2948 .0105 I I 
I 
1 
0. 5000 I . 1587 . 010 6 I I I 
I 
.0847 . 010 6 I 
.0739 . 010 6 
I . 3985 .0108 
.2835 . 01 Ol i 
I 
0. 600 0 . 1597 . 0106 i 
.0838 .010 5 
.0745 .0106 
I 
I 
.4086 . 0110 
.271J .0097 I 
! 
0. 7000 .1630 .0109 
.0824 .0103 
.0748• .0107 
.4184 . 0113 
. 2567 .0092 
0.800 0 . 1696 .0113 
.0805 . 010~ I 
.0747 .0107 I ' 
I 
0·0~ 
r ~ 
<c-
-
l(j!t(}f1{i 
....;, ("2J 
~ 
~ 
........ 
'-._) 
V) fJ tO! 5o 
ljJ 
....:. 
-.l 
~ 
fJIQ IZ!f 
0· 0050 
0. 0025" 
0•2.00 
cu ~ o · «6vo 
ft 12 :- 0· I U U 
Oo/vOirf 1.< o·Kt'U 
(;{ y ~ (I r. '-I (! () 
0•30o 
·--· _____________ _!_ 
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I 007$ 
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• "12,5 
• oo2!i 
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Tab1eT.1 
0.1000 ~ a 1 £. 0.8000 
a2 = 0. l 000 
a3 = a4::;:a5 ~ 0.5000 
f l ~i pnctiv-! V. (Pa;~ty) j V. ( Indiv"· I ! Party a. Party I a. IV; (Party) 1 1 1. • , ) I 1 ! 1 au a , . 1: 1dual) · 
I ,. ,I 
1 0. 1 oc 0 .5180 I . 0140 1 : 0.5000 .3588 .0097 ! I 
2! 2 .3920 i .0140 .3504 . 0125 I 
! (A) 3 .0450 I .0030 ( E ) 3 .1454 .0097 I 
' 
I 
4 .0240 I II .0776 II 
5 . 0210 II .0679 II 
I 
1 0.2000 I .4247 . 0115 11 0.60(.0 . 3608 . 0098 
I 
I 
(B) 2 .3899 .0139 ; ( F ) 21 .3347 .0120 I 
3 .0927 . 0062 3i I . 1522 . 0101 
4 .0494 II 4 .0812 II 
5 .0433 II 5 .0710 II 
1 ~ 0.3000 .3827 .0103 1 ! I 0. 7000 . 3699 .0100 ' ~ I . ! (c) 2 I .3788 .0135 21 . 3168 . 0113 i ( G ) 
I I : I I 3 j .1193 .0080 3 . 156 7 . ~ .0104 
1 
I 
. 
I i 
I 
I l l 4 j .0636 II 
' 
4 .0836 II I I 
i I I I 
I I i ' I 5 I .0557 II ! 5 . 0731 II I I I ~ I I ; 1 ' 
! I ! 1 0. 400 0 . 3845 .OW!fr ' 1 0.8000 .3886 .0105 I 
I I 
I 2 . 3650 . 0130 I 2 .2940 II 
! 
(D) 3 . 1352 .0090 (H) 3 .1587 .0106 I 
! 
4 .0721 II 4 .0846 II 
5 . 0631 II 5 . 0741 II 
I 
' 
i 
' 
I 
I 
I 
l 
! 
! 
! 
- 1 l i -
Tab:e T2 
0.1000 ~ al.;;:: 0.8000 
a2 = 0.1000 
a3 = a4 = a5 = 0.2500 
Party a. j Vi (Party) V.(Indiv-1 1 i dua 1 ) 
I 
I 
.4834 . 0131 1 o.woo 
2 . 3658 II 
(A) 3 .0754 .0050 
4 .0402 II 
5 .0352 II 
1 0.2000 . 3662 .0099 
2 .3894 . 0139 
(B) 3 . 1222 .0081 
4 .0652 II 
5 .0570 II 
1 0.3000 .3154 .0085 
2 .3927 .0140 
(c) 3 . 1460 .0097 
4 .0778 II 
I 
5 . 0681 II 
1 0.4000 . 2949 .0080 
2 .3880 .0139 
(D) 3 .1586 .0106 
4 I .0346 II I 
I I 5 .0740 II I I I 1 
! ! _______ I____________ 
I 
Party a. I V.(Party) V.(Indiv-: 1 I 1 Ld 1) ; 1 ua l 
I 
1 I : 0.5000 .2892 .0078 
I i 
2 .3800 
I 
. 0136 
! 
(E) 3 .1654 . 0110 ' 
j 
4 .0882 II 
! 
5 .0772- II : : 
i 
1 0.6000 .2914 I .0079 ' I t ' I i : 
2 I .3707 I .0132 ! 
j 
: 
!. l (F) 3 •, l .1689 I . 0113 ' i ' 
4 i . 0901 I II ' . : 
I 
I 
5 I .0788 I II : I 
I i i 
: 
1 0. 700 0 .2988 
' 
. 0081 
' 
.I 
1 
2 . 3601 ; . 0129 
I 
I 
(G) 3 . 1705 I . 0114 
.0~!0 i 4 I II I 
I 
5 .0796 I II I 
1 
' 
' I 
1 0.800 0 . 3112 : .0084 
! 
2 .3476 .0124 
i 
(H) 3 . 1706 I . 0114 ' 
I 
I 
I 
4 .0910 I II I I 
I 
5 .0796 i II 
-----
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
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Tab~e T3 
al = 0.1000 
0.1000 ~ a2 < 0.8000 
a3 a4~a5 = 0.5000 
I ' ~ \ ! Party I I a. 1 • (Party !v. (Indiv-! 1 l 1 l 1 idua1) · J ( 
I ! I 1 ! .5180 .0140 
I 
, 
I •I 
I 2 I 0.100 0 li .3920 II I I ~ I I (A) 3 !: .0450 .0030 
; 
,, 
4 
I 
.0240 " 
5 .0210 I 
II 
' I 
l 
; 
I 
. 5177 .0140 
2 0. 2000 .3162 . 0113 
(B) 3 ' . 08Jl .0055 
l 4 .0443 II ! 
l 
5 I .0388 II I 
l 
' I 
1 I .5092 .0138 i 
! 
2 0. 300 0 ' .2774 .0099 I 
(C) 3 .1067 .0071 
4 .0569 II 
5 .0498 II 
1 .4980 I .0135 
2 0.4000 .2576 ! .0092 
(D) 3 I . 1222 .0081 
' i l 
4 l .0652 ' II i i 
' I 5 I .0570 II : i 
' 
I Party V~(Party) V.(Indiv-a. 1 ' 1 idual) 
' 
1 .4858 . 0131 
2 0. 5000 .2482 .0089 
(E) 3 . 1330 l II 
4 .0709 II 
5 .0621 .. 
I 
1 .4733 .0128 I 
I 
j 
I ~ 0.6000 .2449 .008-7 
(F) 3 . 1409 .0094 
I 4 . 0751 II 
5 .0657 II 
1 .4600 l .0124 
2 0.7000 .2459 .0088 
(G) 3 .1470 l .0098 
l 
4 .0784 I II 
I 
5 .0686 I .. I 
1 .4452 I .0120 
.2506 .0090 ' 2 0.8000 I 
3 . 1521 .0101 
4 . ocn 1 .. : 
i 
5 . 0710 II ' 
I 
Table T4 
a1 = 0.1000 
0.1000 ~ a2 ~ 0.8000 
a3 = a4 = aS = 0.2500 
J 
Party a. 
1 
V.(Party)' V.(Indiv-
1 1 idual) 
' l .4834 .0131 
2 0.1000 .3658 .0131 
. (A) 3 .0754 .0050 
I 4 .0402 " 
: 5 .0352 II 
.... 
i· 
l .5101 .0138 
I 
: 2 0.2000 .2639 .0094 ; 
' 
: (B) 3 .1130 .0075 
i 
! 
4 .0602 II 
: 5 .0527 II 
: 
1 .5185 .0140 
2 0. 300 0 .2122 .0076 
i 
(C) 3 . 1346 .0090 
' 4 .0718 II 
5 .0628 II 
i 1 .5187 .0140 
! 2 0.4000 . "1859 I .0066 
I 
, (D) 3 .1477 I .0098 I 
I 
I 
4 .0788 II I I 
I 
5 I .0689 II i 
' 
! Party a. V;(Party) V.(Indiv-
, 1 1 idua1) 
f 1 i .5152 .0139 
i i 
2 0. 500 0 . 1732 I .0062 
(E) 3 . 1558 .0104 
4 .0831 II 
5 .0727 " 
' 
1 .5103 .0138 
2 0.6000 .1677 .0060 
(F) 3 .1610 .0107 
4 .0859 II 
5 .0751 II 
I 1 .505Z .0137 
I 2 0. 7000 .1659 .0059 
• 
(G) 3 1 .1644 .0110 
4 .0877 " 
5 I .0767 II 
! 
I 
1 .5005 .0135 
2 0.8000 .1660 .0059 
(H) 3 . 1668 . 0111 
I 
.0889 II 4 I I 
5 I, .0778 " v 
I, 
I 
- 114-
We note that a. is restricted to 0.100~ a. <0.800@for most of the 1 1 ~ 
above calculations because the approximations of Chapter 3 Section 3.2.4 
guarantee the best results when extreme values such as 0.000 and 1.000 
are avoided with respect to the Direct Approach formula; nevertheless, 
the term by term calculations of Chapter 3 Section 3.2.5could be 
used for extreme values if need be. Extreme values, (0.000, 1.000) 
imply that every member of a party vote together on one side all 
the time which is not usually the case in practical voting situations. 
The above analysis portrays in a clear fashion the effect the 
different sets of a1•s have on a voting system made up of two large 
opposition parties with three or more smaller parties. 
It is therefore clear that the new model is dynami<;: as 
S•..tb-
claimed in,,Section (3.2,l)of Chapter 3. It has been shown that it 
is possible to incorporate the psychology of the players with respect 
to their affinity for voting with other players from other parties as 
shown by the technique for estimating the a1 's. 
We have therefore succeeded in carrying out a valid extension 
to the Shapley value which has been successfully applied to simulated 
voting situations. 
The application to some practical voting situations will now 
follow in Chapter Five as well as a comparison with classical Shapley 
and Owens' modification. 
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CHAPTER 5 
APPLICATIONS TO PRACTICAL VOTING SITUATIONS 
In this Chapter different models w~11 be applied to pract~ca1 
_ voting situations with emphasis on the Nigerian voting s1t~at~ons~ 
since E:ost of the orrig~na] data t"Sas frof.l tr.erre. 
Section 5.1 wi]] contain a sumrr.arry of the Nigerian po1itical 
set-up. In 5.2~ 5.3 and 5.4 the Niger~an Senate wi11 be a~alysed 
and values calculated via the Direct Approach Model, Classi~al 
Shapley and Owen's modification. A summary of value calculations 
for the House of Representatives and the different houses of 
assembly will also be carried out. 
In 5.5 the effect of these vauues on the Nigeria~ political 
situation will be discussed. Application of the new model to other 
voting systems namely, United States, E.E.C. and the U.N. will be 
made in 5.6 while 5.7 will contain the con~luding remarks. 
5.1 THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL SET=UP 
On October 1st 1983, Nigeria will be celebrating 23 years of 
independence. It became independent on October 1st 1960 and with a 
population of 80 million plus it is the fourth largest democracy in 
the world, Guardian, (Oct. 4th, 1982). Since its independence it has 
experienced many strains which afflict large countries with diverse 
populations and aspirations in their march towards democracy. The 
country has about 200 tribal units, Robertson. J. (1974). Regional 
rivalries based on economic. ethnic and religious differences 
er·upted into a sessionist movement which led to a civil war in 1967 
coupled with periodic unrest. 
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Nigeria derives its name from the River Niger. The Nigerian 
plateau in the area around Jos is regarded as the focal point in eariy 
Nigerian history. Agriculture must have been practised in the plateau 
region about 3000 B.C. and since then Nigerian history has been 
characterised by the pressure of northern peoples on the Southern 
forest be 1 t 1 Foreign and Commor.wea l th Office ( 1981 page 2.81). Contact 
with Europe began in the fifteenth century with the Portuguese, and 
much later with the British who subsequently colonised the area and in 
1914 Nigeria was united administratively by the British into one 
dependency. A Nigerian Council consisting of six African and thirty 
European members was set up but had no executive or legislative 
. . 
authority. In 1922 a new constitution provided for a legislative 
Council of 46 members, of whom ten were Africans, four of these being 
elected. This Counci I had powers to legislate for the Southern 
provinces while the governor legislated by proclamation for the 
northern provinces, Foreign and Commonwealth Office ( 1 Y81 , page 2<)3). 
This seems to be the beginning of the history of early elections in 
Nigeria. Political situation changed gradually until 1951 with the 
introduction of ''Richards Constitution" the policy of regionalisation 
was established. There were three regions, North, East and West each 
~lith a regional House of Assembly and a House of Representatives 
whose members were elected via electoral colleges. The political 
growth continued gradually. The 1<151 Constitution was revised in 1953 
and early 1954 and a new Constitution came into force. The changes 
contained in the new document included the granting of more powers to 
the Regions and the declaration that Nigeria was a federation, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (1981, page 284). The political system 
continued to mature until independence on l~t October 1960. Details 
about Nigeria's early history and march towards independence can be 
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fcunci in Crowther, M.(l962), Dike~ K.O. (1956) and Davis9 H.O. (1961). 
At independence a completely indigeneous government came 
into power and on October lst 1963, Nigeria became a Republic within 
the Commom'llealth. In the same year Niger'ia created a fourth Region, 
the Midwest Region, but this first Republic lasted briefly. 
Nigeria's first civilian Government led by Prime Minister Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa was toppled on Jan. 13th 1966 when the Nigerian army 
mutinied as a reaction to widespread unrest and violence caused by 
regional rivalries. The first military Government was toppled six 
months 1 ater and the second military government, led by Gen. Yakubu Gowan 
lasted nine years. During Gowans regime9 in May 1967, 12 states 
were created from the four regions based either enti~~ly on the 
old provinces created by the British Government or a group of 
provinces. A third military Government took power in a bloodless 
coup in 1975 mainly because the Gowan Government appeared to be 
making very little progress towards returning the country to civilian 
rule. The new Government led by General Muhammed in 1975 announced 
a four year programme that would terminate with a return to a 
democratically elected ~overnment. He subdivided Nigeria into 
19 States in 1976 and shortly after was killed in an abortive coup 
in the same year and was replaced by General Obasanjo. General 
Obasanjo successfully led the country to a democratically elected 
civilian Government and then retired from public life in October, 1979. 
In 1976 a constitution drafting committee was appointed by 
General Obasanjo charged with identifying a constitutional form 
better suited to Nigeria's ethnic (tribal) and economic problems. 
The committee eventually decided to model the new constitution on 
that of the U.S. -Guardian (Oct. 4th, 1982). The Constitution 
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creat2d a Nationa1 Assembly ~'l!ith tv.JO Houses. the Upper House - Senate 
which would have five legislat~rs from each State. irrespective of 
the State 1 S size and a Lower House- the House of Representatives 
where seats would be a11ocated accordjng to the popu1ation of the 
States. Each State wo:..tld also he.ve a legislative body. the House 
of Assembly which contains three times the total number of seats 
in the National Assembly's House of Representatives. In addition. 
each State would have a State Governor and a Deputy. \Aihile the 
country will be run by an executive President and Vice-President. 
Also created was the Council of State whose members include the 
following, the President and Vice-President of Nigeria, all former 
federa 1 Presidents and Heads of Governments. a 11 former Chief 
Justices holding Nigerian Citizenship; the President of the Senate9 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, all the State governors. 
the federal attorney general and one person appointed by each State 
Council of Chiefs. The Council mainly advises the President on 
some matters specified by the Constitution as a consultative body. 
For more details see NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION (1979); also see Keesings 
Contemporary Archives, (Dec. 19th 1980, 30621 - 30624). 
Except for the Council of States, the other bodies are elective 
and elections are held along party lines, conducted by the Federal 
Electoral Commission (FEDECO) whose duty it is to-register or rej,ect 
a Party. At the time of election in 1979 five parties were registered 
by the FEDECO for the elections, NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY, (NPP), 
UNITY PARTY OF NIGERIA (UPN), NATIONAL PARTY OF NIGERIA (NPN), GREAT 
NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY (GNPP) and the PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION PARTY (PRP). 
As would be expected, most of the Parties were organised along 
tribal lines as reflected by the results, e.g. the Metropolitan Lagos 
State dominated by the Yorubas had all their legislators from one 
Party (UPN) led by a veteran Yoruba politician Chief Obafemi Awolowo. 
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The fol1otr.Jir.g tables shew a s: .. n:rr.ary cf the resLl~ts of th2 last 1979 
elections. Also shown is a run~down of the 90pulation acco~ding to 
States based on the 1963 Census (The Statesmanns Yea~ Book 1979/80). 
There is considerable uncertainty ove~ the total population but estireates 
based on the electora1 registraticn puts it at 95 oillion, w~ile the 
World Bank gave an estimate of 81~039~000 (The States~an~s Year Book~ 
1981/82~ page 929). The popt~J1ation figul"es given be1ot'll are based on the 1963 
census becalJJse that is the one on which an the e 1 ecti on data ·.we~e based. 
TABLE 1 
STATE HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY RESULTS 
~ GNPP NPN NPP PRP UPN Tot. No. Population e of seats ·un 1 m) 
Anamb~a 1 w 75 - ~ .86 3.6 
Bauchi 9 45 4 2 - 60 2.4 
Bendel ~ 22 3 ~ 35 60 2.5 
Benue 4 44 3 
- -
51 2.4 
Borno 60 11 - .1 ~ 72 3.0 
Cross River 16 57 3 - 8 84+ 3.5 
Gongola 26 17 1 1 18 63 2.6 
Imo 2 8 80 - = 90 3.7 
Kad~na 11 68 4 11 5 99 4.1 
Kano 2 13 - 123 - 138 5.8 
Kwara 2 25 - - 15 42 1.7 
Lagos 
- - - -
36 36 1.4 
Niger 2 28 - - - 30 L2 
Ogun - ~ - - 36 36 L6 
On do - 1 ~ - 65 66 2.7 
Oyo ~ 9 - - 11 7 126 5.2 
Plateau 3 11 34 ~ - 48 2.0 
Rivers - 29 13 - - 42 1.7 
Sokoto 26 85 - - ~ 111 4.5 
+ a seat (AWa constituency) may not have been contested. 
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TABLE 2 
p 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GOVERNORS RESULTaMembers of House 
of Representatives in brackets ( ) and Governors in square 
brackets [ ] ~Senators no brackets . 
. 
~ I GNPP NPN NPP PRP NPN s 
Anambra -
- (2) - (27) 50] - - - -
Bauchi ( 1) - (18) 511] ( 1) -
- - - -
Bendel - - (6) 1 (2) ·- - - (~2)_4[1] 
Benue 
- -
(18) 5[1] ( 1) - - - - -
Barno (22) 4[1] (2) 1 
- - - - - -
Cross (4) 2 (22) 3[1] 
- -
- -
(2) 
-
River 
Gongola (8) 2[1] (5) 1 ( 1) - - - (7) 2 
Imo 
- -
(2) 
-
(28) 5[1] 
- - - -
Kaduna ( 1) - ( 19) 3 (2) - ( 1 0) 2 [1] ( 1) -
Kana - - (7) - - - (39} 5[1] - -
Kwara ( l) 
-
(8) 3 [1] 
- - - -
(5) 2 
Lagos 
- - - - - - - -
(12) 5[1] 
Niger 
- - {10) 5[1] - - - - - -
Ogun 
- - - - - - - -
(12) 5[1] 
Ondo 
- - - - - - - -
(22) 5[1] 
Oyo 
- -
(4) - - - - - (38) 5 [1] 
Plateau 
- -
( 3) 1 (13) 4[1] 
- - - -
Rivers . - - '(10} 3[1] (4} 2 - - - -
Sokoto (6) - (31} 5[1) 
- - - - - -
Total 
Numbers: (43) 8[2] (167) 36[7] {79) 16 [3] (49} 7[2] (1 n) 28 [51 
Percentages: (9.6}8.4 (37.2)37.9 ll7.6}16.8 (10.9)7.4 24.7)29.5 
[10.5] [36 .8] [15. 8] [10.5] [26. 3] 
. 
No. of 
Seats 
(29) 5 
(20) 5 
(20) 5 
( 19) 5 
(24). 5 
(28) 5 
(21.) 5 
(30) 5 
(33) 5 
(46) 5 
( 14) 5 
( 12) 5 
( 1 0) 5 
( 12) 5 
{22) 5 
(42} 5 
(16) 5 
'(14) 5 
(37) 5 
449 95 
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The above tables show that the National Party of Niger~a (NPN) wo~ 
the elections and thus their presidential candidate Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
becam2 Nigeria's first executive president under the new presidential 
.system of Goverr~2nt. He nevertheless did net succeed in obtaining a 
majority in either the Senate or the House of Represe~tatives and so he 
postponed the inaugural session of the National Assembly~ originally 
scheduled by the military Government for October 2nd 1979 unti 1 October 
9th 1979. Within this period a "co-operation~~ agreement was worked 
out between the NPN and NPP whereby the two parties undertook to "work 
together in the interest of the Unity~ peace~ stability and progress 
of the country~• Keesings Contemporary Archives (Dec. 19ths 1980~ page 
30627). Although this did not constitute a forma1 coalition yet it 
gave the NPN federal administration an effective working majority of 
52 out of 95 in the Senate and 246 out of 449 in the House of Repres-
entatives at the beginning of the National Assembly's term. As a result 
of the above"quasi-coalition"s Dr. Joseph Wayas (NPN) was elected pres-
; dent of the Senate while Mr. Edwin Ume-Ezeoke (NPP) was elected Speaker 
of the House of Representatives. Also an NPP deputy President of the 
Senate was elected~ as well as an NPN deputy Speaker for the House of 
Representatives. See Keesings Contemporary Archives as quoted above 
for details. It was therefore possible to pass most of the President • s 
bills and as will be pointed out later this "quasi-coalition" did not 
last until the end of the National Assembly's term. 
Another interesting result was Kaduna State where the Governor was 
elected from a minority party in the State's House of Assembly. As would 
be expected he enjoyed a difficult time and was finally impeached and 
removed from office before the end of his term. Details of Governor Alha-ji 
Balarabe Musa's impeachment and subsequent removal from office can be 
found in most Nigerian daily papers. 
A detailed analysis of the Nigerian Senate with respect to calculating 
the values of the players now follows. 
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5. 2 THE NIGERIAN SENJHE 
The Nigerian Senate is therefore a relatively new voting body 
since it only came into existence in October 1979~ as a result data 
tll!ith respect to proceedings have been quite scanty. Ou1 scu1ces of data 
for the tables given above and trce Senate proceedings were Okion~ 
Ojigbo (1980); West Africa 24/31 December (1979); Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, National Assembly Debates~ Dec. (1979-1981~ and Keesing~ 
Contemporary Archives~ (1980, page 30621- 3.0628). 
There are fivepolitical parties represented in the Nigerian 
Senate and they were represented in the Senate as follows: 
Natfonal Party of Nigeria (NPN) = 36 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) = 28 
Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) = 16 
Great Nigeria Peoples 
Party (GNPP) = 8 
Peoples Redemption Party {PRP) = 7 
Although Okion Ojjgbo summarised the positions of the parties 
as stated above~ Okion Ojigbo (1980~ page 318) yet while enume1ating 
the number of senators for each party the following was the case 
National Party of Nigeria {NPN) = 37 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) = 28 
Nigeria Peoples Party {NPP) = 15 
Great Nigeria Peoples 
Party (GNPP) = 8 
Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) = 7 
This was due to the fact that one senator, Mr. George Baba Hoomkwap 
was listed as a member o~ the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) while 
in fact he belonged to the caucus of the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) 
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National Assemb1y debates~ (Vol. 4~ No. 32D Co1u~n 1961 page 7). 
Nevertheless~ this slight errou" did not result in any significant 
change. The voting situations were first~y analysed as above with 
NPN = 37 and NPP = 15 and later with NPN = 36 a~d NPP = 16. The 
differe~ce in va1ues as would be seeV1 was r,egaigiD1e. 19 voti~g 
situations were recovered from the Federal Republ'ic of Niigeria~ 
Natioi1a1 Assembly Debates coverirng specific voting sessions from 
December 1979 until 1981. The number is small but these are actual 
situations; the simulated data discussed in the last chapter provided 
extensive materials but there is value iri analysirng real data. 
The proportions of voters from each party who voted yea arnd 
nay during each voting situation was recorded as presented in 
Table 3. These proportions were then used to estimate the a~ 0 s 
via formulae (1)~ (2) and (3) of Section (4.3) of Chapter 4e 
.A 0-l matrix was constructed from the data as indicated in the same 
table and this was used for determinirng the affinity of association 
between parties via the cluster analysis package arnd the multi-
dimensional package (SPACES) described in Section (4.1) of Chapter 4. 
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5. 2. 1 
----
>>· ---~ I : ~OT- NPN UPN NPP GNPP PRP 
' 1ING ' 
iSES- % yes I % no % yesl % no % yes % nc % yes % no % yes % no i 
isiGN Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. 
I 0-1 L_j 0-1 I 0-1 !! 0-1 0,-1 
! ~ I 
I I j I II I 
I 
100 0. 0 i II ~ 1% ! 0.0 laO ~ 53.8 46.1 14.2 85.8 ~ 100 0.0 i• r .000 A 1. 000 I 0.000 0.000 i.OOO d .538 . 461 . 142 .858 0.000 I' I Prop . ' II 
1 0 I 
" 
I 0 I I 1 0-1 I I 
I 100 I if o.o I 0.0 0.0 100 ! 61.5 38.5 100 50 50 % !s i 0.000 1.000 . 615 .385 0.000 1.000 .500 .500 Prop . : 1.000 j 0.000 
' f 
' 1 0 1 0 l 1 0-l I I l ! I 
I I 1 oo 1 100 ' 4.3 95.6 100 0.0 50 50 0.0 0.0 % i 
I I :c .043 I .956 l. 000 0. 0_00 .5_00 .500 1. 000 0. 00_0 1.000 0.000 :Prop. ' 
i I j 0 1 1 I 1 1 0-l i i 
i ! I 100 .I 0. 0 
! 
I 4.5 95.5 100 0 80 20 lOO 0.0 % i I 
' lo . 045 I .955" 1.000 0.000 .800 .200 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 Prop . ' I I 
I 0 ! 1 i 1 1 1 1 o·. 1 i 
' I 
i 
.,, i I i I 86.4 13.6 0.0 100.0 75 25 25 75 100 0.0 % ' 
'E 
.864 .136" 0. 000 1. 000 .750 . 250 .250 . 750 1.000 0.000 Prop . 
1 1 ! 0 l I 0 1 I 0-1 I ; ! 
100 . 0.0 
; 
58;3 ! 85.8 . I 0.0 i 100 41.7 : "14 .. 2 66.6 33.3 % 
I I I 
o.oob I .666 F 1.000 0.000 1.000 . 583 .417 .142 .858 I .333 Prop . 
1 I 0 1 I 0 l 0-l ' I I I ' I 
I I 
J 100 I 1 oo I I l 95.0 5.0 0.0 50 50 0.0 100 0.0 % I 
i G .950 .050 0.000 1.000 .500 . 500 1.000 0.000 1. 000 0.000 Prop . 
1 0 I 0 : 1 I 1 I 0-1 I 
! /wo ! 1oo I b.O I 90 10 0.0 75 I 25 40 60 % ! 
H .900 .100 0.000 1. 000 . 750 . 250 1. 000 o. 000 .400 .600 . Prop . 
1 i 0 1 1 J 0 I I o-1 : I i 
! I I ! 1 oo I 3.2 I 96.8 10"0 ' 0. 0 53.8 46.2 80 20 0.0 % 
I .032 .968 J.OOO 0. 000 .538 .462 .800 .200 1.0 0.0 Prop. 
0 I 1 I 1 ! 1 I 1 I 0-1 ., ' I 
' 
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Tab:e 3 (Cont.) 
~OT- I I I ! NPN UPN I NPP GNPP PRP lNG % yes % no % yesl % 110 %yes i % no %yes % no % yes % no 
SES- Prop. Prop. Prop. 
1 
Prop. Prop. 1 Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. 
sion 0-1 0-1 I 0-1 I 0~1 0-l 
I I I I 
8.69 91.3 25 I 6"" 6 33.3 % 
: 
0.0 100 64.2 35.8 75 I o. 
J .087 .913 0.0 1.0 I • 642 .358 . 250 . 750 ; .666 . 333 Prop . 
I 
I 0 0 I j 1 I 0 1 0~1 
I 
I I I 4.5 95.5 100 0.0 i 60.0 I 40.0 l 75 25 j100 0.0 % 
K .045 .955 1.000 0.000 I .600 .400 I .750 . 250 r.ooo 0.000 Prop. 
-~ 1 j 1 I 0-1 I 0 I 1 I ! .I 1 L I l 
. .100 I 0.0 ~ 4.40 95.6 100 lo.ooo I 100 lo.ooo 100 I 0.0 % I 
L 1.0 0.0 i .044 .956 1.000 0.000 lil. 000 0.000 1.0 0.000 Prop. 
I 
. 
I .1 i 0 1 : 1 I I 1 I I 0-l l I 
I l 94. j J s';3 . i" 0.0 1 oo 1 I . -~. . -100 I o~o 100 0.0 ! 83.3 116.7 %' 
M r.o 0.0 . .947 .053 1.0 0.0 1.0 0._0 1 .833 .167 Prop. I 
I 
1 L 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 0-1 I I i I I 
3.3 I 96.7 96.2! 3.84 66.6 i 33.3 16.7 1 83.3 ! 0. 0 ll 00 % I : 
N .033 .967 .962 .038 .666 .333 . 167 .. 833 I o.o ll.o Prop . 
I 
' 
I 
0 i. 1 I 1 I 0 I 0 0-1 I : i I 
! 
: 6~66 193.3 100 I 76.9 I 23.0 '. lQO I o lwo I 0.0 0 i % I I 0 .. 066 .933 1.0 0.0 . 769 .230 0.0 1.0 ! 0.0 1.0 Pl"op. 
I 
I i ' ! { 0 1 1 0 : 0 0-1 I i i I I 
' ! 93.1 I 6.89 I 14.2 i 85.8 o.o I 100 I I I 0.0 100 I 0 i 100 % 
I I 
I : I p 
.931 .069 0.0 1.0 .142 .858 0.0 1.0 I Q;Q 1.0 Prop. I 
I 
I 
l I 0 I 0 0 I 0 0.-l 
i 
i J i I 
I 96. 1 ! 3.84 0.0 I 100 60 I 40 100 i 0 I 1.00 I 0 
Of ! i 7o 
Q .961 .038 0.0 1.0 .600 .400 1.0 0.0 1 1.000 0.0 Prop. 
1 I 0 I 1 1 i i 1 0-1 I ' i I I I i 
I 4.34 I I 
I I I 
. 95.6 0.00 1 100 100 I 0.0 100 0.0 50 ! 50 % : 
R .956 .04~ 1o.ooo 1 .000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 . 500 .500 Prop . 
1 I 0 1 I 1 j 0 0-1 
-
: i I 
100 I 0.0 0.0 I 100 25 I 0.0 ! I 75 100 100 0 % 
• s 1. 000 0.000 0.000 1.000 . 250 .7SO 0.000 1.000 . 1.000 0.000 Prop . 
I I o I l 
I 
1 0 I ! 0 l I o-1 
·---
• I j I 
The following ai 1 S fo~ the different part1es w~re recovere~ which 
indicate an overal~ measure of the te~dency of the parties to vote 
together i lfl orcler to CO !'TiS ti tu te a minima 1 win~ing coa~ion. 
A NPN = al ::: 0.852 
UPN = a2 = 0.0 
NPP = a3 = 0.487 
GNPP = a4 = 0.436 
PRP = a5 = 0.524 
Another set of a; 0 S was also recovered which indicate the preserrnce of 
different local minima in the least squares approxlimatioV!l~ the bso 
sets were approximately comp~ementary as would be expected since 
as already stated the ~objective is unchanged by replacing each 
"a .. by 1-a. 
B NPN = al = 0.148 
UPN = a2 = 1 .. 000 
NPP = a3 = 0. 513 
GNPP = a4 = 0.564 
PRP = a5 = 0. 47@ 
The above ai •s determined our choic.e for the initial probabilities 
that were used for the simulation exercise of Chapter 4. 
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5. 2.2 CLASSICAL SHAPLEY RESULTS 
Both the Classicial Shapley results already obtained in 
Chapter 4 are listed again here. 
PART'! AS PIIJOT 
' 
1 v 1 f . d. i : a u • o 1 n 1 v ., 
Party Seats Va 1. of Party . in r,arty 
i 
NPN 37 0.400 0. 0108 
UPN 28 0.233 0.0083 
NPP 15 0.233 0.0155 
GNflP 8 0.067 0.0083 
PRP 7 0.067 0.0095 
INDIVIDUAL AS PIVOT 
I 
i Val. of indiv. 
, Va 1. of Partyj in Party 
0.389 0.0105 
0.295 0. 0105 
0.158 0.0105 
0.085 0.0105 
0.074 0.0105 
The calculations were also carried out with the amended number of 
Senate seats for the NPN and NPP and the following results were 
obtained. 
PARTY AS PIVOT INDIVIDUAL AS PIVOT 
: Val. of Indiv. 
:Party Seats 
; Va 1 . of I ndi v. 1 
Va 1. of Party in Party · ! Va 1. of Party : in Party 
NPN 
. UPN 
, NPP 
: GNPP 
; 
' 
I PRP 
36 
28 
16 
8 
7 
0.400 
0.233 
0.233 
0.057 
0.067 
0. 0111 
0.0083 
0.0145 
0.0083 
0.0095 
! 
I. 0.378 
0 .. 294 
0.168 
0.084 
0.074 
0.0105 
0.0105 
0.0105 
0.0105 
0.0105 
Classical Shapley results indicate that the middle party and to a small 
extent the 1a•rgest party would be more powerful if they remained 
completely homogeneous voting each way each time. We hope to validate 
this sug§estion in our sumr.1ary of the political situation in Nigeria. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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5.2.3 OWEN'S MODIFICATION RESULTS 
TABLE 4 
: 
Party Point on the 
Circle 
Seats Value of 1 Va 1ue of Ind- 1 Party I ividual memb-:- 1 
NPN 
UPN 
NPP 
GNPP 
PRP 
180 
0.0 
97.0 
119.0 
54.0 
37 or 36 
28 
15 or 16 
8 
7 
errs 
0.2694 0.0072 
0.2306 0.0082 
0.4999 0.0333 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
The same result~ were obtained for NPN = 37 or 36 and NPP = 15 or 16. 
The above result is similar to the· result obtained from the simulation 
exercis.e giving some i·ndication of the reproducibility of values. It 
indicates that the middle.· party is rather more powerful due to its 
tendency to vote with either of the tw.o major opposition parties with 
a probab.i1ity.of about•5. This model though makes some, useful pred-
ictions but is intli~e·d to exaggerate the values of the players as a 
result of the numerous "0" values which is caused by the theoretical 
base of the model which is the circle. 
5.2.4 RESULTS FROM DIRECT APPROACH MODEL 
• Va 1 ue Value ofi · Va 1 ue of Value I 
Party I a.'s ! Seats of I Indiv. Seats of Indiv. 
. 1 Party in ; Party in 
Party ' Party : I 
! I l 
NPN lo.852 37 ! 0.372 0.0101 36 0.358 0.0039 
I 28 1 o. 309 UPN lO.O . O.OlTO 28 0.313 0.0112 
10.487 
I 
NPP 15 0. 159 : 0. 0106 16 0.169 o~olo6 
GNPP 0.436 8 0.085 . 0.0106 8 I 0.085 I 0.0106 i 
PRP 0.~24. 7 0.074 0.0106 7 I 0.074 '0.0106 I 
' 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
of ! 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_...,.. __ ,_ ----· 
-·- _, 
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Ca1culaticns ~ere done with data based on both NPN = 37~ and NPN = 35 
and also NPP = 15 a:nd NPP = 16. Tho diffcrer.ce in values ~Jas vsry 
i·nsignHicant. The results are as reported above. 
The results show that the midd~e pBlrties have gair:ed s1ightly more 
'power thaV'l their values vial the Classic~! Shap1ey approach~ whiLe 
t~e major parties lose or gain according to their attitude to the 
minor parttes. 
5:2~5 Direct Approach - Group Concept 
When these parties w~re analysed through the group concept 
of 3.2.3 of Chapter 3 with same a1
1s the following values 
were calculated. 
Value Value of Value ··Value of 
Party a. Q s Seats of Kndiv Seats of Indiv. 1 Party in Party in 
Party Party 
NPN 0.852 37 0.351 0.0094 36 0.348 0.0096 
UPN 0.0 28 0.291 0.0103. 28 0.286 0.0102 
NPP 0.487 15 0.221 0.0147 16 0.233 0.0147 
GNPP 0.436 8 0.077 0.0096 8 0.078 0.0098 
PRP 0.524 7 0.57 0.0081 7 0.057 0.0081 
The values of the major middle party namely NPP due to its voting 
tendencies is seen to appreciate considerably. We shall now present a 
summary of the values for the House of Representatives and the loc~l 
Houses of Assembly. 
5. 3 BESUL TS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
From the election results presented in 5.1 it is clear that the 
voting pattern in Nigeria is along ethnic and tribal lines~ thus a 
state supports a party in all the legislative bodies on the same scale 
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so t~at t~e ratio of 1eg~sla~ors ~n the House of Representatives fro~ a 
party is simi1lar to the ratio in the Senate as aha ref1ected by the 
nu11ber of Governors from the different parties. Analysis of the House 
of Representatives was done using the same aius as calculated from the 
Senate. The results w2re as follows: 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Direct Approach Direct Appu .. oach Vic s from 
Parties Seats \/i 0 S (Individ~ V~ 0 S (Group- ·Shapley 
ual} ing) !(weighted) 
NPN 167 0.373 0.360 I 0.400 
UPN 1n 0.245 0.300 0.233 
NPP 79 g. 176 0.174 0.233 
GNPP 43 0.096 0.073 0.067 
PRP 49 0.109 0.093 ~ 0. 067 
~ 
Owen•s model gave the same results as the Senate and for Shapley 
(Individual Pivot)~ the value would be proportional to the weights. 
The trend is simi 1 ar to the Senate. 
5.4 LOCAL HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY - VALUES 
To complete the picture a distribution of powers between the various 
parties in all th~ states is presented as calculated via the Direct 
Approach (General) model using the following a1 's NPN = al = 0~160· 
UPN = a2 = 0 .940 ~ NPP = a3 = 0.449 9 GNPP = a4 = 0.572· and PRP = a5 = 
l 
I 
0. 459 as in {b) of 4.4.1. These were estimated using ~ simulafed data.' since 
data on voting situations from the diffe.rent states is very difficult to 
come by. The values in some cases could be very different if the a1os 
from the States voting situations were used because some local parties 
remain in direct opposition at the state level, while their counterparts 
at the national level cooperate. These instances are of course not very 
common. Data for the seats in the different Houses of Assembly was 
as contained in Table 1 of 5.1 (State Houses of Assembly results). The 
distribution now follows. 
~Bl-
p 
PARTIES VALUES - ·r~divid~al values in brackets ( ) 
l ! 
·I STATES NPN 
., 
U?N I NPP GN?P PRP ! . ! ( 
. I 
I 
I i 
I ' 
Anambra . 1212 I 0.0 .8551 .OFJ2 0.0 I 
I I (. m 21 > I (0.0) i (.0114) ( .0112) (0.0) I j I 
I 
I I I Bauchi .8591 0.0 .0333 I .0625 .0184 ' f 
I 
i 
(0.0191) I (0.0) {0.0083) {0.0069) (0.0092) ! 
I ! ! I I 
' 
I 
I I ! I I I .l ! I Bendel .1534 I .8074 .0323 0.0 0.0 I j I I I (.0070) (.0231) i (.0108) (0.0) : (0.0) I i I I 
' t I l 
I ! 
·' 
Benue .9642 I 0.0 .0184 .0173 0.0 I I i 
I (.0219} I (0.0) i (.0061) I (.0043) (0.0} : I I I I i 
' 
I I 
I l i 
I 
Born@ 0.1497 0.0 0.0 .8230 I 0.0137 I 
I 
i ( .OB7) I { .0136) i (0.0) (0.0) 1 (0.0137) 
i ' ! 
' 
I i I ; ' ; Cross R1ver . 7971 . 0431 .0245 01175 
(Oo0140) (0.0054) (.0082) { 0 0073) (0.0) 
Gongo1a i o2289 .3282 .0154 .4123 .0152 
(. 0135) (.0182) (.0154) {.0159) (o0152} 
! 
I . 
Imo .0916 OoO .8751 .0216 i 0.0 
I 
I {. 0114} (0.0) {.0109) (.0108) I (0.0) I 
I 
Kaduna o8143 .0209 .0258 .0627 o0763 
(.0120) (.0042) (.0065) (.0057} ( .0069} 
-'TJ2-
Cor.t. 
STATES NPN UPN NPP GNPP PRP 
Kano . 1015 0.0 0.0 .0138 .8765 
(.0078) (0.0} (0.0) (.0069) ( .0071) 
Kwara .6582 .2699 0.0 .04313 0.0 
(. 0263) ( . 0180) (0.0) (. 0219) (0.0) 
Lagos 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(0; 0) ( .0277) co~ o) (0.0} (0.0) 
Ntger .9427 0.0 0.0 .0003 0.0 
(. 0337} (0.0) (0.0) cooQ2) (0 .0) 
Ogun. 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(0.0) (.0277) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
On do 0.0 l.O 0.0 0.0 0.0 
( 0. 0) (.0151) (0~0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Oyo 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(0.0) (. 008'5) (0.0) (Q.O) (0.0) 
Plateau .2466 0.0 .6720 .05.77) 0.0 
( . 0224) (0.0) (.0198) (.0192) (0.0) 
Rivers .7900 0.0 .1732 0.0 0.0 
(0. 0272) (0.0) (0.0133) (0.0) (0.0}. 
Sok.oto .8968 0.0 0.0 .1032 o.o 
( .0106) (0.0) (0.0) (. 0040) (0.0) 
-------· -·~------~--
., ' .. 
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The above cc~pletes the p~cture of tha political situation in 
Nigeriu.. NPN tha ruling party is more t"\lidespread and t·:herever they 
appear they teno1 to con11and a 1 ot of power. They may a11 wen succeed 
in obtaining an ove~~nelming w.ajority if they are ab1e to b~ild on 
their present pcwers. 
An analysis of the effect of the values on the political situation 
based on the Senate calculations now follows. The Senate as pointed out 
earlier seems to reflect the trend of events in the whole political 
spectrum of Nigeria. 
5.5 EFFECT OF VALUES (SENATE) ON POLITICAL SITUATION IN NIGERIA 
~ i 
ClJ a. -o ~ ~ 
....- VI!:: u u 
0. VI....., ClJ QJ +-) "'d 
as as s.. s.. OJ..-
..s::: ...- ~+> .... ..... S::CLI E (/) +> UCLIO E 0 0 ..... ..s::: 
0 0 ..-_ > 0 ..c 
s.. .....- > E O.·r- s.. E E IOVI -~ as ..... o as .a. ~ o..s::: 0 .s:: 0')' u c: 
uo.. s.....c: s..u.- s..us:: 0 in•r- D 1.1-V')VI VI ~1010 1.1- ·as .,... ~-..... 
> VI QJVI:>, 10 Q) 0 s... 0 0. 0~ 
1- +> ::lVI~ •.....- ::1 c • s.. ClJ 0 ... ::1 .,... ex: as .--ass.. ...... as 0 ...... Q) ..... 0. s:: ..... 0. 0 • VI 
ct ClJ 10 ..- m IOU> as 3:: as o.. aJ 10 0. ... 00 
VI 
~ 
n VI 
-S::- 0 
0 0.. s:: .. 
~ 
<II-OJ 
OS:: 
'F "'0 
• ..c ..... 
OIOOJ 
0.. (/) >UO.. > •r-·•,.... >O .>c::C~ >«:(~ z 0. .ZU..S::: 
NPN 36 0.389 0.378 0.2694 0.358 0.348 19 
UPN 28 0.295 0.294 0.2306 0.313 0.286 0 
NPP 16 .0. 158 0.168 0.4999 0.]69 0.233 5 
GNPP 8 0.084 0.084 0.0 0.085 0.0 78 0 
PRP 7 0.074 0.074 0.0 0.074 0.057 0 
As stated earlier in 5.1~ the Nigerian President~ Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari postponed the inaugural session of the National Assembly which was 
originally scheduled for Oct.2nd 1979 until Oct. 9th 1979 in order to give 
his party the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) the chance of forming a 
coalition in order to have a working majority in the Senate as well as 
the House of Representatives. The NPN succeeded in forming a 'quasi-
coalition~ with the middle party, the Nigerian Peoples Party NPP 
13 
0 
4 
0 
0 
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which they referred to as a •'co-oparation agreemant". This enabled 
the NPN federal Government to have an effective working majority of 52 
out of 95 in the Senate and 246 out of 449 in the ~ouse of Representatives 
as pointed out earlier. Our Direct Approach calcu'!attons shew that the 
ratio of the value of NPP to the value of NPN is 0.358 : 0.169 = .472 
in the individual calculation technique and 0.348 : 0.233 = 0.670 forr 
the grouping case. In this instance the results obtained from the 
grouping are more vital since a permanent coalition arrangement is 
being worked out. 
In contrast the ratios for the other models are .406 and .444 
far Sh_apley and 1.856 for Owen~ so this !!!Odel is intermediate in its 
estimate of a small party's value between Shapley and Owen. It is 
r.easonable to compare the ratios with the distribution of influential 
positions. The distribution of cabinet positions show that out of 
24 Cabinet positions, the NPN with a Direct Approach value of 0.358 
had 19- while NPP with 0.169 had only 5 and aut of 17 non-Cabinet 
ministerial positions, NPN' had 13~ while NP:P had -only 4. NPP in 
addition had no special presidential advisers. The ratios are .26 for 
Cabinet and .31 for non-Cabinet. Such an arrangement where a pprty 
receives much less than its value in a coaljtion arrangement is not 
expected to last. As a result the cooperation agreement between NPN 
and NPP came to an end and all NPP Cabinet and non-Cabinet appointees 
re.!)igned except the few who decided to leave their ·Party and remain 
in the NPN·Government, for example, Professor Ishaya Audu, External 
affairs minister. It seems clear therefore that this new model could 
serve as a useful guide to political parties, Governments, committees 
and any organisation th~t has a political structure in helping the 
players to take decisions with respect to co-operation, coalition, etc . 
. ' 
',. _, 
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~r.Jhen determinirng the a11oca.t"ilons C:IJie to different individuals~ parties 
or organisations within such scheme. 
Further variations of the a;'s were carried out in order to 
study the effect of changes in attitude on the Nigerian political 
partie,values with respect to the Nigerian Senate. The results 
obtained were similar to those obtained in the simulation of 
Chapter 4. 
We can9 therefore9 infer that the.best course of action for 
a middle party is to remain united and to have a flexibility with 
respect to association with major opposition parties. Major parties 
should seek coalition with minor parties in oxder to achieve working 
majorities but ·;n doing so must guarantee payoffs n:ot less than the 
Shapley value of the co-operative minor parties. The minor parties 
may in fact be given more than their due in order to keep them in 
the coal it ion and for the sake of stabi-1 ity. The calculation for 
such a value can be based on any of the three techni·ques discussed. 
Owen would give an exagge.rated result which the parties involve.d 
should use as their optimum bargaining point. ~lassical Shapley will 
give a conservative result which the ~arties should regard as their 
minimum bargaining point while the Direct Approa.ch model will give 
an equitable mid way result since it takes all possi.ble parameters 
into consideration. Long lasting coa'litions should resort to the 
group concept but a one off coa 1 it ion which gets di·ssol ved as soon as 
a bi 11 is pa·ssed or their aim achieved should resort to the genera 1 
concept whereby individual participation is paramount. 
Applications of the Direct Approach model to other voting 
systems now follow . 
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5.6 Application of Direct Approach Mode1 to other Voting Systems 
A. U.S.A. 
An attempt was made to apply the Direct Approach model to 
the situatio11 in the U.S. The majoi'~ handicap vJas data but as stated 
earlier the ai's can be estimated fron different so~rces~ including 
utterances of the players newspaper reports and sample surveys. 
In ~966 during the Presidency of Johnson, the average Democrat voted with 
the majority of his party against the majority of Republicans only 
sixty-one per cent of the time, while the average Republican voted 
with the majority of his party against a majority of Democ1rats 
sixty-seven per cent of the t~me, VHe, M.J.C. (1916 page-149'). Some 
members of the House of RSp~esentatives and' the Senate were mdre 
often in opposition te a maJority of their party than in agreement 
with it. This was the era referred to as the period of 'Conservative 
coalition' which may still exist to some extent presently. The split 
in the Democratjc party was a split between Northern and Southern 
Democrats. This made it possible for the Southern Democrats to vote 
against a majority of northern Demo era ts ·in 1 i ne with the Republicans 
and thus certai.n legislations were checked .e.g. Civil rights bills, 
Vile, M.J.C. (1976). The voting ~ttitude of America., legislators is 
controlled by several factors other t~an party alT¢gtarice. These 
include the attitudes of the constituents towards a. particular legis-
lation, loyalty to administration, effect of pressure groups, as well 
as personality factors. This type of set up produces a fluidity in 
voting patterns arid the slackness of party ties and as a result gives 
the American pol~tical committee system a vitally important role. 
From sources such as the percentage of-voting pattern quoted above it 
is possible to estimate our ai's and in such fluid voting situations 
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, the result wou1d be very close to that wr.ere each party had its a1 
1 S 
to be 0.500 nevertheless the a. for the Senate and House of 
1 
Representatives fo·r that year was estimated to be as foHows: 
_0.390 for tl-:e Dscocr~t:c ~u.rty ~r.d 0.670 for t:1e :tep:.~bl"ican party. Y!l'l 
ordev- to study the varri ati on in values had tr.ei rr vot~ ng attitud2s been 
D = DEMOCRATS R = REPUBLICANS 
~ 1 2 3 4 
a.'s 
1 
D: .390 .500 .390 .900 
R: o67Q .500 .900 .330 
Case 1 reflects the 1966 Voting situation. Case 2 reflects the sttuatioi"ll 
whereby the legislators voted without bias which is sfmHar to the 
Classical Shapley individual pivot case whiJe cases 3 and 4 were used to 
determine what would have happened to the values of the legislators had~ 
(a) the Democrats maintained t~eir 1966 voting attitude while t~e 
Republicans voted almost as a block and {b) the Republicans maintained 
their 1966 woting attitude while the Democrats voted a1mnst as a block 
as represented by the ai as for 3 and 4 respective 1y •. 
The following values were calc!Jlated for the Senate and the 
House of Representatives~ individual values are in brackets. 
SENATE : D = 67 , R = 33 
VALUES DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
CASES 
l .6794 (.0101) .3206 (.0097) 
2 .6634 ( .0099) .3267 ( .0099) 
3 .6323 (. 0094) .3592 ( .0109) 
4 .9267 ( .0138) 0 0711 ( .0022). 
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HOJSE OF REPRESENTA1IVES : D = 295~ R = 140 
VALUES DE.MOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
[cASES 
! 1 .6833 ( . 00232) .3166 (. 00226) 
2 .6782 ( .00230) .3218 ( .00230) 
i 3 .6443 ( .00218) .3557 (.00254) 
I 4 .9576 (. 00325) .0424 ( 0 {)0030) I 
As stated earlier the values for case 1 is very close to the C1assical 
Shapley value where individuals occupy pivot positions as calcu.lated 
vi a the Direct Approach mode 1 by assigning ai = 0. 500 to each of the 
parties as reflected in case 2 which is used as a yardstick to determine 
where a party has increased or decreased in value. 
Case 3 indicates that the Republicahs would have increased the1r value by 
voting together on one side more often than they did realising tha:t the 
party was less than ~the Democratic party both in the house of repres-
entatives and the Senate. 
Cas_e 4 indicates that the Democratic party would h~ve succeeded ifl 
requciggthe Republic party to 11 dummies 11 or close to dummies by voting 
together .on one. side more often than they did; Becal!se of their vo~i ng 
attitude their power as calcul:ated in Case 1 did not reflect their over~· 
whelming majorfty. It fnust be pointed out that only simply majority 
cases are considered as stipulated in Chapter 3. The above analysts 
clearly shows how useful the mode 1 presented in Chapter 3 can be with 
respect to the analysis of powers. 
B. Appli cation of the Direct Approach mqde 1 to th.e EEC 
The EEC as at 1973 had 9 member States. Most decisions are expected to 
be a consensus of a 11 the member States but the members of the Counci 1 on 
proposals from the Commission had different weights attached to them as shown 
in the followi.ng table. Brams,S.J.(1976). The Commission is a collegiate body of 
13 individual members, chosen by member states,which serves as the administrativE 
arm of the Council, the main decision-making body. Action by the 1973 Council 
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on [Oi"'Opo_?als from th2 Conrntssion required a qu:alified majority of 41 
out of 58. Our model is designed for simple majority minimal winning 
cases but can nevertheless give an idea as to the values of the 
members. We do require details of voting situations in order to 
estimate our a.'s but in the absence of that we can make estirr.ates 
1 
of the a;'s using what we can gather from the interactions between 
member States e.g. the case of the sale of agricultural productss- the 
fishing rights problem etc. The followi'ng a;'s were estima,te:d a_nd 
the result from the direct approach calculation is given as compared 
to the results from the Banzhaf model as calculated by Brams9 S.J. 
and contained in~Brams, s~J. (1976 page 184). 
Banzhaf Direct 
States Weight liidex a.'s /-\ 11proach 1 
France 10 .167 0. 1 . 185 
Germany 10 . 16.7 0.5 .169 
Italy 10 .167 0.5 -.169 
Be1gium 5 . 091 0.5 .085 
Netherlands 5 .091 0.5 .08~ 
Luxembourg 2 .016 0.2 .036 
Denmark 3 . 066 0.5 . 057 
Ire land 3 .066 0.2 .054 
U.K. 10 . 167 0.9 . 148 
The Direct Approach values seem more reasonable than the Banzhaf 
values. It seems clear from observation that France and Germany 
command a lot of power i·n the EEC, so does Italy; and certainly 9 any 
model that alloca,tes the same amount of power via value calculations 
I 
I. 
_._, .. 
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to France~ Germany~ Ita1y and the U.K. is not very r2a!istic, thus 
the values calculated via the Direct Approach model seem to show 
how powerful and useful the Direct Approach model can be. 
C. Application to the U,N. 
A vote in the U.N. presently can have more than one meaning. 
A 11yes 11 vote can mean support~ it can also mean that one does not like 
the bill at all but finds it inconvenient to distinguish hi:mself by 
voting agatnst it. Only a "no .. vote still keeps its unambiguity, 
Kaufman, J. ( 1980) . 
There are some geographical subdivisio.ns i:n the U.N. which could 
be regaf'_d§!d 9-$~ __ ele~tor~aJ group,s · sinc·e most pro_p()~aJ$ go ~hrqugh 
these groups before they come b.efore the floor of the Ge.ner.al Assembly. 
The groups are composed as shown in the table below. It is also 
difficult to collect enough material and then to e·stimate·the a.•s 
1 
for the different groups but the U.N. Year Book 1978 provided some 
material for this. The results from the calculations based on the 
a. • s estimated from such data is given below_. 1 -
It must be pointed out that most recent decisions in the U.N. 
are now being adopted without votes, e.g. in 1978 5.4% of the decisi.ons 
taken were done without votes, Kaufman, J. (1980 page 2l0). The system 
is now working towards compromise situations which in effect produce 
consensus rather than voting. Also the values calculated are not 
very representative of the Powers of the different member states since 
the ·existence of the Security Council with e·normo.us powers due to 
the possession of veto power makes the permanent members of the Security 
Council able to have real powers which are out of proportion as 
compared toother States. The results from our Direct Approach 
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calculations without co;:lsideration for decisiorns that require 2/3 
majorities ar.d Security Cour.ci1s approvals now follow-
l 
U.N. electoral ;Actual number Vi for I 
Group jNumber % a.'s i of People groups 1 
· Reprresentati ves 
(in millions) 
African Group 50 33 .800 434 . .78 0. 371 
--
I Asian Group 39 26 I .600 2326.~0 0.236 
i._Lati n Am~ri can 29 19 i . 500 339.52' 0.159 
: group ( i nCl ud-
: ·iQ9 Sta·b~s· of 
1 ~tr.e_:Carr-ibean 
i area) I .. 
I 
Socialist Sta, tes 11 0.(.)42 I 7 0.0 394.35 
I 
i of Eastern 
I 
Euro·pe · 
I Western Europe 23 15 .890 642.82 0.188 
I & o:thers. (in-
I c 1 udes A.ustr-I ali'a ~Canada' 
I New Zeg.l and 
& USA . .) 
l 
:r:he above results are reasonable. For example, the Socialist 
States of Eastern Europe are about half the Western t;uropeanStates, 
precisely 11:23 = .478 having a percentage ratio of- 7~1t y~t the 
powers calculated via the Direct Approach model allocates powers 
in the following ratio .042 : 0.188 = .223. This ultimately gives an 
indication of how powerful the Western European Countries and the 
u.s. are in the U.N. The power allocation is very reasonable and 
the model is L!Seful. The above power allocations are not very rep-
resentative of :the powers of the different member States because the 
Security Council membership was not considered in these calculations 
as pointed out above. 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
It ca~ be cor.c1uded t~at the ond2l just prese~ted is a ijSefu1 
tool for analysing the power or va~Me of any group or individual 
concerned ~tJi th a system that i nvo hes yes a~r~cl vto votes. It 'Us 
StllparrioV' to the otr11er mode1s because H is dyl!!ar.;~c as a l."'csult 
of the cm-:sequence of varying the a1°s (probab~Hties of assochtion)o 
It can theY..,efotre be usedl to study in deta11 and in advance the 
behaviour of any system that has the puH.tical voti119 character with 
respect to detel"mi rni ng a 11 the poss i b 1 e occurrerrnces tha.t may 'ta!ke 
place irn the event of a foi11 or a voting sHuation. The major 
o.u.~ta·ndirng advantage is of course the .indusioU1 of t~e probabilities 
of all the individual players concerned in Hs cak.ulatiovn. 
The analysis of the practical situatioU'ls shows that this model 
CaU1 be used in almost all circumstances whether olata was avaiJable. 
or in short supply. When d.ata is not r?aoli ly avanable the smaU 
number of situations that can be obta.irned either by random sampling of 
opinion or from past voting situations can theU1 be used to calculate 
the probabi 1 ity parameters. 
It is therefore clear that having appli.ed this model success~ 
fully to simulated anol practica 1 data it can therefore be claimed to 
be a useful extension to the Shapley value concept since its 
theoretical base is centred around the classical Shap,ley concept. 
An alternative approach which was evolved in the course 9:f 
this work will be presented in appendix B. AHpendiX: A will coU'ltain the 
mathematical derivation of the conditional expectation fUU1Ction used in 
Chapter 3. Appendices C and D will contain details of computer techniques 
used in the application of Owen's modification and computerised extension. 
Appendix E will contain an extension of the Owen concept to Oceanic games 
and the project will be concluded with the computer programs used and the 
usual bibliography. 
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APPENDIX A 
Derivation of Conditional Expectation Function us.ed in General 
Direct Approach model of Chapter three. 
In the generalised Dir~ct Approach model of Chapter three 9 the conditional 
expectation of X. normally distributed (u. 9o. 2 ) subject to 1 1 1 
LX. ~ L U· + K was stated to be U· + 
1 i 1 1 ~ (J 2 
1 i 
The d~rivation for three variables is given. 
Probability density fu~ction (Pdf) 
= r ;e.xp _ ~ l. (Xi- -J.Id 2 + (X2 -J.I.z)\ (X3 - ~) 2 f.· 
(2 rrJ1°1 ° 2° 3 L 0 2 0 2 0 2 ) 1 2 3 
Th~ P.d.f of X + X + X = z is 
l 2 3 
1 
We change the variables to 
v~ = xl - U.i xl :;. u1 + J.ll 
u2 = xz - Uz xz = u2 + ].12 
u3 = x1 + Xz + x3 - U1- J.lz- U3jX3 = u 3. - U:r Uz + U3 
So 
. X 1 1 0 
xz = 0 
XJ -1 
and the expon~nt 
-r 
. y . -1 
= Oi -l;!_) v ( x - u) 
- '-
-~44:.. 
because 
(U1 u2 U3) (l 0 -~ / 1 0 11 0 ~\ u\ iQ'"Z 1 I ' \ 1 io 1 1 
-1 j (J2 10 01 U2j I i 2 I I \o ,, 1 I 0 v 0 -2 I '~1 -1 u3 \ a3 
I \ I 1 1 1 l ,.u (U1 u2 u :j + I 1 I = -:--z-
-::-'7 (J'L --::--7 I ' \ 
I 
I al a3 3 a3 I I 
I I \ I 1 1 I u I .I I I 
\ 
(J7 "(J2 + 0"2 -2 2 I 0,3 I 3 2 3 J 
\ \ / 
- \ 1 1 1 I U . ·. \ crz ~ -::---2'" "(JZ \3/ 
' 
3 a3 3 
So probability (U 1 U2 U3 ) = l exr-( 21T )'%; a a· a 
1 2 3 
aod conditional probabi I i ty I U, " K is 
Now consider 
(U, u2_ K) /a 2 a 2 1 ~ /\ 1 + 3 ('\ .-~ a 2a 2 a 2 a 2 K 1 3 3 3 a 2+ a 2+ a 2 
I I 1 2 3 I I r· 2 0 2 )/ + 'l u% I \ rJ 2 () ;> (j % r· 2 I 3 2 3 ) 3 J 
I 
I I 
\ \ \ 
I 1 1 \K, \ - I \~ / a 2 1/ 3 3 
(a 2 a z\ 
1 "'{' 3 • 
= - ' 
a2 a2j· 
1 3 
u 2 + 
1 
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The exponent can be written as 
' \ a a U-f1J 
( 
n 1j; 1 _ 1 ..- a (U _ fil. )2 
a a lu - M - 11 1 1 
12 2. \ 2 2/ 
a 2 o 2 o 2 o 2 a = so ( i ) al, 1 + 3 22 2 +- 3 = 
o 20 2 o 2 o 2 
1 3 2 3 
o 2 (J 2 0 2 + + det A 1 2 3 = a a a 2 = 
1 1 22 1 2 
o 2 o 2 o 2 
1 2 3 
(.4.4) a ('11 + a fl'l 
= a~'1 so !1fYl = I< 11 1 12. 2. 1 that .2 03 
1:1{() a rrl + a fY) = K ) = K 2 
1 2. 1 2.2. 2 o 2 
,. 
o 2 . / 
3 3 
+ 2a (U - f.!/) (U - fi'7 ) 
12 1 1 2 2 
1 a = 12 o 2 
3 
= 1:1 
(a .-
22. . 
a ) 
12. = K l 
--. <>--
03 
2 
. 02 2 
(a -a ) K 1 
1 1 12 =--o--
(J 2 a 2 
3 1 
Henc~ the conditional expectation of U ism , U is~ 
So E (cU ) = ffl1 = 1 
1 1 2 2. 
= ].l 
1 
+ 
o 2 K 1 
."', .. 
E(U ) 
2 
0 2 
K 2 E(X ) 
a 2+ a 2+ a 2 2 
1 2 3 
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= ].J + 
2 
K a2 2 
a 2+a 2+a 2 
1 2 3 
u = 
3 
I< 1 So E (X ) = K - E(U ) - E(U ) + l.J 3 1 2 3 
= K l -
So E(X) 
Thus E(X + X + X ) 
1 2 3 
Hence given X 
1 
Thus 
)1 a 2 
1 1 
P a 2 
2 2 
l.J a 2 
n n 
K a 2 3 
+ --'----
a 2+ a. 2+ a 2 
1 2 3 
We have condi tiorH~.l expectations su.pject to LX = ~)1 + 1\ to be 
- i ; i i 
K a. 2 fl/.g.. ____ ,_ as required o 
An alternative approach to the model presented in Chapter 3 will be 
presented in the next Appendix. 
APPEKID I X B 
THE STRAIGHT LlNE APPROACH 
We now present an alternative approach to the Direct approach 
model. The technique has great flexibility as will be seen shortly 
ar.d is closely related to the classical Shapley concept9 yet the 
cumbersome calculations involved in deriving the value made it difficult 
for application to more than three participants9 nevertheless9 we 
recommend it for further research. 
We looked at th·e relationship betwee·n different parties from 
the direction of a linear model whereby each party was assigned some 
lengtb of' a straight line wit~ in which i ~s members had freedom of 
mov~m~nt. gll_aw_ance was made for overlaps in -order t_d permit me[llQers 
of one group to .cooperate with members of:a different group. 
Thus, let X1 , X2 and X3 be three players such that X 1 C[O~l], 
X2 E [a,l+a], X3s [S,l+B] and 0 ~a~ 6 ~ 1 and l + 6 < 2. 
Wi_th tQe ab.ove arrangement X 1 can be the "Pivot" player if he was 
somewher~. between X2_ and X 3 and the same for X2 and. X 3 • Thus the 
sum of the probability of X1 being in b~tween Xi a~d X3 would then 
be the value of X1 • This will correspond to the ordedrigs 
* * 2-13 and 312. This could be Hkened to a voting situat.ion whereby 
either X2 or X3 would Vote on the same side with X1 because the 
vfew initiated and held by X1 is acceptable on the average to the 
views held by either XL or X3 or both. The above probability could 
then be calculated from the areas occupied by the orderings 
* * 213 and 312 which in this case will be three dimensional resulting 
in tbe calculation of the volume. 
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This implies triple integration~ e.g. if X0 in ft;5)1] the probability 
* of having the ordering 123 with 2 as the pivot is 
1 
f dX0 
l+a 1+8 
J dXz J dx ~ 
8 X1 X2 
* * * * Similar integrations would also be carried out for 213~ 231.~ 321~ 312 and 
* 132 
For a formal derivation let us restate the above conditions. 
F"oao- cases result. 
( l) 0 ~a~ 8~ < l +cot 
(2) 0 ~a~ 1 ~ 1 +a~ 8 
( 3) 0 :...< 1 .~ a.::; 8 
(4) 0 ~ a~ 1 ~ s ~ 1 + a 
Cons.ider (1) 0~ a .:f f~ ~ l 
We have three contributibns to the integral, 
(i) X < a which implies that .. X1 cannot be in the middle and thus 
* .* 
cannot be a pivot player. (i) results in the orderings 132 and 123. 
( i i ) a ~ X ~ B this results to three orderings as fall ow.s, 
1 
* * * 132, 123 and 213 
* * * * (iii) . B~ X ~ 1 which results to six orderings 123, 213, 231, 321, 
1 
* * 312 and 132. To eqch ordering we associ ate the probability of the 
middle player being the 'pivot' for that particular ordering. 
For contribution ( i) (Prcbabflity ~11e denote by Pr. for brevity). 
* = _!_ a + a2 1 3 
- a2S + ..!. aB2 (1) Pr. 132 - aB + 2 a 2 2 
* 
1 1 3 + a 2 B - _!_ a(3 2 (2) Pr. 123 =....:...a - a2 + aS 
--r 
. 2 2 
(3) Contribution (ii) * 1 1 Pr. 123 = - r + zB 
3 2 l 3 1 3 
- z·<a 13 + tx - 2 13 
(4) * .l (32 + 1 2 Pr. 213 = -aS 2a 2 
* 1 + 1 (3 3 .z 13 l 3 3 2 l 133 Pr. 132. = --a - a2 - 132 + 2aB + 2a· - 2a - 2 aB + 2 2 2 (5) 
* 11 1 ,. 1 {6) Contribution {iii) Pr. 1'23 = 6 - 2a
2 
- ~\s: + aj3 + 2 a2S - aS 2 + 3 13 3 
* 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 l . 3 (7) Pr. 213 = - - -a + - B - -B + 2 o.B - 6 (3 6 2 2 2 
* l 1 ..!. Bz 1 2 + ..!. B3 {8) Pr. 231 = 6 - zo: + aS - - - a(3. 2 2 . 3 
·* 1. 1 + l (32 _._!_ 83 (91 Pr. ~21 = 6 - 2(3 .. 2 6 
* 1 + la ls· + l 132 .1 13 3 1 2 ( lQ,) Pr. 312 = - - - a.(3 - + 2 a.(3 
6· 2 2 2 6 
and 
(11) Pr.1J2 = ~+~a-~B+ ~a' •ts'-as-}a's•tas'-is' 
In order to determine the probability of any particular ordering 
with re?pect to case (1) we have to sum the probabilities of that 
particular ordering· in all the situations where it contributes to 
the integral and to determine the probability that any player is 
pivotal we have to sum over all the situations where that particular 
player is pivotal as fol16ws. 
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The probability of 3 as pivot for case 1 
u 3 % 
= Pr. 231 Contribution (iii)+ L: Pr.l32 (i =contributions) 
~ ~ ~ 
= Pr. 132 Co;,tribution (i) + Pr. 132 Contribution (ii) + Pr. 132 
{; 
Contribution (iii)+ Pr. 231 Contribution (i.ii) 
(12) ::: 1 1~ 2 2 2 3 3 + 2 a + aS - S - aS.· + 3 (3 
Also Pr. 2 as pivot 
.~ ~ 
= Pr. 321 Contribution (iii) + 3 E Pr. 123 (i =contributions) 
( 13) = .!_ - c:J.2· + aB + .!. B 2 - J S 3 3- ... ·· . 2- 3 
Simi1arly Pr. 1 ai pivot 
~ ~· 
= Pr. 312 Contribution (iii) + 3 L: Pr.2l3 
i = 1 
To .. determine . the overa.ll probabil i ~y of any ord~ring. t·t]erefore we have 
to consider the remaining three cases thus 
Case (2) 0 ~ a ( 1 ~ 1 + a~ B 
We have two contributions to the integral 
( i) X / Ct and ( i i ) 1 ~ X :?;-u 
"' I 
* ::;()\. For ( i ) we have only Pr. 123 
*· ·* ( i i ) we have Pr. 213 and Pr. 123 
* l Pr 213 = 2 (1-a) 2/ So Pr. 1 as Pivot 
(15) ~ (l-a)2 
•: I ,-
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* * Pr. 2 as Pivot= Pr. 123 Contrib::Jtion (i) + PY'.l23 ContY'ibution (ii) 
which gives 
l 2 1 ( l6 ) = a - 2 a + '2 
Also we have the third case where 0 ~ 1 ~ a E B as stated above. 
* * ~~e can only have P·" '. 132 and Pr. 123 
( 17) Pr. 123 = 1 -{(l+a-B) 2 = Pr. 2 as Pivot 
and 
* l + a - B) 2 = ( 18) Pr. 132 = 2 ( 1 PY'. 3 as Pivot 
Finally we have the Fourth Case when 0 -~ a~ 1 ~ f3 ~ 1 + a 
we have two contributions to the integral 
(;) X ~- CL (;; } CL~ X~ 1 
1 1 
,;r. 
* For ( i ) we have Pr.l32 and Pr. 123 and·for (ii) w.e have Pr. 
11-
213 and 
· Pr~1~.2 again. Ihus tota.1 .fo·r Pr.d2 = ~ H+a- -(3)-2 which is--the -same as- -
in Case 3 above. and total for Pr. 123. = f3 - a2 + o.B - ~f~ 2 
* l l 2 l 2 also Pr. 2l3 = 2 - a + "tx = 2 (1 -a) same as in Case 2 above. 
To determine the value of any player we hav,e to consider the probability 
that such a player occup.ies a pivotal position in any of the or.derings 
discussed above-and work out the players value therefrom . 
. We summarise the above for clarity 
1 as-- Pi vat: we consider 
( ) 0 1 1 h · h · 1 l 2 .. 2 l 2 ·2 2 la3 a ·· ~ a ~ i3 ~ ~ +'ct. w 1 c gwes 3 .. + ~ - af3 + 78 + . i3 - y 
(b) 0 -~oL ~ 1 < 1 +a-~ B II II 1 (l-ot) 2 
' ~ 
(c) 0 ~ l ,.. r1 ~ (~ II II NCl"NE -~ 
(d) 0 ~ Ct ~ 1 ~ 8 ~ + a .. II ~ ( 1-a) 2 same a,s (b) .'·.,, 
For 2 as Pivot we consider (a) - (d) as above 
and get 1 
- a2 + aB + ~82 - ls3 from (a) 3 3 
l 2 1 
a - 2a + 2 II (b) 
l 1 
- 2 ( 1 + a -B) 2 II (c) 
B -a2 + aB - ~2 II (d) and 
similarly for 3 as pivot we get 
1 + 1 2 2 1 2 a + aB - 6
2 
- af3 2 + 1 s
3 from (a) 
No:1~ from (b) 
~(1 + a -B) 2 from (c) 
and also~ (l + a -s·) 2 from (d) same as (c) 
When a = B = 0 we consider only (a) and we get V1 + V2 = 
= Classical Shapley value for 3 equal participants. 
1 V3 = 3 
The va 1 ue in this mode 1 wi 11 then vary according to the 
number a and 13. The scheme has great f1 exi bil ity because through 
a and (3 the p l<1yers are allowed a great freedom which can be 
reflected by a Democratic voting system e.g. U.S. S.enate where the 
politicj ans h,ave great t.endency to h.o ld to their i ndi.vidual 
views r.esuT:t:ing_. in tile tendency· to share severa,l views in .common 
with members ·of other political parti·e.s. 
We realise that a dtacticaJ applic~tion"of this vari~tfon 
. . ~ 
linear model will be fairly difficult because the type oJ mathem-
atical hitegrations involved, nevertheless we recommendcfu.rther 
resea~.ch,i:nto.this line of thought and perhaps it lr{illbe possible 
to devise a numeri ca 1 technique for tack hng the,· Snq:pley value 
concept through this line of thought. A simulation techni~ue is 
~n alte~native to integration but tha stze involved wo~ld be 
quite large. 
Graphs showing the variations of the value of the· players 
with variations in a and 13 for all the cases now foHow after 
which details of the computerisation technique used for the 
analysis of values via Owen's modification will be presented 
in Appendix C and D. 
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/WPENDIX C 
Deta i1 s of Ootio:ns and C.orr:r.1ands U$ed o.n the 
SPACES PACKAGE 
The fonovring are the C:etaHs of opti·o?Js a:1d corr:ma-nds used 
on the spaces package ~tJith respect to the rr:u-H:idirr:ensiona1 scalirng 
of chapters 4 and 5 in an attempt to cletermi ne the avera 11 relati-on-
ship between diffe.rent distinct groups of players as required by the 
Owen approach for input as distinct points round the circle or one 
half of it. 
HIJTT: The init command hel~ps ~o cteate an initi,al conftgurat;i'on and 
tb,e '~ptfoh .we use.d ... was ~ruskat .. s arbi-trary s~arting_:- conft.gti'r.a~ton 
with .. an indicatian· tha't we needed the ·scaling to 6~ don~ fn o'ne 
dimension. Kruskal, J.B. (1964b) has a good coverage on the general 
concepts of multidimensional scaling. The model used was or.iginally 
lnvented by C. H •. Coombs in 1950, Coombs, C. ( 19:50) and generalised tq 
the mwltidimensional case by Bennet., J. T. and H9yes .• W.L. in the 
•.. 
early 1950's. In this type of scaling there are two kinds of 
p,a-ints:.called "subject 11 pqi.nt? and "stimulus" points. Distances 
from only~.one subject point at a time are coli!p~red to the different 
stimulus points-. Krusk'al 's paper on multid.i~m~nsional scali,ng by 
Optimizing g_oodness of fit to a non metric hypothes.is, has the 
details of the theory Kruskal, J.B. (1964~. 
~ 
Regr = Diss : we speciffed Reg.r = Diss to indicatei\the data 
matrix tepresented interpoint distances. 
Dist: The dist command was finally given for a display of the matrix 
of interpoint distances. 
The 'SPACES' ~ackage accepts data in the OSIRIS matrix types. We 
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us:d OSIRIS type 2 rnat:r-ix VJhich ar.a1ysed data only in the upper~right 
triangular, off-diagonal portion of the array. 
The matrix of cor:r-eiation cceffidents produced by the 
Clustan package (mentioned in Chapter 4) on the lower right-hand 
triangular off-diagonal position is automatically converted to the 
upper right-hand off-diagonal po:r-tion via a program designed for that 
purpose. Then i nvo!<e the 1 SPACES 1 program with an the necessary 
commartds and options as preser:ted above and what we get is a set 
of points that have been through muJtidimensional process and 
p.resented in Euclidean one dimension scale . 
. Details of the p·roghim used and .. a 'flow diagram for Owen 1 s 
mocfification· now follow. 
APPENDIX D (1) 
PROGRAM FOR CALCULATION OF VALUE VIA OWEN'S 
METHOD 
The program used for calculating the Shap1ey values via 
Owen's method calls for a permutation of theN players as 
gr9uped into their distinct homogeneous parties {grOups) in 
1 ine w.Hh the Shapley value concept as poi-nted ou,t in 
Chapter 4. This requirement was accomplished by; a program 
,• .,- ,•< I ·. _::: ' ' "',:"•', 
·- -- - -,-- . -.-- ·- -- -
des.tgned. f9r that purpose whi.ch .will :be ·presepfed a:t:ter tne ·nex_! 
appE:ndi X as weJl a·s SOrTie other programs used durJ.ng :'thiS 
. . 
course. Pe.rrnutation--of the dis.tinct. groups wa?-carr~,ed out 
vi.a the 11 adjacent mark. order 11 •. Details of tbis -prqc'i=dure are 
. " 
conta i ne(j in Page and Wilson's book on 11 Ati In~rqducti on to 
. ·, . . . ··'. . 
computc:rtiqnal Combinator;ics'! Page, t.s. and Wilson,; J.·B .. 
(1979) also in Applied; Cdmbina.torks,Tucker, A. (1980). 
" . . . ' .· ,, . 
A- si iTip.li ffed fl:ow diagram of the. progratn follows. 
A srrr:PUFISJ. nm1 BJAGR/~:~1 ::-oR Ti-lE cc:lf?UTEREsso OlrJEN • s 
'~--.--. - --~ ... ~-' ..... ~-----
fVIODIFICATION OF" THE SHAPLEY VALU( 
fREAD POSITION OF PLAYERS AND t~O~(] 
OUT BISECTORS FOR EACH PAIR PLACEOt .O~l THE C lRCUMFE.RENCE OF __ THE £IRQJ] 
WORK OUT ALL THE PERMUTATIONS OF 
THE N PLAYERS REPRESENTING THE 
ORDER OF COALITION FORMATION 
~0!v PERI\iiiT?~so ro EXIT-::> 
~ 
STABTING WITH TWOPA-I:R-S,-0-F-1 
·siSECT·ING .POINTS ,DETERMINE THE!! .. 
. ---+---1 ANGLE'COMMON TO THEM I N<THE .--{-----
.-. . . '. . ....... ·. · ....... - ... _ I 
I 
f 
l 
l 
i 
·- ORDER:ING--UNDER·;CONSIDERATION~ ·t · .- ·· 
JET iF~ XL :Bt :FIRST PAlR'.:AND j 
X;l,Yl BE SECOND PAIR. DETERMJNE' 
THE ANGLE COM~O~ _ ·j 
--- -- --- - f .... 
tHA._y-r .. ··N .. G .. : ... DETE·_.RMINEO :C.H ... ~.·.c-p"MM-ON--1 tANGLE RE~LABEL THE HRST PAIR 
lxr,·. ·xL~ THEN PICK uP A <SECOND _-. 
I PAIR OF POINTS IN THE SAME I ORDERING, .CALL THHfX1 ' Yl ' 
~6BRY OUT TESTS AS ABOVE. _J 
ftoNTINUE THE ABOVE PROCESS . .--~,·-···.· 
1 U..N·T ... I.L . N·o_. M. o.RE. __ .·PA:IR.. o_ ·r, :P __ o·.! NT~. A~-E_·_. 
iLEFTFOR THAT-PARTICUlAR-ORO..: .. 
IEli_ING_JPERMQTAJ;ION)·: .: :·· .> ·. . .. . . . I ----~AN~,~~--! I -..c--. __ _:_rl)'ALL ~  <P=O 
! -t Yes 
I 
l_ _____ - CALCUL~~6E_~IN~AL~ IT ~r. ~F I 
I 
I 
The above flow diagram contains the processes involved in the modification. 
A lirtk ~etween Owen's modification and Oceanic games was also established 
as contained in the next Appendix. The program designed for the 
application of Owen's technique and the other programs wi 11 be 
presented after the presentation of the link with Oceanic gameso 
PERt,1UT = PERMUTATION 
Pr. = PROBABILITY 
Z - THE COMM'O~ ANGLE 
··r .. 
APPH!J:.)( E 
Owen's Modificattcn and Oceanic Ga~es 
An extension of OUI!e71DS modification technique of 2.4.2~ 
Chapter 2~ to Oceanic Garr:es li:as attempted. Oceanic Garr:es as defined 
in 2.3 of Chapter 2 is a s.pecial class of weighted ma;j.ority games 
lrJhere a few players {atoms) control ve'r'y 1arge number of votes9 
~1hUe a block of votes is broken up and distributed among a very 
large number of players. Such situations arise with respect to 
shares in compani.es etc. 
The structure of t;he circJe. makes H dHficu:lt to place a 
_cont-i;m.nim -Of points. -On U, and :re,t ci~terrni ne ariy lilea,ni f19fUl cominon 
_cideri!)gs def'trt~9 by corrmpn ·angles or :afcs. 'In or,der to c:arry 
out the link with Oceanic games~ the minor players were assigned 
fixed positions all spaced at equal intervals from each othe·r on 
the circle while the- major players interchanged. pos-iti·ohs with ea6~ 
other. The necessity for intetchanging the---positions of the.major 
players is because the pos-ition of any pa.rticu,~ar 111aJor p;layer 
wi:t!'J resp~ct to the minor p.l ayers can influence· the weight of that 
f!JaJpr player a:nd: by all owi·ng the IJlajor .p 1:ay~~s . to . interchange positions 
"'''- ~ ,.:.· - .. •• . - -- •. - _, .. ;:J . - . • . . . . "'' . ..., .• 
no ac;!vantage is g:iven to any major player over the other. Snme minor 
players may not hqve any values at all due to their po_sitfons but 
position in the case of minor players is irrelev.an.:t, they all 
have the same weight and their attitude towards the'major players are 
assumed tb be the same. They therefore share equally whatever 
values that accrue to them, but where definite preference exists 
between the ocean and the major players then such should be defined 
by fixing the posHions of the major players without interchanging 
them. In determ·ini,ng these positions the Oceanic players should be 
I 
I 
'1:"1 
.. :c.-
treated firstly as a si~g1e p:ayer after which it shoul~ be broken up 
into the exact number of oceanic players and allowed to occupy a 
specified portion of the circle as determined from the preference scale. 
The results fer 2 ~ajor players a~d th~ee ~ajor players with 
an ocean of 12 and 18 mi~or players respectively is given. The 
expected Shapley va1ue as calculated using formula (4) of 2.3 Chapter 2 
is also given. 
PLAYERS 
1 
2 
OCEAN ( 12) 
1 
2 
3 
OCEAN ( 18) 
1 
2 
3 
OCEAN ( 18) 
(Individual weights and va1ues of Ocean in 
brackets) 
WEIGHTS 
2.5 
2.5 
' 
6 (.500) 
1.666 
1. 666 
! 
1. 666 I 
' 
I 
' 6 (.333) ' I 
I 
I 
I 
4.0 
2.0 
5.0 
14 (.777) 
SHAPLEY VALUE 
OCEANIC 
. 1220 
. 1220 
.7560 (.0630) 
. 1670 
. 1670 
. 1670 
.4990 (.0277) 
. 1254 
.0784 
.2500 
.5462 (.0303) 
OWEN MODIFICATION 
EXT.OCEANIC-VALUE 
. 1420 
. 1420 
. 7160 {o@597) 
.1800 
.1800 
.1800 
. 5400 ( . c 300) 
.1400 
.0700 
.2620 
.5280 (.0293) 
Extensive computations were carried out but the amount of 
I 
' 
' 
I 
I 
! 
: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
work involved in determining appropriate intervals and the computer 
calculations invo1ved in the determination of the different possible order-
ings suggests that Owen's modification as extended to Oceanic games 
may be hard to apply when the number of minor players becomes very large. 
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The technique described above provides a link between Owen's 
modification based on a sphere (circle) with the concept of Oceanic 
games. It cov~d be useful in calculat1ng the Shapley value when 
preference situations exist between the major players (atoms) and 
minor players (ocean). The above concludes the extensions undertaken 
in this course. 
Every model in this thesis was computerised but we shall 
present the programs used for Owen's modification and the least 
squares minimisation as well as an example print out of the result 
of the simulation of Chapter 4 since it is not necessary to list 
all the programs used. A listing of the specified programs and the 
example print out together with necessary comments and descriptions 
now follows. 
OWEN'S MODIFICATION EXTENSION ?ROGRAM 
!"'~ P:H·'l 
1 c 
2 c 
3 c 
4 c 
5 c 
6 c 
7 c 
8 c 
9 c 
~0 c 
l J c 
:12 c 
13 r.; 
:14 c 
15 c 
!6 c 
17 c 
18 c 
19 c 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2b 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
3:ll 
34 
33 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43· 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
oO 
61 
62 
63 
64 
b5 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
7b 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
c" 
THIS PROGRA~ AUTOMATICALLY PLAC~S lhD!VlDUALS OR 
P~IIHIES IWUiW A L!HCLt Ut~ Ol~t:: Hi-\iJ"OF lT 
AT PRE-DEFINED DISTANCES AND THEN CALCULATES THE 
SHAPLEY VALUE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN LINE WITH 
G. OWEN'S EXTENSION nODIFICATtO~S. 
~INtitLY tHE PANriCIPANTS ARE PLACED ON THE CinCLE 
AND THEN THE PERPENDICULAR BISECTORS OF EACH OF THE 
LINES JOINING THE DIFFERENT PARTICIPANTS ARE WORKED OUT. 
A PERMUTATION OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IS CARRIED OUT 
AND EACH PERMUTATION REPRESENTS AN ORDERING OF THE 
PARTICIPANTS. A SEARCH IS TH~N CARRIED OUT TO 
DETERMINE THE ORDERINGS THAT HAVE COMMON ARCS OR 
ANGLES W~ICH WUULD THEN BE ASSIGNED AS THE 
PROBABILITY THAT SUCH AN ORDERING CAN EXIST WKICH IN 
fUR~ BECC~ES THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR SUCH AN ORDERING. 
DIMENSION XNC25.251,YNC25,251.DPNC5lr[EC3l,JJ(25lrJFC251 
DIMENSION TJM<25l.PPPI2Sl 
COM~ON /X/ JL(5000r25l 
COMMON /Y/ JT<S000.25l 
COMMON /W/ ITP!2600r!Ol 
COM~ON /P/ IMP12600r101 
COMMON /Z/ JJ,JF,TJM 
COMMON /V/ T. IT 
DATA DPN/0.0,90.0r1BO.Oo270.0/ 
rz.,tJ 
NUi'Jc4 
H'P=O 
JPPcQ 
AC"O 
KcO 
1\1\8"1) 
INcNUM 
iN!IJc!Z-1 
1{1\;1 
JM"l 
DO 5 M"lrlNN 
KK.,IIt\v1 
DOoJ=Kf\,IZ 
--- XN(M, J>oAI"lODI ( <OPNIFll<>DPNl J)) 12 .O•),..lBO.OO) .360.00) 
YNCMrJl"AMODCCXN<MrJI,..180.00J.360.00) 
XN(J,MicYNIMrJI 
YNCJ,MI=XNIMrJl 
6 CONTINUE 
5 CONTINUE 
DO 7 N=l .IZ 
00 8 NJ=l.IZ 
IF<N.EG.NJIGO TO 8 
IFIAC.EQ.OlGO TO 8 
WRITEI6r900IXNINrNJlrVNINrNJI 
8 CONTINUE 
7 CONTINUE 
WRIT£16,9901 
NNc3 
DO 100 I= 1 , NN 
1F<I.GT.1l GO TO 20 
DO 10 J=>l rNN 
10 Il(J);J 
GO TO 30 
20 KK=!I<ll 
II<Il=II<I-ll 
IJ<I-JlcKK 
30 CONTINUE 
K cl{v1 
DO 15 L<=1rNN 
15 JLCK,Ll=Jl(L) 
100 CONTINUE 
IF<NUM.EG.3J GO TO 33 
25 NM=NN+l 
CALL PERMUT CK,NNrNMI 
KP•K*NM 
KcKP 
NNcNN+l 
IFINM.LT.NUMI GO TO 25 
IF<NUM.LT.!Zl GO TO 33 
DO 200 IH=l,K 
DO 800 I M= l, NM 
ID=NN+l-ll'l 
ITP< IH, JO) =JLC JH,li'll 
800 CONTINUE 
200 CONTINUE 
003KC=lrK 
3 WRITE<o.350l(JLIKCoKNJ,KM=1,NMl.!ITP<KC,KMioKI'l=l,NI'll 
33 CONTINUE 
IF<NUM.EQ.3l GO TO 99 
KG"K 
IFCNUM.GT,31 GO TO 989 
00 t./fl-.., 
92 989 KB=O 
93 00 50 IP~1.KG 
9~ P=O 
9] IIP=IP 
96 K~G-KC 
0~ DO 60 JI=l,NU~ 
9C 60 JJ<Jil=JL<IP.Jil 
'79 )( F = )( N ( J J ; 1 l , J J ( ..: ) l 
100 XL=YN(JJ(!J,JJI2ll 
i01 >a=XN(JJ(2),JJ(3Jl 
102 Yl=YN<JJ(2),JJ(3Jl 
103 P=1 
104 J1=2 
105 J2=3 
1U6 IC=O 
107 IF<NUM.EQ.3l GO TO 555 
108 IFIMUM.LT.[Zl GO TO l6 
109 IF(AC.~Q.OJGO TO 16 
110 I~~RITE{6,9t)l}~~F,;{L,}(1v\'l 
111 16 IF<XF.LT.XL.AND.X1.LT.Y1lGO TO 111 
112 IFOtF.LT.l<L.AND.X1.GT.~'1lGO TO 222 
113 IFlXF.GT.XL.AND.Xl.LT.Y1lGO TO 333 
1!4 IF<XF.AT.XL.~~D.XI.GT.YllGO TO 444 
115 P=O 
1t6 TR=100 
117 GO TO 400 
118 111 IF<XF.EG.X1.AND.Xl.EG.Yll GO TO 446 
119 IF<X1.GT.XF.AND.Y1.GT.Xll GO TO 142 
120 XL=Y1 
121 }(1=0 
122 Yl=O 
123 TR=1 
124 GO TO 400 
125 142 XF=Xl 
126 X1=0 
127 Yl=O 
129 TR=2 
129 GO TO 400 
130 222 !F!Yl.EG.XF.AND.XI.EG.XLJ GO TO 447 
131 IFIY1.GT.XF.AND.X1.GT.XLJ GO TO 121 
132 XF=X1 
133 Xl=O 
134 Yl=O 
135 TR=3 
136 GO TO 400 
137 121 XL=YI 
138 X1=0 
139 Yl ={)----
140 TR=4 
141 GO TO 400 
142 333 IF<Yl.EG.XF.AND.Xl.EG.XL) GO TO 447 
143 IF<Y1.GT.XF.AND.X1.GT.XLl GO TO 131 
144 XF=Xl 
145 Xl=O 
146 Yl=O 
147 TR=5 
148 GO TO 400 
149 131 XL=Yl 
150 X1=0 
151 Y1=0 
152 TR=6 
153 GO TO 400 
154 444 IFCXF.EG.X1,AND.XL.EG.Y1l GO TO 446 
155 IFIX1.GT.XF.AND.Yl.GT.XL> GO TO 445 
156 XL=Y1 
157 X1=0 
158 Y1=0 
159 TR=7 
160 GO TO 400 
161 445 XF=Xl 
162 Xl=O 
163 Y1=0 
164 TR=8 
165 GO TO 400 
166 446 X1=0 
167 Yl=O 
168 TR=9 
169 GO TO 400 
170 447 P=O 
171 TR=20 
172 XF=O 
173 XL=O 
174 400 IF<NUM.LT.IZI GO TO 601 
175 IFCAC.EG.O>GO TO 601 
176 WRITE(6.9061XF,XL.TR 
177 601 CONTINUE 
178 Jl=J2 
179 J2=J2+1 
180 X1=XN<JJ(J1),JJCJ211 
181 Y1=YN(JJ(J1),JJ(J2l) 
182 IFINUM.LT.IZl GO TO 555 
188 IF<AC.EG.OIGO TO 555 
184 WRITEC6,9021XF,XL.X1.Yl 
185 555 IF<P.EG.OIGO TO 511 
186 IF<XF.LT.XL.ANO.X1.LT.Yll GO TO 123 
VC"'IVr- lY \lf /\hln '·-'1 f":T V1~ r,.n Tn 1...,./l 
. -. ···-- .. ·- -- - - -·. -
188 lFIMF.GT.XL.AND.X1.LT.Y11 CiO ·m 125 
189 IFIXF.GT.XL.AND.Xl.GT.Yll GO TO 126 
190 P=O 
1 C) l GO YO 6000 
192 123 i.F; l(L, F.:G. \'• I GO TO :]()4 
FiJ IFO~F .. EO.H!> CiO TO 517 
191J IFIXL.EQ.Xl.OR.XF.EQ.~ll GO TO 507 
195 IFIX1.LT.X~.AND.YI.GT.XLl GO TiJ 504 
196 IFCXl.GT.XF.AND.Xl.LT.XLI GO TO 505 
1'11 IriYl.U .XL.AN!J.Yl.a-t .XfJ GO TO 506 
198 IFIXF.LT~X1.AND.XL.LT.X11 GO TO 507 
199 IFIXF.GT.Y1.AND.XL.GT.Y11.GO TO 507 
200 P=O 
201 GO TO 6000 
202 504 !C=l 
203 Xl=O 
204 Ylr:O 
205 IFI ..i2 .LT.~lUi'll Gu TO 601 
206 P=ABSIXL-XFl/180.00 
207 CALL !~EIGHT CIC,NUM.IZl 
208 GO TO 500 
209 505 IC'-2 
210 XF::}{i 
211 X1=0 
212 ~'1 =0 
213 JFIJ2.LT.NUMl GO TO 601 
214 P=ABSIXL-XFl/180.00 
21~ CALL HEIGHT CJC,NUM,121 
216 GO TO 500 
217 506 IC=3 
218 XL=Y1 
219 X1=0 
220 Y1=0 
221 IFIJ2.LT.NUMl GO TO 601 
222 P=ABSIXL-XFl/180.00 
223 CALL WEIGHT IIC,NUI'I,IZl 
224 GO TO 500 
225 507 IC=4 
226 P=O 
227 }(L=O 
228 XF<=O 
229 Xl=O 
230 Yl=O 
231 IFIJ2.LT.NUMI GO TO 601 
232 IF<IIP.EIJ.KKGl GO TO 66 
233 IFIJZ.EIJ.NUMl GO TO 50 
234 517 IFIHL.EGI. Y1 l GO TO 504 
235 IF<XL,LT.Y1) GO T0-504 
236 IFOfL.GT. Yl l P=O 
237 GO TO 6000 
238 124 IFIXF.EG.Xll GO TO 5111 
239 JF()(L.El:l.Y1l GO ro 5111 
240 IF<XF.ECl.Yll GO TO 511 
241 IF<XL.EGl.H1l GO TO 511 
242 IFIXl.LT.>:Fl GO TO 508 
243 IF<X1.GT.XF.AND.X1.LT.XLI GO TO 509 
244 1FIY1.GT.XF.AND.Yl.LT.XLl GO TO 510 
24:5 IF<XF.GT.Y1.AND.X~.LT.X11 GO ro :511 
246 IFIXF.LT.Y1.AND.XL.LT.Y1lGD TO 508 
247 P=O 
248 GO TO 6000 
249 508 IC=5 
250 Xl=O 
251 Yl=O 
252 IFCJ2.LT.NUMl GO TO 601 
253 P=ABSIXL-XFl/180.00 
254 CALL WEIGHT <IC,NUM.IZl 
2!55 GO TO 500 
256 509 IC=6 
257 XF=Xl 
258 Xl=O 
259 Yl=O 
260 IFIJ2.LT.NUI'Il GO TO 601 
261 P=ABSIXL-)(F l /180.00 
262 CALL WEIGHT < I C, NUM , I Z I 
263 GO TO 500 
264 510 IC=7 
265 XL=Yl 
266 X1=0 
267 Yl=O 
268 IFIJ2.LT.NUMl GO TO 601 
269 P=ABSIXL-XFI/180.00 
270 CALL WEIGHT ( I C , NUM, I Z l 
271 GO TO 500 
272 511 IC=8 
273 P=O 
274 XL=O 
275 XF=O 
276 Y1=1) 
277 }(1 =0 
278 IFIJ2.LT.NUMl GO TO 601 
279 iF I IIP.EG!.KKGl GO TO 66 
280 IFIJ2.EGl.NUMl GO TO 50 
281 5111 IC=9 
262 /~l =0 
"'0"" V.Qc/\ 
2E4 IF ( J2. L-1-. ~;UMJ L1U 1 J 6Ul 
?.85 r~r-:BRC)(L-)\Fl/180,00 
286 CALL ~E!GHT CIC.NUM.IZI 
28J GO TO 500 
280 125 Ir<~CFPE~-~1) GO TO Sll 
~89 IF<XL.EQ.Xll GO TO 511 
Z90 IFI)\L.LT.XJ .. ,qi~D.l(f',GT.Yll GO :a :Jli 
291 IFCXl.LT.XL.AND.XL.LT.Y11 GO TO 512 
292 IFIYl.GT.XF.AND.XF.GT.Xll GO TO 513 
2~J ~·u 
294 GO 10 6000 
295 126 IFCXF.EQ.Xll GO TO 514 
296 IFCXL.EY.YJl GO TO 514 
297 
29El 
299 
800 
!FIY!.GT.XL.AND.Xl.LT.XFI GO TO ~01 
IFCXI.LT.XF.AND.Yl.LT.XLI GO TO 502 
IFIXl.GT.XF.AND.Yl.GT.XLl GO TO 503 
301 GO TO 6000 
302 ~12 ic~1o 
303 XF=Xl 
304 X1=0 
3oJ Yt~o 
306 l~IJ~.LT.NUMI GO TO 601 
307 P=ABSIXL-XFI/180.00 
308 C~LL WEIGHT (JC,NUM.IZI 
309 GO TO 500 
310 513 IC=11 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 
319 
320 
321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331--
332 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
338 
339 
340 
341 
342 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
349 
350 
351 
352 
353 
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
359 
360 
361 
362 
363 
364 
365 
366 
367 
368 
369 
370 
371 
372 
373 
374 
375 
376 
377 
378 
XL=\'1 
}(1 =0 
y 1 =0 
IFIJ2.LT.NUMI GO TO 601 
P=ABSIXL-XFI/180.00 
CALL WEIGHT IIC.NUM,IZI 
GO TO 500 
501 IC=l2 
Xl=O 
Yl=O 
IFIJZ.LT.NUMI GO TO 601 
P=A8S((360.00-XFI+XLI/180.00 
CALL WEIGHT IIC,NUM,IZI 
GO TO 500 
502 IC=l3 
XL=Yl 
Xl=O 
Y1=0 
IFIJZ.LT.NUM) GO TO 601 
P=ABSII~bO.OO-XFI+XLl/180.00 
~-CALL WEIGHT CIC.NUM~IZl 
GO TO 500 
503 IC=l4 
XF=X1 
Yl=O 
IFIJ2.LT.NUMI GO TO 601 
P=ABSII360.00-XFl+XLI/180.00 
CALL WEIGHT IIC,NUM,!Zl 
GO TO 500 
514 IC=l4 
Xl=O 
\'1=0 
IFIJZ.LT.NUMI GO TO 601 
P=ABSI(360.00-XFI+XLl/180.00 
CALL WEIGHT IIC,NUM,IZI 
GO TO 500 
6000 HRITE(6,7000lP 
7000 FORMAT16X,F8.31 
GO TO 601 
500 KB=KB+l 
DO 23 KA=1,NUM 
23 JT<KB,KA>~JJIKAI 
IFINUM.LT.IZIGO TO 40 
IF<P.EG.OlGO TO 40 
P=P/2.0 
KKB=KKB+l 
DO 777 KAA=l,NUM 
IDD=NUM+l-KAA 
IMPIKK8,IDDI=JJIKAAI 
777 CONTINUE 
IPP=IPPvl 
PPP<IPPI=P 
WRITE(6,905)T,IT,P 
HRITE16,904l(JJ(LJ,L=I,NUMJ 
WRITE(6,907JITJMILMl.LM=l.NUMl 
IFIAC.EQ.OJGO TO 40 
WRITE(6,9031P,IC,XF,XL,Xl,Yl 
40 IFIIIP.LT.KKG>GO TO 50 
66 DO 21 IK=l ,KB 
IF!NUM.EQ.IZIGO TO 50 
DO 22 KA=1,NUM 
22 JLIIK,KAl=JTIJK,KAI 
21 CONTINUE 
N~l=NN+ l 
K=KB 
CALL PERMUT IK.NN,NMI 
NUM=NUM+1 
"'-1/'0.>l.hlll"" 
J80 NN=Ni~~l 
381 GO TO 33 
382 50 CONTINUE 
333 P=O 
J~~ DU )112 IK~=l,KK8 
305 DO 7773 JJI=l,NUM 
386 JJ(JJil=IMPIIKP,JJIJ 
387 7773 CONTINUE 
388 CALL W~IGHTCIC,NUM.IZl 
389 JPP~JPP~l 
390 P=PPPIJPPl 
391 WRITE(6,905JT,IT,P 
392 WRITE(6,904liJJILl.L=l,NUMi 
393 WRITE16.9071CTJMCLMJ.LM=l,NUMI 
394 IFIAC.EQ.OlGO TO 999 
395 WRITEC6,903)P,IC,XF,XL.Xl,Vl 
J~6 99~ IFCIKP.E8.KKBIGO TO 9991 
397 P=O 
393 7772 CO~TINUE 
399 990 FORMAT(//,4X,6H I=UPN,ZX.7H 2=GNPP,2X,6H 3=NPP,2Xo6H 4=PRP, 
400 1 2X,6H 5=N?N,//l 
401 906 FORMATI3X.F10.6,2X.FL0.6.2XoF10.61 
402 905 FORMAT(/,2X.F7.3,2X,I3.F10.61 
403 904 FORMATI4X,15I71 
404 907 FORMATI4X,15F7.31 
405 903 FORMATI1H ,1X.Fl0.6,J3,1X.F10.6.2X.F10.6.2X,F2.1.2X.F2.11 
406 900 FORMAT(/,1H .2X.F10.6,2X,F10.6l 
407 350 FO~MATI12X.4I2.10X,4I2l 
408 901 FORMATI/olH ,JX,FS.3.2X,F8.3,4X,F8.3,1X,F8.31 
409 902 FORMATClH olX.F10.6,2X,Fl0.6,3X.F10.6.2K,F10.6l 
410 9991 STOP 
411 END 
412 c 
413 c 
414 C SUBROUTINE FOR CARRYING OUT THE PERMUTATION EXERCISE. 
415 c 
416 c 
417 SUBROUTINE PERMUT IK,NNrNMI 
418 COMMON IX/ JL15000,251 
419 COMroON /Y/ JTI5000.25l 
420 
421 
422 
423 
424 
425 
DO 22 KT"1oK 
DO 16 KM=1,NN 
16 JTIKT,KM);JLIKT,KMl 
JTIKT,NMI=NM 
22 CONTINUE 
KP=O 
426 DO 27 ~C=l,K 
427 DO 17 KM=1,NM 
428 IFCKM.£Q.11GO TO 19 
429 K2=JTIKC.NM-KM+ll 
430 JTIKC,NM-KM~1l=JTIKC,NM+2-KMI 
431 JTIKC,NM+2-KMI=K2 
432 19 CONTINUE 
433 KP,KP+l 
434 DO 18 KS=l,NM 
435 18 JL<KP,KSl=JT<KC,KSI 
436 IF!KM.LT.NMI GO TO 17 
437 17 CONTINUE 
438 27 CONTINUE 
439 RETURN 
440 END 
441 c 
442 c 
443 C SUBROUTINE FOR ATTACHING WEIGHTS TO THE 
444 C PARTICIPATING PARTIES OR GROUPS ACCORDING 
445 C TO THE EXACT NUMBER OF PLAYERS THE PARTY 
446 C OR GROUP HAS. 
447 c 
448 c 
449 SUBROUTINE WEIGHT !IC.NUM,IZl 
450 DIMENSION JJ!ZSl,JF<25l,TJMC251 
451 COMMON /K/ JLI5000.25l 
452 COMMON /Y/ JTI5000.251 
453 COMMON /W/ ITP<2600r10) 
454 COMMON /P/ IMPC2600,101 
455 COMMON /Z/ JJ,JF,TJM 
456 COMMON /V/ T.IT 
457 DO 31 LM=1,NUM 
458 31 JFILMI=JJCLM) 
459 DO 4 LM=l,NUM 
460 IFIJFILMl.EG.1lTJMILMl=O.OOO 
461 IFIJFILMl.EQ.2)TJMILM)=O.OOO 
462 IFIJFILMl.EG.3lTJMILMl=O.OOO 
463 IFIJF!LMI.EG.41TJMILMl"O.OOO 
464 IFIJFILMI.EG.51TJM!LMI=O.OO 
465 IFIJF<LMI.EG.61TJMCLM>=O.OOO 
466 IFIJFILMl.EG.7lTJMILMl•O.OOO 
467 IF!JFILMI.EQ.SlTJM!LM)=O,OOOO 
468 IF<JFILMl.EG.9lTJMILMI=O.OOOO 
469 IFIJFILMl.EG.lOITJMILMI=O.OOOO 
470 IF!JF<LMl.EG.lLITJM<LMI=O.OOOO 
471 IF<JF!LMI.EQ.121TJ~!LMl=O.OOOO 
472 IFIJFCLMI.EG.13)TJMILMl=O.OOOO 
473 IF<JF!LMl.EG.14lTJMILMI=O.OOOO 
474 IFIJFILMl.EQ,lSlTJMILMJ=O.OOOO 
TC"t CC'fl M\ r:'n 1L'T IM/1 M\-1i liili••"" 
1":·7S 
/).77 
~·IC 
Ll/9 
r,t;;; 
.J';.C ~ 
Ll82 
08::i 
484 
~85" 
486 
487 
488 
.1!89 
~90 
~-91 
£.•]:: 
!:.?3 
f"..9/; 
<·'1J 
·~96 
~-97 
490 
».-99 
500 
-
of 
IG ,_ 
f' i 1 ~ 
zr·.:J:-=-~Li~i) ·::Gl J/) J~·~(Li'l>=o.nuuu 
~FrJF~Lti}.E0 .. .J.8) J:,{Llfi)=O.c)...:.OO 
:F: JF(L;··;;. ~L:ln i"i• J Jt~: (,_!'1} =~·~ ,uc,,·,n 
.:1- (.Jr.; l_;c;) .. EO .20) Jc, It 1'1 l =U.OCGO 
:: r t J ; ( ... :~: } , .• :. G , :: i. ' J .·~ ( ! 1 ·I 1 = 11 . · , n 11 n 
I F : ..J F < L 1··; : " E t3 ., ;::. ~: ) T J ~~ ( L !'! i = 0 o 1.-d_) 0 0 
!F( Jf--(;_i~<;) .EG~23J J • ...ll·,tli ... J) =0.0(•00 
~ .' I J F ( :...i: i • EGJ. 20 T Ji-; ( 1-i·i l =-0. 8000 
IFIJFILMl.E0.25lYJMILMl=O.OuOO 
!FI )Fr: ~ll.Ff.1.26lTJf·IILI'il=O.OOO 
IFIJFILMl.E0.271TJMILMI=O.OOO 
IFIJFILMl.EQ.28lTJMIL~l=O.OOO 
IFIJFILMl.E3.29lT~MIL~l=O.OOO 
L!- CONTII~UE 
AVE=O 
flO 5 LM=!. ,i'WH 
:':'.IE· T Jfi ( L\1 l -:-At: 
IFIAVE.L;.u.uO lGO TJ ~ 
IFCruUM.LT.IZlG TO 6 
T~f.lv:: 
IT=-JF I Ul l 
GO "10 6 
01 CONTINUC 
6 RETL::~~I 
f::ii!:J 
L2 03:13:35 to 03:49:13 Sat 10-SeP-83 
~j 1. 47 
351.55 
11 diGcan~cctGd-
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> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
PROBABILITY THAT ANY TWO PARTIES WILL VOTE 
TOGETHER ON ONE SIDE. THE RESULT !S THEN 
USED BY THE NEXT PROG. FOR FINAL CALCULATIONS OF THE mi's. 
DIMENSION A< 100 l ,B ( 100) ,C < 100 l ,DC 100 l, E < 100 l 
1\=0 
CC1=0.0 
CC2=0.0 
CC3=0.0 
CC4=0.0 
CC5=0.0 
CC6=0.0 
CC7=0.0 
CC8=0.0 
CC9=0.0 
CBl=O.O 
WRITEC6, 15) 
7 DO 1 I= 1 , 1 00 
111 
222 
IFCK.EQ.il GO TO 222 
IFCI.GT.ll GO TO 111 
READCS,10lACIJ,BCIJ,CCIJ,DCII,ECII 
GO TO 222 
READCS,lOOlA<I>,B<IJ,CCIJ,DCIJ,ECil 
IFCK.EQ.il GO TO 80 
AA1=2.0•ACII•BCIJ+l.O-ACil-B<Il 
AA2=Z.O•ACIJ•C<Il+l.O-ACII-CCIJ 
AA3=2.0•ACil*D<II+1.0-ACIJ-DCil 
AA4=Z.O•ACIJ•E<Il+1.0-ACIJ-EIII 
AA5=Z.O•B<Il•CCIJ+1.0-BIII-CCIJ 
IFCK.EQ.OI GO TO 9 
80 AA6=2.0•B<I>•D<Il+1.0-BCII-D<I> 
AA7=2.0•BCII*EIII+1.0-81Il-ECil 
AA8=2.0•CCIJ•D<Il+1.0-CCIJ-D<Il 
AA9=2.0•C<I>•Eill+1.0-CCII-EIII 
AB1=2.0•DCII*ECIJ+l.O-DCIJ-EIII 
IF<K.EQ.ll GO TO 70 
9 CC1=CC1+AA1 
CC2=CC2+AA2 
CC3=CC3+AA3 
CC4=CC4+AA4 
... >- ·- --45-------- - GC5c--C.C~+--AA5-
IF<K.EQ.OI GO TO 91 > 
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> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 
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) 
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> 
> 
) 
) 
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> 
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) 
l 
> 
) 
> 
> 
> 
> 
#End 
(j 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
of file 
70 CC6=CC6+AA6 
CC7=CC7+AA7 
CC8=CC8+AA8 
CC9==CC9+AA9 
CB1=CB1+AB1 
IFCK.EG.ll GO TO 94 
91 WRITEC6,11JAIIlrBIIJ,AA1,AIIJ,CIIJ,AA2,ACIJ,DCIJ,AA3, 
1 A< I) , E (I l , AA4, B <I> , C <I J , AAS 
GO TO 1 
94 WRITEC6r11lB<I>.D<IlrAA6,BCIJ,E<IlrAA7,CCilrDCilr 
1 AA8, C <I l , E C I l , AA9, D < I > , E ( I) , AB 1 
1 CONTINUE 
IF<K.EG.il GO TO 96 
DDl=CCl/100.0 
DDZ=CCZ/100.0 
DD3=CC3/100.0 
DD4=CC4/100.0 
DD5=CC5/100.0 
WRITE(6,13JCC1,DD1,CC2,DD2,CC3,DD3.CC4,DD4,CCS,DD5 
IFCK.EQ.OI GO TO 93 
96 DD6=CC6/100.0 
DD7=CC7/100.0 
DDB=CCB/100.0 
DD9=CC9/100.0 
DBl=CBl/100.0 
WRITE(6,131CC6,DD6,CC7,DD7,CC8,DDB,CC9,DD9,CB1rDB1 
IFCK.EQ.l) GO TO 333 
10 FORMATC////,8X,F5.3,8X,FS.3.8X,F5.3,8X,F5.3,8X,FS.3l 
100 FORMAT(///,8X,FS.3,8X.FS.3,8X,F5.3,8X,F5.3,8X,F5.3l 
15 FORMAT<3Xr15H NPN AND UPN > 
11 FORMAT<F5.3,1X,F5.3.1X,F5.3,2X,F5.3,1X,F5.3,1XrF5.3,2X, 
1 F5.3,1X,FS.3,1XrFS.3,2X,F5.3,1X.FS.3,1XrFS.3,2Xr 
1 F5.3,1X,F5.3,1XrF5.3rZX> 
13 FORMATC//,F7.3,2X,F7.3,3X,F7.3,2X.F7.3,3X,F7.3,ZX,F7.3,3X, 
1 F7.3r2X,F7.3,3X.F7.3,2X,F7.3,//J 
93 K=K+1 
GO TO 7 
333 STOP 
END 
M!J 
CONSTRAINED LEAST SQUARES MINISATION PROGRAM 
LiST VOTS2 
> 1 c 
> 2 c 
> 3 c 
> 4 c 
> 5 c 
> 6 c 
> 7 c 
> 8 c 
> 9 
> 10 
) 11 
> 12 
> 13 
> 14 c 
) 15 
) 16 
> 17 
> 18 
> 19 
> 20 
> 21 
> 22 
> 23 
> 24 
> 25 
> 26 
> 27 
> 28 
> 29 
30 
31 20 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
32 99998 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
hlEnd 
() 
33 99997 
34 99996 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
of file? 
THIS PROG. CALCULATES THE ~i's WHICH ARE 
THE OVER ALL PROBABILITY MEASURE OF ASSOCiATION 
BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS i.e. THE PROBABILITY 
THAT ALL THE PARTIES WILL VOTE TOGETHER ON ONE SIDE. 
IMPLICIT REAL*B<A-H,O-Zl 
DIMENSION BLC5l.BUCSI,WC70l,XC51 
INTEGER IBOUNDriFAIL,JrLIW,LWrNrNOUT 
INTEGER IWC7l 
N=S 
INITIAL GUESSES ARE MADE W.R.T. THE FUNCTION VALUES ON EXIT. 
Xlll=<INITIAL GUESS> 
X<Z>= 
Xl31= 
Xl41= 
X<S>= 
IBOUND=3 
BUC1l=1.0 
BL< ll =0.0 
LIW=7 
LW=70 
IFAIL=1 
CALL E04JAFCN,IBOUND,BL,BU,X,F,7,LIW,W,LW,IFAILl 
IFCIFAIL.NE.OIWRITE<6.99998JIFAIL 
IF<IFAIL.EG.llGO TO 20 
WRITE<6.999971F 
WRITEI6,99996liXIJl,J=1,Nl 
STOP 
FORMATC//,16H ERROR EXIT TYPE,I31 
FORMATC//,27H FUNCTION VALUE ON EXIT IS,F8.4l 
FORMATC13H AT THE POINT,SF9.4l 
END 
SUBROUTINE FUNCTlCN,XC,FCl 
IMPLICIT REAL*B<A-H,O-ZI 
DIMENSION XCCSJ 
INTEGER N 
N=S 
Xl=XCCll 
X2=XC<2l 
X3=XCC31 
X4=XCC4l 
X5=XC<SI 
FC=CC~.143-l+X1+W2-20X1•X2>••21 
1 + <<0.545-l+Xl+X3-2oXl•X3l••2l 
1 + <<0.526-1+Xl+X4-Z•X1*X4l**Zl 
1 + <<0.635-1+X1+X5-2oX1*X51**2l 
1 + <<0.542-1+XZ+X3-2•X2•X310*Zl 
1 + CC0.625-l+X2+X4-2oX2oX41**2l 
1 + <I0.520-1+X2+X5-2*XZ*X51**21 
1 + CC0.608-1+X3+X4-2oX3•X4>**21 
1 + CC0.594-l+X3+X5-20X3oX51**2l 
1 + CC0.789-1+X4+X5-2*X4•XSI•oZ> 
RETURN 
END 
ror 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
10 
'0 
SAMPLE OUT=PUT VOTING SI~~ULATION 
THIS IS A SAI1PLE OUl==PUT FROM THE Slt'IULA-t !ON PfiOGI~AM. 
THE FIRST SET OF NUMBERS ARE THE GIVEN a1's.<THESE ARE 
RECORDEn rn~LY ONCE> THEY ARE FOLLOWED BY THE EXACT 
NIIMBEfiS FROM EACH PARTY THAT VOT::::D ::::ITHER YES OR NO. 
NEXT TO THESE ARE THE PROPORTIONS THAT VOTED EITHER WAY. 
THESE ARE FOLLOWED BY THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY EACH 
PARTY TO THAT PARTICULAR MINIMAL WINNING COALITION. 
YN ORDER TO SAVE SPACE VOTING SITUATIONS ARE RECORDED 
AFTER EVERY TEN MINIMAL WINNING COALITIONS.THE FINAL 
SET OF NlJMBERS J.IHHIN EACH SET OF TEN MINH1AL HINNII\:G 
COALITION~ IS THE VALUE CALCULATED. A SUMMARY OF TKESE 
VALUES WITH THE ASSOCIATED VALUES CALCULATED FOR 7HE 
VOTING SYSTEM CAN BE FOUND AT THE END OF THE SIMULATION 
EXERCISE.<WE NOTE THAT ONLY 2000 VOTING SITUATIONS WERE SIMULATED.> 
NPN UPN NPP PRP GNPP 
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
o.aso 0.010 0.480 0.500 0.530 
32 5 0 28 a 7 5 3 3 4 
0.86 o. 14 0.0 1.00 0.53 0.47 0.63 0.38 0.43 0.57 
.667 .o .167 .104 .063 
0.310 0.350 0.167 0.094 0.079 
32 5 0 28 8 7 3 5 5 2 
0.86 0.14 o.o l.OO 0.53 0.47 0.38 0.63 0.71 0.29 
.667 .o .167 .063 .104 
0.281 0.408 0.150 0.083 0.077 
34 3 0 28 8 7 3 5 3 4 
0.92 o.oa 0.0 1.00 0.53 0.47 0.38 0.63 0.43 0.57 
.708 .o .167 .063 .063 
0.269 0.402 0.158 0.085 o.oas 
28 9 0 28 12 3 5 3 3 4 
. o. 76 0.24 o.o l.OO 0.80 0.20 0.63 0.38 0.43 0.57 
.583 .o .250 .104 .063 
0.427 0.233 0.169 0.081 0.090 
34 3 0 28 6 9 3 5 4 3 
0.92 0.08 o.o 1.00 0.40 0.60 0.38 0.63 0.57 0.43 
.063 .583 .188 .104 .063 
0.229 0.462 0.173 0.071 0.065 
32 5 0 28 6 9 5 3 4 3 
0.86 0.14 0.0 1.00 0.40 0.61) 0.63 0.38 0.57 0.43 
.104 .583 .188 .063 .063 
0.496 0.175 0.158 0.083 0.087 
31 6 0 28 9 6 4 4 3 4 
0.64 0.16 0.0 1.00 0.60 0.40 0.50 o.so 0.43 0.57 
.125 .583 .125 .083 .083 
0.379 0.298 0.162 0.075 o.oss 
33 4 0 28 6 9 6 2 3 4 
0.89 0.11 0.0 1.00 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.25 0.43 0.57 
.688 .o .125 .12S .063 
0.327 0.350 I). 1 56 0.085 1).081 
33 4 0 28 7 8 4 4 3 4 
0.89 0.11 o.o 1.00 0.47 O.S3 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.57 
.083 .S83 .167 .083 .083 
0.435 0.231 0.167 0.098 0.069 
YES=~B N0=47 
YES=Lb8 NO=Lb7 
YES=48 C\l0=47 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=47 N0=46l 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=48 N0=47 
YE5=47 N0=48 
J\.J ,.j..j 4 
Oo89 0,11 
o688 
lO 33 4 
1).89 Ooll 
o688 
0.277 
~0 33 4 
0,89 0.11 
o688 
Oo608 
0 31 6 
Oo84 Ool6 
.125 
0.400 
0 34 3 
0.92 0.08 
.708 
0.412 
0 35 2 
0.95 0.05 
.729 
0.398 
) 34 3 
0.92 0.08 
.708 
0.515 
30 7 
0.81 0.19 
. 146 
0.242 
33 4 
0.89 0.11 
.083 
0.365 
33 4 
0.89 0.11 
.688 
0.390 
31 6 
0.84 0.16 
.646 
0.323 
32 5 
0.86 0.14 
.667 
0.548 
34 3 
0.92 0.08 
.063 
0.400 
27 
<).04 0.96 
.021 
0.354 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
oO 
0.406 
0 28 
OoO 1.00 
.0 
0.062 
1 27 
0.04 0.96 
.563 
0.296 
0 28 
o. 0 l 0 00 
.0 
0.292 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.0 
0.294 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.0 
o. 175 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.583 
0.465 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.583 
0.290 
I) 28 
o.o 1.00 
.o 
0.287 
I) 28 
o.o 1.00 
.o 
0.348 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.o 
0.115 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.583 
0.294 
0.33 0.67 
.104 
1), 140 
6 9 
O.iiO 0.60 
.125 
0.165 
7 8 
0.47 0.53 
.146 
o. 154 
8 7 
0.53 0.47 
.146 
Oo 162 
6 9 
0.40 0.60 
.125 
I). 156 
7 8 
0.47 0.53 
.146 
0.144 
7 8 
0.47 0.53 
.146 
0.154 
9 6 
0.60 0.40 
o125 
0.144 
6 9 
0.4(1 0.60 
.188 
0. 181 
8 7 
0.53 0.47 
.167 
I). 171 
9 6 
0.60 0.40 
.188 
0.169 
8 7 
0.53 0.47 
.167 
0.162 
8 7 
0.53 0.47 
.146 
0.160 
6 2 
0.75 0.25 
. 1.25 
Oo092 
7 1 
0.88 0.13 
.14A 
0.087 
3 5 
0.38 Oo63 
.063 
Oo094 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
o063 
Oo075 
5 3 
Oo63 0.38 
.104 
0.081 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.104 
0.092 
2 6 
0.25 0.75 
.042 
0.083 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.063 
0.081 
4 4 
Oo50 0.50 
.083 
0.083 
!::> "' 0.63 0.38 
.104 
0.081 
4 4 
0.50 Oo50 
.083 
Oo079 
2 6 
0.25 0.75 
.042 
0.094 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.063 
0.075 
3 
0.43 
.063 
2 5 
Oo29 0,71 
11042 
0.065 
5 2 
Oo 71 Oo29 
ol04 
2 5 
0.29 Oo7l 
.104 
Oo067 
YES=48 NlJ=L.'7 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES'-'48 N0=47 
YES=47 N0=48 
3 4 r: YES=48 N0=47 
0.43 Oo57 
.063 
0.058 
1• 6 
0.14 Oo86 
.021 
0.073 
5 2 
0.71 0.29 
.104 
0.073 
3 4 
Oo43 1).57 
.083 
0.069 
t!· 3 
0.57 0.43 
.063 
0.081 
2 5 
0.29 0.71 
.042 
0.071 
4 3 
0.57 0.43 
.083 
0.081 
6 l 
0.86 0.14 
.125 
0.081 
0 7 
o.o 1.00 
• 146 
0.071 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=47 N0=48 
0. 86 1). 14 
.667 
0.435 
0 31 6 
0.84 0.16 
.125 
0.333 
j 33 4 
0.89 0.11 
.688 
0,452 
) 28 9 
0.76 0.24 
n) 88 
0.398 
) 34 3 
0.92 0.08 
.708 
0.369 
30 7 
0.81 0.19 
.146 
0.400 
32 5 
t). 86 0. 14 
• 104 
0.308 
32 5 
0.86 0.14 
.667 
0.456 
33 4 
0.89 0.11 
.083 
0.450 
34 3 
0.92 0.08 
.708 
0.335 
33 4 
0.89 0.11 
.688 
0.535 
31 6 
0.84 0.16 
.125 
0.331 
32 5 
o. 86 0.14 
.667 
0.346 
31 6 
0.84 0.16 
.125 
0.0 
.0 
1. 0;) 
() 
0.21l2 
2 26 
0.07· 0.93 
.542 
. 0.3LI6 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.0 
0.229 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.583 
0.296 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.0 
0.294 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.583 
0.292 
1 27 
0.04 0.96 
.563 
0.344 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.o 
0.233 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.583 
0.233 
0 28 
o.o 1.00 
.0 
0.346 
27 
0.04 0.96 
.021 
0.121 
3 25 
o. 11 0.89 
.521 
0.346 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.o 
0.350 
0 28 
0.0 1.00 
.583 
0.53 0.47 
.167 
7 8 
0.47 0.53 
.167 
I). 150 
10 5 
0.67 0.33 
.208 
o. 175 
8 7 
0.53 0.47 
.146 
o. 144 
6 9 
0.40 0.60 
.125 
0.162 
7 8 
0.47 0.53 
.167 
0.158 
5 10 
0.33 0.67 
.208 
0.194 
6 9 
0.40 0.60 
.125 
o. 154 
6 9 
0.40 0.60 
.188 
o. 152 
7 8 
0.47 0.53 
.146 
0.158 
5 10 
0.33 0.67 
.104 
0.154 
5 10 
0.33 0.67 
.208 
0. 175 
5 10 
0.33 0.67 
.104 
0.169 
6 9 
0.40 0.60 
.188 
0.2:5 0.75 
.042 
0.085 
4 4 
0.50 0.50 
.083 
0.092 
2 6 
0.25 0.75 
.042 
0.073 
6 2 
0.75 0.25 
.042 
0.096 
4 4 
0.50 0.50 
.083 
0.090 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.063 
0.081 
4 4 
0.50 0.50 
.083 
0.081 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.104 
0.081 
6 2 
0.75 0.25 
.042 
0.092 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.104 
0.085 
3 5 
0.38 0.63 
.063 
0.096 
4 4 
0.50 0.50 
.083 
0.079 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.104 
0.058 
5 3 
0.63 0.38 
.063 
0.86 0.14 
.. 125 
3 4 
0.43 0.57 
.083 
0.079 
3 4 
0.43 0.57 
.063 
O.C71 
5 2 
0.71 0.29 
.042 
0.067 
4 3 
0.57 0.43 
.083 
0.085 
5 2 
0.71 0.29 
.042 
0.069 
5 2 
0.71 0.29 
.042 
0.073 
5 2 
0.71 0.29 
.104 
0.075 
2 5 
0.29 0.71 
.104 
0.073 
2 5 
0.29 0.71 
.042 
0.075 
6 1 
0.86 0.14 
.125 
0.094 
4 3 
0.57 0.43 
.063 
0.069 
6 1 
0.86 0. 14 
.125 
0.077 
5 2 
0.71 0.29 
.042 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=48 NQ;::47 
YE5"'47 N0=48 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=48 NQ;::47 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES;::48 N0=47 
YE5"'48 N0=47 
YES=47 N0=48 
YES=48 N0=47 
YES=47 N0=48 
- -~ --- ---~-- - --
_-_:_ __ . ___ 
----
0.452 0.237 ;) . 150 0.079 0.081 
0 34 3 1 27 5 JO l. 7 7 0 YES=48 N0=47 
0.92 0.08 0.04 0.96 0.33 0.67 o. 13 0.88 1 . :)0 o.o 
.708 .021 .104 .021 .146 
0.294 0.408 0.142 0.079 0.077 
0 35 2 3 25 6 9 ,, '- 6 2 5 YES=48 N0=47 
0.95 0.05 0.11 0.89 0.40 0.60 0.25 0.75 0.29 0.71 
.729 .063 .125 .042 .042 
0.550 0.133 0.11.!4 0.090 0.079 
0 32 5 0 28 9 6 5 3 2 5 YES=48 1\!0=47 
0.86 0.14 0.0 1.00 0.60 0.40 0.63 0.38 0.29 0.71. 
.667 .o .188 .104 .042 
0.379 0.294 0.158 0.100 0.069 
:_') 31 6 0 28 10 5 4 4 3 4 YES=48 N0=47 
0.84 0.16 o.o l. 00 0.67 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.57 
.646 .0 .208 .083 .063 
0.258 0.410 0.175 0.090 0.067 
) 31 6 0 28 7 B 6 2 3 4 YES=47 N0=48 
0.84 o. 16 o.o 1.00 0.47 0.53 0.75 0.25 0.43 0.57 
.125 .583 .167 .042 .083 
0.375 0.296 0.171 0.079 0.079 
33 4 0 28 10 5 1 7 4 3 YES=48 N0=47 
0.89 0. 11 0.0 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.13 0.88 0.57 0.43 
.688 .o .208 .021 .083 
0.275 0.406 0.169 0.077 0.073 
0.310 0.350 0.167 0.094 1).079 
2 0.281 0.408 0.150 0.083 0.077 
3 0.269 0.402 0.158 0.085 ·o.o85 
4 0.427 0.233 0.169 0.081 0.090 
5 0.229 0.462 0.173 0.071 0.065 
6 0.496 0.175 0. 158 0.083 0.087 
7 0.379 0.298 0.162 0.075 0.085 
8 0.327 0.350 0.156 0.085 0.081 
9 0.435 0.231 0.167 0.098 0.(169 
lO- 0-.-3-35- 0. 3:54-- 0.140·- 0.092 -0.079 ~··------
L 1 0.277 0.406 0.165 0.087 0.065 
L2 0.608 0.062 0.154 0.094 0.081 
L3 0.400 0.296 0.162 0.075 0.067 
14 0.412 0.292 0.156 0.081 0.058 
l5 0.398 0.294 0.144 0.092 0.073 
l6 0.515 0.175 0.154 0.083 0.073 
L7 0.242 0.465 0.144 0.081 0.069 
L8 0.365 0.290 0.181 0.083 0.081 
l9 0.390 0.287 0. 171 0.081 0.071 
w 0.323 0.348 0.169 0.079 0.081 
~1 0.548 0.115 0.162 0.094 0.081 
~2 0.400 0.294 0.160 0.075 0.071 
~3 0.435 0.242 0.162 0.085 0.075 
~4 0.333 0.346 I). 150 0.092 0.079 
~5 0.452 0.229 0.175 0.073 0.071 
~6 0.398 0.296 0.144 0.096 0.067 
~7 0.369 0.294 0.162 0.090 0.085 
~8 0.400 0.292 0.158 0.081 0.069 
~9 0.308 0.344 0.194 0.081 0.073 
30 0.456 0.233 0.154 0.081 0.075 
31 0.450 0.233 0. 152 0.092 0.073 
32 0.335 0.346 0.158 0.085 0.075 
33 0.535 o. 121 0.154 0.096 0.094 
34 0.331 0.346 0.175 0.079 0.069 
35 0.346 0.350 0.169 0.058 0.077 
36 0.452 0.237 0.150 0.079 0.081 
37 0.294 0.408 0.142 0.079 0.077 
38 0.554 0. 133 0. 144 0.090 0.079 
39 0.379 0.294 0. 158 0.100 0.069 
~0 0.258 0.410 0.175 0.090 0.067 
H 0.375 0.296 o. 171 0.079 0.079 
~2 0.275 0.406 o. 169 0.077 0.073 
).383433 0.296280 0.160466 0.084226 0.075595 
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